Christopher T. Kenny
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Interests
Christopher T. Kenny has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Cory McCartan
Pennsylvania State University
12 shared publications - Tyler Simko
University of Michigan
9 shared publications - Kosuke Imai
Harvard University
8 shared publications - Shiro Kuriwaki
Department of Political Science Department of Statistics Yale University Pennsylvania State University
4 shared publications Cory McCartan
3 shared publications- Jacob Robert Brown
Department of Political Science, Boston University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 10 October 2026
- Published by The R Foundation
irelink: Fast Probabilistic Record Linkage
Performs fast, scalable probabilistic record linkage and deduplication using the Fellegi-Sunter model. Records lacking a shared unique identifier are compared across configurable dimensions using exact, fuzzy, and distance-based comparisons, with model parameters estimated via unsupervised Expectation-Maximization. Multiple SQL backends are supported through 'DBI', including execution via 'DuckDB'. This package is a translation of the Python 'splink' library by Linacre et al. (2022) into idiomatic R.
- 10 October 2026
- Published by The R Foundation
irelink: Fast Probabilistic Record Linkage
Performs fast, scalable probabilistic record linkage and deduplication using the Fellegi-Sunter model. Records lacking a shared unique identifier are compared across configurable dimensions using exact, fuzzy, and distance-based comparisons, with model parameters estimated via unsupervised Expectation-Maximization. Multiple SQL backends are supported through 'DBI', including execution via 'DuckDB'. This package is a translation of the Python 'splink' library by Linacre et al. (2022) into idiomatic R.
- Open Access
- 17 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Intra-Partisan Gerrymandering
Partisan gerrymandering is a familiar practice. But intra-partisan gerrymandering—one faction within a party designing districts to handicap another faction within the same party—has barely been noticed by courts or scholars. In jurisdictions dominated by a single party, though, intra-partisan gerrymandering is more impactful than its partisan counterpart. In these places, there’s no doubt which party will govern. What’s uncertain is which actors within this party will prevail. Intra-partisan gerrymandering matters precisely because it shapes the identity of the ruling intra-party coalition. In this Article, we first conceptualize intra-partisan gerrymandering. We define the practice, compare it to other forms of abusive redistricting, and explain how it unsettles views of parties as monolithic entities. Next, we provide several examples of intra-partisan gerrymandering. These span the one-party Democratic South, major Democratic cities, and heavily Republican states. We then argue that intra-partisan gerrymandering should be recognized as a distinct legal theory, especially under state constitutions. Its representational harms are analogous to those inflicted by partisan gerrymandering, and it can be regulated through a similar doctrinal framework. Finally, we offer an empirical proof of concept using a recent state senate redistricting as a case study. It’s feasible to identify intra-party factions, measure disparities in their treatment, and
- 17 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessIntra-Partisan Gerrymandering
Partisan gerrymandering is a familiar practice. But intra-partisan gerrymandering—one faction within a party designing districts to handicap another faction within the same party—has barely been noticed by courts or scholars. In jurisdictions dominated by a single party, though, intra-partisan gerrymandering is more impactful than its partisan counterpart. In these places, there’s no doubt which party will govern. What’s uncertain is which actors within this party will prevail. Intra-partisan gerrymandering matters precisely because it shapes the identity of the ruling intra-party coalition. In this Article, we first conceptualize intra-partisan gerrymandering. We define the practice, compare it to other forms of abusive redistricting, and explain how it unsettles views of parties as monolithic entities. Next, we provide several examples of intra-partisan gerrymandering. These span the one-party Democratic South, major Democratic cities, and heavily Republican states. We then argue that intra-partisan gerrymandering should be recognized as a distinct legal theory, especially under state constitutions. Its representational harms are analogous to those inflicted by partisan gerrymandering, and it can be regulated through a similar doctrinal framework. Finally, we offer an empirical proof of concept using a recent state senate redistricting as a case study. It’s feasible to identify intra-party factions, measure disparities in their treatment, and
- 6 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Human Behaviour
- Vol. 10 (10) , 1898-1909
Individual and differential harm in redistricting
- 6 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Human Behaviour
- Vol. 10 (10) , 1898-1909
Individual and differential harm in redistricting
- Open Access
- 30 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- p. 1-20
Redistricting Reforms Reduce Gerrymandering by Constraining Partisan Actors
Political actors often manipulate redistricting plans to gain electoral advantages, a process known as gerrymandering. Several states have implemented institutional reforms to address this problem, such as establishing map-drawing commissions. Estimating the impact of these reforms is challenging because each state structures its processes and rules differently. We model redistricting as a sequential game whose equilibrium solution summarizes multistep institutional interactions as a univariate score. We argue that this score measures the leeway political actors have over the partisan lean of the final plan. Our differences-in-differences analysis demonstrates that reforms reduce partisan bias and increase competitiveness by constraining partisan actors. We perform a counterfactual policy analysis to estimate the effects of enacting recent reforms nationwide. Though commissions are likely to reduce bias, reforms that restrict partisan actors in multiple ways, such as removing veto points (Michigan), are more effective than commissions where parties retain some control (Ohio).
- 30 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- p. 1-20
Open AccessRedistricting Reforms Reduce Gerrymandering by Constraining Partisan Actors
Political actors often manipulate redistricting plans to gain electoral advantages, a process known as gerrymandering. Several states have implemented institutional reforms to address this problem, such as establishing map-drawing commissions. Estimating the impact of these reforms is challenging because each state structures its processes and rules differently. We model redistricting as a sequential game whose equilibrium solution summarizes multistep institutional interactions as a univariate score. We argue that this score measures the leeway political actors have over the partisan lean of the final plan. Our differences-in-differences analysis demonstrates that reforms reduce partisan bias and increase competitiveness by constraining partisan actors. We perform a counterfactual policy analysis to estimate the effects of enacting recent reforms nationwide. Though commissions are likely to reduce bias, reforms that restrict partisan actors in multiple ways, such as removing veto points (Michigan), are more effective than commissions where parties retain some control (Ohio).
- 9 July 2026
- Published by The R Foundation
ipf: Iterative Proportional Fitting
Fast raking for survey weighting. The computational core is written in Rust for speed. Supports multiple raking variables, automatic variable selection, weight bounding, and comprehensive diagnostics.
- 9 July 2026
- Published by The R Foundation
ipf: Iterative Proportional Fitting
Fast raking for survey weighting. The computational core is written in Rust for speed. Supports multiple raking variables, automatic variable selection, weight bounding, and comprehensive diagnostics.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Sampling Solutions to the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem
Political scientists often use aggregate spatial units like neighborhoods, precincts, and administrative districts. Statistics based on aggregate data are sensitive to boundary definitions, a well-known issue called the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem. Scholars struggle to investigate this issue because the number of possible aggregations in most applied problems is intractably large. We propose a sampling-based method for measuring geographic aggregation sensitivity. Building on graph partition algorithms developed for legislative redistricting, our approach allows researchers to sample alternative aggregations from a specified target distribution. Researchers can ensure aggregations are realistic for their setting by defining constraints, such as population targets and respect for geographic boundaries. Researchers can then compare estimates across aggregations. We illustrate our approach through applications measuring segregation, racially polarized voting, and the relationship between racial context and exclusionary attitudes. Alternative aggregations can shift estimates in these analyses by 11% to 44% depending on outcome and setting.
- 3 July 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessSampling Solutions to the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem
Political scientists often use aggregate spatial units like neighborhoods, precincts, and administrative districts. Statistics based on aggregate data are sensitive to boundary definitions, a well-known issue called the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem. Scholars struggle to investigate this issue because the number of possible aggregations in most applied problems is intractably large. We propose a sampling-based method for measuring geographic aggregation sensitivity. Building on graph partition algorithms developed for legislative redistricting, our approach allows researchers to sample alternative aggregations from a specified target distribution. Researchers can ensure aggregations are realistic for their setting by defining constraints, such as population targets and respect for geographic boundaries. Researchers can then compare estimates across aggregations. We illustrate our approach through applications measuring segregation, racially polarized voting, and the relationship between racial context and exclusionary attitudes. Alternative aggregations can shift estimates in these analyses by 11% to 44% depending on outcome and setting.
- 16 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Cities
- Vol. 3 (7) , 618-628
City racial segregation statistics are robust to aggregation bias
- 16 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Cities
- Vol. 3 (7) , 618-628
City racial segregation statistics are robust to aggregation bias
- Open Access
- 30 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
The Republican geographic advantage in congressional elections has largely disappeared by 2024
Where voters live shapes partisan control of Congress, independently of how district lines are drawn. Political scientists have long argued that Democratic voters concentrate in cities while Republican voters spread more efficiently across suburbs and rural areas, giving Republicans an advantage in redistricting. I show that this geographic advantage has steadily declined. I build a national panel of precinct-level presidential returns from 2008 to 2024, standardized to small, fixed geographic units within each state, and estimate how many House seats Democrats would win under a large sample of nonpartisan congressional redistricting simulations. Under these simulations in a tied national election, the 2008 electorate produces about 203 Democratic seats and the 2024 electorate produces a near-even House. Standard measures of partisan bias in elections similarly show a reduced Republican advantage. However, this decline in geographic partisan advantage does not make the House more competitive. The current distribution of voters by party would produce a fair House absent gerrymandering
- 30 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessThe Republican geographic advantage in congressional elections has largely disappeared by 2024
Where voters live shapes partisan control of Congress, independently of how district lines are drawn. Political scientists have long argued that Democratic voters concentrate in cities while Republican voters spread more efficiently across suburbs and rural areas, giving Republicans an advantage in redistricting. I show that this geographic advantage has steadily declined. I build a national panel of precinct-level presidential returns from 2008 to 2024, standardized to small, fixed geographic units within each state, and estimate how many House seats Democrats would win under a large sample of nonpartisan congressional redistricting simulations. Under these simulations in a tied national election, the 2008 electorate produces about 203 Democratic seats and the 2024 electorate produces a near-even House. Standard measures of partisan bias in elections similarly show a reduced Republican advantage. However, this decline in geographic partisan advantage does not make the House more competitive. The current distribution of voters by party would produce a fair House absent gerrymandering
- Open Access
- 20 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
A Multi-District Markov Chain Monte Carlo Sampler for Redistricting
Random sampling of redistricting plans has become a standard tool for detecting gerrymandering and evaluating proposed maps. Most MCMC redistricting algorithms operate by merging two adjacent districts and splitting them back into two new districts at each step of the chain. I extend this Merge-Split framework with the Multiple Merge Sequential Split (MMSS) algorithm, which generalizes each step to merge ℓ ≥ 2 adjacent districts and repartition them into ℓ new districts via a sequence of ℓ − 1 uniform spanning tree cuts. MMSS targets the same spanning-forest-weighted distribution used by existing samplers, and I derive the Metropolis-Hastings acceptance ratio. I validate the algorithm by comparing samples against exactly enumerated distributions on small grid maps and compare its scalability with two related algorithms on a realistic redistricting problem. The algorithm supports any value of ℓ ≥ 2, giving users direct control over per-step exploration. MMSS is implemented in the open-source redist R package.
- 20 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessA Multi-District Markov Chain Monte Carlo Sampler for Redistricting
Random sampling of redistricting plans has become a standard tool for detecting gerrymandering and evaluating proposed maps. Most MCMC redistricting algorithms operate by merging two adjacent districts and splitting them back into two new districts at each step of the chain. I extend this Merge-Split framework with the Multiple Merge Sequential Split (MMSS) algorithm, which generalizes each step to merge ℓ ≥ 2 adjacent districts and repartition them into ℓ new districts via a sequence of ℓ − 1 uniform spanning tree cuts. MMSS targets the same spanning-forest-weighted distribution used by existing samplers, and I derive the Metropolis-Hastings acceptance ratio. I validate the algorithm by comparing samples against exactly enumerated distributions on small grid maps and compare its scalability with two related algorithms on a realistic redistricting problem. The algorithm supports any value of ℓ ≥ 2, giving users direct control over per-step exploration. MMSS is implemented in the open-source redist R package.
- 5 May 2026
- Published by The R Foundation
manifesto: Create Project Manifest Files
Provides 'TOML' representations of packages needed that must be installed to run a project. Includes functions to specify detailed installation functions, validate files, and to use a given file as the requirements for a project. Handles package installations, when necessary, via 'pak'.
- 5 May 2026
- Published by The R Foundation
manifesto: Create Project Manifest Files
Provides 'TOML' representations of packages needed that must be installed to run a project. Includes functions to specify detailed installation functions, validate files, and to use a given file as the requirements for a project. Handles package installations, when necessary, via 'pak'.