Jianhua Huang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Jianhua Huang has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Liping Zhang
School of Economics and Trade, Fujian Jiangxia University, Fuzhou 350108, China
1 shared publication - Ruihan Liu
School of Economics and Management Fuzhou University Fuzhou 350108 China
1 shared publication Tingting Zhang
School of Economics and Management Fuzhou University Fuzhou 350108 China
1 shared publication- Wei Li
School of Economics and Management, Taiyuan University of Technology, Taiyuan 030024, China
1 shared publication - Wenhai Qiu
School of Information Engineering, Fujian Business University, Fuzhou 350012, China
1 shared publication - Xueping Wu
School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 28 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- p. 1-32
Selecting an optimal alternative: a multi-criteria decision-making approach with cloud distance and prospect theory
- 28 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- p. 1-32
Selecting an optimal alternative: a multi-criteria decision-making approach with cloud distance and prospect theory
- 25 July 2023
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 32 (3) , 1792-1815
A tripartite evolutionary game model of ginger transaction under the “regulation + target price insurance ” policy
This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, dealers, and ginger farmers under asymmetric price transmission and explores the impact of the target price insurance on the stabilization strategy of the tripartite evolutionary game. It is also demonstrated that farmers’ interests can be effectively protected under long‐term government regulation and issuance of reasonable insurance subsidy coefficients. Finally, the model is assigned according to the actual data to systematically reveal the factors affecting the decision of each actor. The research shows that: long‐term government regulation is necessary to effectively curb speculation, while the implementation of target price insurance can improve farmers’ trading position; the probability of government regulation and implementation is not only related to the cost and social benefits but also influenced by ginger trading volume, while the probability of ginger dealers choosing to hoard speculation increases with the increase of ginger trading volume.
- 25 July 2023
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 32 (3) , 1792-1815
A tripartite evolutionary game model of ginger transaction under the “regulation + target price insurance ” policy
This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, dealers, and ginger farmers under asymmetric price transmission and explores the impact of the target price insurance on the stabilization strategy of the tripartite evolutionary game. It is also demonstrated that farmers’ interests can be effectively protected under long‐term government regulation and issuance of reasonable insurance subsidy coefficients. Finally, the model is assigned according to the actual data to systematically reveal the factors affecting the decision of each actor. The research shows that: long‐term government regulation is necessary to effectively curb speculation, while the implementation of target price insurance can improve farmers’ trading position; the probability of government regulation and implementation is not only related to the cost and social benefits but also influenced by ginger trading volume, while the probability of ginger dealers choosing to hoard speculation increases with the increase of ginger trading volume.
- Open Access
- 15 October 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 13 (20) , 11421
Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Government and Residents in Municipal Household Waste Separation
Municipal household waste (MHW) separation is a fundamental way to achieve waste reduction and a recycling economy. This study takes the positions of government and residents in MHW separation as the research object, and aims to explore the change process and influencing factors of their decision-making behavior, which is of great significance to attract residents to participate in MHW separation and establish an effective MHW separation mechanism to solve MHW pollution. This paper firstly establishes an evolutionary game model between government and residents in MHW separation; secondly, the payoff matrix of the system is determined, and the replication dynamic equations under different constraints are calculated to obtain the evolutionary stability strategy of the system, and the stability conditions are analyzed; Finally, through numerical simulation, the decision-making behavior of MHW separation and its influencing factors are studied, and the rationality of the model is verified. The results show that: (1) In the process of MHW separation, residents often choose not to separate without government regulation; (2) Environmental fee rates and government effort have great impacts on residents’ decision-making behavior; (3) The increase of penalty intensity can significantly drive residents to separate MHW; (4) The sensitivity of residents’ behavior decision to subsidy coefficient is the lowest among all the variables, and the incentive effect of increasing subsidy coefficient is not obvious. The research results can not only provide theoretical guidance for policy makers to develop waste management policies, but also provide valuable insights for local communities to guide residents’ MHW separation behavior.
- 15 October 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 13 (20) , 11421
Open AccessEvolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Government and Residents in Municipal Household Waste Separation
Municipal household waste (MHW) separation is a fundamental way to achieve waste reduction and a recycling economy. This study takes the positions of government and residents in MHW separation as the research object, and aims to explore the change process and influencing factors of their decision-making behavior, which is of great significance to attract residents to participate in MHW separation and establish an effective MHW separation mechanism to solve MHW pollution. This paper firstly establishes an evolutionary game model between government and residents in MHW separation; secondly, the payoff matrix of the system is determined, and the replication dynamic equations under different constraints are calculated to obtain the evolutionary stability strategy of the system, and the stability conditions are analyzed; Finally, through numerical simulation, the decision-making behavior of MHW separation and its influencing factors are studied, and the rationality of the model is verified. The results show that: (1) In the process of MHW separation, residents often choose not to separate without government regulation; (2) Environmental fee rates and government effort have great impacts on residents’ decision-making behavior; (3) The increase of penalty intensity can significantly drive residents to separate MHW; (4) The sensitivity of residents’ behavior decision to subsidy coefficient is the lowest among all the variables, and the incentive effect of increasing subsidy coefficient is not obvious. The research results can not only provide theoretical guidance for policy makers to develop waste management policies, but also provide valuable insights for local communities to guide residents’ MHW separation behavior.