Daniel Villiger
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Daniel Villiger has a total of 57 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Johannes Ullrich
University of Zurich Zurich Switzerland
5 shared publications Joachim Krueger
4 shared publications- Brian David Earp
Centre for Biomedical Ethics, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
2 shared publications Khaleel Rajwani
McGill University
2 shared publicationsMelanie Meister
2 shared publicationsSeverina Caplazi
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 November 2026
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
Is consenting to digital duplication ethically distinctive? A bioethical analysis
- 6 November 2026
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
Open AccessIs consenting to digital duplication ethically distinctive? A bioethical analysis
- Open Access
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 207 (4) , 133
AI-assisted rational decision-making
AI has become a common assistant for making choices, from minor to major ones. It can inform our beliefs relevant to a decision by both helping us to find existing information and generating new information. But in what ways and to what extent is AI useful when making a rational decision? The present paper provides answers to this question for three different types of choices: easy choices, hard choices, and transformative choices. In easy choices, where the rational action is, in principle, straightforward, AI can make the decision-making process more efficient and accurate, increasing derived value (at least in the long-term). In hard choices, where options are on a par, AI can help us when we commit to an option by assisting us in the creation process of new will-based reasons. In transformative choices, where we cannot, even in principle, know by ourselves which option maximizes expected value, AI cannot fill the epistemic or metaphysical gap characteristic of such choices, and therefore cannot enable rational decision-making. Overall, the analysis shows that if the values of our options do not already allow us to determine the rational choice without AI, its assistance does not change that.
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 207 (4) , 133
Open AccessAI-assisted rational decision-making
AI has become a common assistant for making choices, from minor to major ones. It can inform our beliefs relevant to a decision by both helping us to find existing information and generating new information. But in what ways and to what extent is AI useful when making a rational decision? The present paper provides answers to this question for three different types of choices: easy choices, hard choices, and transformative choices. In easy choices, where the rational action is, in principle, straightforward, AI can make the decision-making process more efficient and accurate, increasing derived value (at least in the long-term). In hard choices, where options are on a par, AI can help us when we commit to an option by assisting us in the creation process of new will-based reasons. In transformative choices, where we cannot, even in principle, know by ourselves which option maximizes expected value, AI cannot fill the epistemic or metaphysical gap characteristic of such choices, and therefore cannot enable rational decision-making. Overall, the analysis shows that if the values of our options do not already allow us to determine the rational choice without AI, its assistance does not change that.
- Open Access
- 10 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- p. 1-19
Mystical experience in the Bayesian brain
Mystical experiences are among the most extraordinary and meaningful experiences one can have. While such experiences have been studied for more than a century, it is still an open question how the brain can produce them. The present paper provides a possible answer by examining mystical experience from the lens of the REBUS hypothesis—a theory that explains the neurocognitive mechanisms of psychedelics in the Bayesian brain. Since psychedelics have consistently been shown to induce mystical experiences, the REBUS hypothesis implicitly suggests that it can also shed light on the underlying mechanisms of mystical experiences. The resulting account holds that during a mystical experience, the brain’s constant process of prediction error minimization is characterized by a decreased influence of high-level predictions and, simultaneously, an increased influence of sensory input. The latter can be related to the noetic quality of mystical experiences; the former to the experience of oneness, altered perception of time and space, ineffability, and deeply felt positive mood during/after a mystical experience. While the paper’s account is developed on a conceptual basis and thus remains speculative, it is compatible with other models of mystical experience, such as that mystical experience involves maximal uncertainty or a breaking down of attention.
- 10 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- p. 1-19
Open AccessMystical experience in the Bayesian brain
Mystical experiences are among the most extraordinary and meaningful experiences one can have. While such experiences have been studied for more than a century, it is still an open question how the brain can produce them. The present paper provides a possible answer by examining mystical experience from the lens of the REBUS hypothesis—a theory that explains the neurocognitive mechanisms of psychedelics in the Bayesian brain. Since psychedelics have consistently been shown to induce mystical experiences, the REBUS hypothesis implicitly suggests that it can also shed light on the underlying mechanisms of mystical experiences. The resulting account holds that during a mystical experience, the brain’s constant process of prediction error minimization is characterized by a decreased influence of high-level predictions and, simultaneously, an increased influence of sensory input. The latter can be related to the noetic quality of mystical experiences; the former to the experience of oneness, altered perception of time and space, ineffability, and deeply felt positive mood during/after a mystical experience. While the paper’s account is developed on a conceptual basis and thus remains speculative, it is compatible with other models of mystical experience, such as that mystical experience involves maximal uncertainty or a breaking down of attention.
- Open Access
- 16 September 2025
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 20 (9)
Psychedelic Ethics
The reemergence of serotonergic psychedelics in clinical research and practice has sparked numerous debates within bioethics. This paper aims to provide an overview of the key issues discussed in the emerging field of psychedelic ethics. It organizes these issues into four (partly overlapping) categories: (1) the implementation and execution of psychedelic research and practice, (2) the ethics of belief as applied to PAT, (3) discrimination and injustice in psychedelic research and practice, and (4) potential consequences arising from the expansion of psychedelic research and a possible future approval of PAT. Overall, the paper shows that in just a few years, psychedelic ethics has become a thriving area within bioethics—one that is essential for grounding the rapid clinical developments in robust ethical reflection.
- 16 September 2025
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 20 (9)
Open AccessPsychedelic Ethics
The reemergence of serotonergic psychedelics in clinical research and practice has sparked numerous debates within bioethics. This paper aims to provide an overview of the key issues discussed in the emerging field of psychedelic ethics. It organizes these issues into four (partly overlapping) categories: (1) the implementation and execution of psychedelic research and practice, (2) the ethics of belief as applied to PAT, (3) discrimination and injustice in psychedelic research and practice, and (4) potential consequences arising from the expansion of psychedelic research and a possible future approval of PAT. Overall, the paper shows that in just a few years, psychedelic ethics has become a thriving area within bioethics—one that is essential for grounding the rapid clinical developments in robust ethical reflection.
- Open Access
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 38 (7) , 3340-3383
Psychedelics beyond medicine: Treatment, enhancement, hype, consent, and the limits of medicalization
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 38 (7) , 3340-3383
Open AccessPsychedelics beyond medicine: Treatment, enhancement, hype, consent, and the limits of medicalization
- Open Access
- 3 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (7) , W1-W5
The Challenge of Ignorance Under Scrutiny: Response to Open Peer Commentaries on “Informed Consent Under Ignorance”
- 3 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (7) , W1-W5
Open AccessThe Challenge of Ignorance Under Scrutiny: Response to Open Peer Commentaries on “Informed Consent Under Ignorance”
- Open Access
- 6 June 2025
- Published by Elsevier in General Hospital Psychiatry
- Vol. 96, 54-59
Patient–therapist relationship in psychedelic-assisted therapy: Implications for future real-world settings
- 6 June 2025
- Published by Elsevier in General Hospital Psychiatry
- Vol. 96, 54-59
Open AccessPatient–therapist relationship in psychedelic-assisted therapy: Implications for future real-world settings
- Open Access
- 8 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- p. 1-21
Mental disorder and its treatment as a transformative experience
According to L.A. Paul, undergoing an experience is transformative if we learn something we cannot learn without having the experience and if it substantially changes our point of view. While the implications of transformative experiences have primarily been discussed in the context of rational choice, their underlying concept has also proven fruitful in the context of unchosen occurrences. The present paper examines mental disorder and its treatment from a transformative experiential perspective, using major depressive disorder as an exemplary case. It shows that developing a mental disorder typically requires a transformative experience since the two popular mental disorder classification systems primarily classify such disorders on an experiential basis. This provides an explanation for the lack of understanding mentally disordered people often face: their experiential state is epistemically inaccessible for those who have not experienced a similar state before. Furthermore, successful treatment of mental disorder again requires a (personally) transformative experience that results in the disorder’s overcoming. The paper examines pharmacological, psychological, and psychedelic-assisted treatment and reveals that each of them uses a different transformative route to recovery: a finding relevant, for example, to ongoing debates in medical ethics about informed consent.
- 8 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- p. 1-21
Open AccessMental disorder and its treatment as a transformative experience
According to L.A. Paul, undergoing an experience is transformative if we learn something we cannot learn without having the experience and if it substantially changes our point of view. While the implications of transformative experiences have primarily been discussed in the context of rational choice, their underlying concept has also proven fruitful in the context of unchosen occurrences. The present paper examines mental disorder and its treatment from a transformative experiential perspective, using major depressive disorder as an exemplary case. It shows that developing a mental disorder typically requires a transformative experience since the two popular mental disorder classification systems primarily classify such disorders on an experiential basis. This provides an explanation for the lack of understanding mentally disordered people often face: their experiential state is epistemically inaccessible for those who have not experienced a similar state before. Furthermore, successful treatment of mental disorder again requires a (personally) transformative experience that results in the disorder’s overcoming. The paper examines pharmacological, psychological, and psychedelic-assisted treatment and reveals that each of them uses a different transformative route to recovery: a finding relevant, for example, to ongoing debates in medical ethics about informed consent.
- Open Access
- 15 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Ethics
- Vol. 29 (2) , 215-236
Breaking Up Rationally
The end of a long-term romantic relationship ranks among the most stressful and momentous events in life. Thus, the decision of whether to break up with someone whom one has been with for many years should generally be made very carefully. Unfortunately, decision theory is often thought to be unable to provide rational guidance in such high-stake life choices due to the outcomes’ presumed transformative character. The present paper shows how agents can rationally decide whether to leave their romantic partner even if the decision is transformative. It does so by using a novel five-level account of transformative decision-making, which can also be used for other key life choices, and which is the first to integrate in a systematic way several approaches for making (certain types of) transformative decisions that have been proposed in recent years.
- 15 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Ethics
- Vol. 29 (2) , 215-236
Open AccessBreaking Up Rationally
The end of a long-term romantic relationship ranks among the most stressful and momentous events in life. Thus, the decision of whether to break up with someone whom one has been with for many years should generally be made very carefully. Unfortunately, decision theory is often thought to be unable to provide rational guidance in such high-stake life choices due to the outcomes’ presumed transformative character. The present paper shows how agents can rationally decide whether to leave their romantic partner even if the decision is transformative. It does so by using a novel five-level account of transformative decision-making, which can also be used for other key life choices, and which is the first to integrate in a systematic way several approaches for making (certain types of) transformative decisions that have been proposed in recent years.
- Open Access
- 2 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 92-95
Same Same but Different: On Psychedelic Exceptionalism
- 2 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 92-95
Open AccessSame Same but Different: On Psychedelic Exceptionalism