András Lapsánszky

The increasing complexity of socio-technical systems has challenged traditional regulatory models centred on the supervision of individual actors. In response, regulatory theory has evolved from responsive regulation and risk-based regulation towards systemic-risk governance, which focuses on resilience, adaptation, and the management of interconnected risks. While this shift has been extensively analysed in financial, digital, and AI regulation, its implications for space governance remain underexplored.,This article examines whether the proposed European Union Space Act can be understood as a manifestation of systemic-risk governance. Building on the literature on responsive regulation, risk-based regulation, and systemic-risk governance, it develops a theoretical framework and applies it through a comparative analysis of macroprudential financial regulation, the Digital Services Act, and the AI Act. The analysis demonstrates that the proposed Space Act extends beyond traditional operator-centred compliance by addressing systemic challenges such as orbital congestion, space debris, cybersecurity risks, and vulnerabilities affecting the orbital environment as a whole. Consequently, the regulation reflects key characteristics of systemic-risk governance, including lifecycle oversight, resilience-oriented regulation, and the management of collective vulnerabilities.

Digital finance is reshaping financial intermediation through platform-based credit, stablecoin-based payment and settlement arrangements, and a rapidly deepening reliance on critical third-party technology providers. Existing international frameworks identify many of these vulnerabilities, but macroprudential authorities still lack a traceable operational bridge from FinTech activities to systemic-risk channels, measurable indicators, stress-test assumptions and staged policy escalation. This article proposes the FinTech Macroprudential Integration Framework (FMIF) as an evidence-mapped operationalisation layer for existing macroprudential regimes. The FMIF does not claim to replace the frameworks issued by the FSB, BIS, IMF, BCBS, the EU or cyber-resilience authorities; instead, it translates their risk taxonomies and policy insights into a structured workflow linking activity perimeter, dependency registry, indicator formulas, modular stress tests and governance interfaces. The framework is developed for three activity clusters: platform credit and bank–FinTech partnerships; stablecoin-based payment and settlement; and critical third-party technology dependencies. These clusters are mapped to three channels: liquidity/run dynamics, interconnectedness and market spillovers, and operational concentration/correlated disruption. The article contributes by clarifying the research gap, disclosing the evidence-mapping procedure and source-level coding, classifying evidence quality, specifying indicator formulas and calibration principles, adding a stablecoin-run illustrative application, and discussing legal and institutional feasibility. The FMIF should be understood as a decision-support and decision-preparedness framework rather than as a fully validated decision-ready model. Empirical validation, jurisdiction-specific thresholds and legal triggers remain necessary next steps.

How should governments organize to supervise, enforce, and learn from the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) when a common digital regulation is implemented through heterogeneous national administrative systems? Building on digital government and algorithmic governance scholarship, we conceptualize AI Act implementation as the construction of a public-sector oversight infrastructure that couples six governance capabilities: technical assessment, legal enforcement, rights oversight, coordination, transparency, and organizational learning. We conduct a comparative documentary analysis of publicly available laws, regulations, policy documents, and agency materials for all 27 EU member states (data collected 2024–2026; see Supplementary Appendix A for the EU‐27 mapping and codebook). The analysis identifies three recurring enforcement architectures: inheritance (distributed sectoral enforcement anchored in existing regulators), hub‐and‐spoke (a coordinating lead authority with sectoral spokes), and specialist agency (a newly created or explicitly AI‐focused regulator). We show that these architectures systematically differ in how they bundle oversight capabilities and in the information flows they can generate for auditability, public transparency, and cross‐sector learning. The paper contributes by specifying the organizational preconditions of ’trustworthy AI’ in digital government and by explaining why harmonized rules may still yield uneven enforcement capacity across jurisdictions. It also offers design principles for policymakers building national AI oversight authorities under multi‐level regulation.

Radio spectrum is a limited national resource whose efficient utilization is of strategic importance. With the rapid advancement of wireless technologies, maintaining spectrum cleanliness and enabling fast and reliable anomaly detection have become critical challenges. Artificial intelligence (AI)-based approaches have recently shown great promise in addressing these issues; however, their effectiveness strongly depends on the availability of high-quality, representative, and annotated datasets. Generating such datasets is a complex task, further complicated by environmental conditions such as weather. Hungary’s nationwide spectrum monitoring network enables continuous observation of frequency bands, thereby providing the opportunity to construct large-scale and sustainable datasets. This study introduces a measurement methodology designed for the FM sound broadcasting in the VHF band (87.5–108 MHz), presents the resulting dataset, and details the annotation process. The published, openly accessible dataset is expected to serve not only as a valuable reference point but also as a benchmark for the international research community, facilitating the development, validation, and objective comparison of AI-driven spectrum monitoring solutions.

Green fintech merges sustainable finance with data-intensive innovation, but national translations of EU rules can create regulatory risk. This study examines how such risk manifests in Central Europe and which policy tools mitigate it. We develop a three-dimension framework—regulatory clarity and scope, supervisory consistency, and innovation facilitation—and apply a comparative qualitative design to Hungary, Slovakia, Czechia, and Poland. Using a common EU baseline, we compile coded national snapshots from primary legal texts, supervisory documents, and recent scholarship. Results show material cross-country variation in labelling practice, soft-law use, and testing infrastructure: Hungary combines central-bank green programmes with an innovation hub/sandbox; Slovakia aligns with ESMA and runs hub/sandbox, though the green-fintech pipeline is nascent; Czechia applies a principles-based safe harbour and lacks a national sandbox; and Poland relies on a virtual sandbox and binding interpretations with limited soft law. These choices shape approval timelines, retail penetration, and cross-border portability of green-labelled products. We conclude with a policy toolkit: labelling convergence or explicit safe harbours, a cross-border sandbox federation, ESRS/ESAP-ready proportionate disclosures, consolidation of recurring interpretations into soft law, investment in suptech for green-claims analytics, and inclusion metrics in sandbox selection.

The research article offers a comparative analysis of the legislative frameworks governing the appointment of heads of autonomous central public administration entities in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The relevance of the subject matter lies at the intersection of administrative law and public governance, addressing the critical question of how legal provisions shape the institutional autonomy and professionalism of state bodies. Although the three countries share common historical and regional characteristics, the study reveals significant differences in the legal regulation and practical execution of appointments. The central thesis posits that legal frameworks alone are insufficient to guarantee institutional independence if political discretion and informal practices undermine transparency and merit-based selection. The research aims to evaluate the degree of formal autonomy, the safeguards against politicisation, and the effectiveness of legal norms in ensuring impartiality. The originality of the research stems from its interdisciplinary and comparative approach, integrating doctrinal legal analysis with an examination of administrative realities. While the scope of the study is national, its relevance extends across Central Europe and the broader EU context. The findings contribute meaningfully to ongoing academic and policy debates on good governance, rule of law, and institutional integrity in public administration.

This paper explores the growing regulatory role of very large online platforms (VLOPs) through the lens of digital constitutionalism. It argues that while these platforms operate under private legal frameworks, their governance functions—especially content moderation and algorithmic decision-making—closely resemble public regulatory authority. As platforms increasingly shape the terms of civic participation, public discourse, and access to information, a normative gap has emerged between the private character of their power and its public consequences. The study identifies three core questions: what motivates platform self-regulation, whether platforms exercise public-like functions, and whether digital constitutionalism provides a viable framework for constraining their power. Drawing primarily on a comprehensive literature review, the analysis confirms that platform self-regulation is strategically motivated, that platforms exercise quasi-public authority, and that digital constitutionalism offers a promising—though still evolving—response. The findings suggest that constitutional values such as transparency, due process, and the protection of fundamental rights must increasingly be applied to powerful private actors in the digital environment to uphold rule-of-law standards and democratic legitimacy.

Direct-to-Device (D2D) satellite communications—where standard mobile devices connect directly with satellites—offer a promising solution to extend coverage and improve network resilience. This paper examines the spectrum allocation and regulatory challenges of enabling D2D satellite services in the European Union (EU), situating the analysis within the broader evolution of International Telecommunication Union (ITU) regulatory processes. While anchored in the preparations for the World Radiocommunication Conference 2027 (WRC-27), the study emphasizes that regulatory developments are dynamic and extend beyond a single conference cycle, ensuring long-term relevance for spectrum governance. The paper provides an overview of satellite communication fundamentals and defines key D2D concepts, including Internet of Things (IoT) use cases and differences between terrestrial mobile bands and Mobile-Satellite Service (MSS) bands. The analysis highlights the current EU landscape for MSS spectrum, particularly the 2 GHz S-band, and its upcoming licensing challenges. It contrasts the EU approach with international developments—notably the United States’ new “Supplemental Coverage from Space” framework and the United Kingdom’s satellite-to-mobile integration plans—to draw lessons for spectrum-sharing models. Technical and regulatory challenges for integrating D2D are identified, and potential alternative frequency bands and spectrum-sharing techniques are explored. A policy roadmap is proposed, outlining short-, medium-, and long-term actions for EU policymakers and stakeholders to enable D2D services. The study ultimately supports the formulation of a forward-looking regulatory framework that secures Europe’s role in shaping the future of hybrid satellite-terrestrial connectivity.