PZPengwei Zhan

Pengwei Zhan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Pengwei Zhan has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Uncovering the App Cloud Access Risks under Recommended IAM Security Practices

    by Hengtong Lu, Yan Zhang, Qingfeng Tang, Pengwei Zhan

    The rapid development of mobile applications and cloud computing has led to the widespread adoption of cloud service platforms for mobile backend services. However, improper use of cloud credentials has frequently resulted in the leakage of application data on cloud servers. Despite security recommendations from cloud service providers, vulnerabilities persist. To assess the effectiveness of these measures, we propose a detection system to identify cloud credential leaks in mobile applications, including hard-coded credentials and those stored on servers. We analyzed 21,724 applications from Google Play and one Chinese market, revealing new attacks triggered by stolen cloud credentials. Our findings indicate that even temporary credentials recommended by cloud providers may pose security risks. We identified 893 applications using cloud credentials from the three major providers, with 945 credentials found. By analyzing these credentials, we uncovered severe vulnerabilities in 356 apps, such as personally identifiable information (PII) leakage, credential forgery, and remote code execution (RCE). These issues threaten user privacy and app security. We also evaluated developer adherence to recommended IAM best practices and provided suggestions for improving cloud credential security, highlighting issues such as improper permissions, insufficient protection, outdated versions, and regional variants.

  • Unsupervised Clustering with Contrastive Learning for Rumor Tracking on Social Media

    by Yang Wu, Chen Song, Zhitong Lu, Chunlei Jing, Pengwei Zhan, Zhen Xu, Liming Wang


  • Open Access

    Website fingerprinting on early QUIC traffic

    by Pengwei Zhan, Liming Wang, Yi Tang

    Cryptographic protocols have been widely used to protect the user's privacy and avoid exposing private information. QUIC (Quick UDP Internet Connections), including the version originally designed by Google (GQUIC) and the version standardized by IETF (IQUIC), as alternatives to the traditional HTTP, demonstrate their unique transmission characteristics: based on UDP for encrypted resource transmitting, accelerating web page rendering. However, existing encrypted transmission schemes based on TCP are vulnerable to website fingerprinting (WFP) attacks, allowing adversaries to infer the users' visited websites by eavesdropping on the transmission channel. Whether GQUIC and IQUIC can effectively resist such attacks is worth investigating. In this paper, we study the vulnerabilities of GQUIC, IQUIC, and HTTPS to WFP attacks from the perspective of traffic analysis. Extensive experiments show that, in the early traffic scenario, GQUIC is the most vulnerable to WFP attacks among GQUIC, IQUIC, and HTTPS, while IQUIC is more vulnerable than HTTPS, but the vulnerability of the three protocols is similar in the normal full traffic scenario. Features transferring analysis shows that most features are transferable between protocols when on normal full traffic scenario. However, combining with the qualitative analysis of latent feature representation, we find that the transferring is inefficient when on early traffic, as GQUIC, IQUIC, and HTTPS show the significantly different magnitude of variation in the traffic distribution on early traffic. By upgrading the one-time WFP attacks to multiple WFP Top-a attacks, we find that the attack accuracy on GQUIC and IQUIC reach 95.4% and 95.5%, respectively, with only 40 packets and just using simple features, whereas reach only 60.7% when on HTTPS. We also demonstrate that the vulnerability of IQUIC is only slightly dependent on the network environment.