CDCary A. Deck

Cary A. Deck

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Cary A. Deck has a total of 41 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Effect of Complexity on (Higher Order) Risk Attitudes

    by Cary A. Deck, Erik O. Kimbrough

    Risk attitudes, including higher-order risk attitudes, are typically measured using transparent presentations of payoff distributions. Yet many real choices require people to evaluate risks that are visually or cognitively complex. We conduct experiments that vary visual complexity in choices over second-, third-, and fourth-order risks while holding objective payoff distributions fixed. Complexity changes measured risk attitudes in all three domains. In the main second-order task, complexity shifts subjects toward the safer lottery even when the safer lottery itself is complex, a pattern inconsistent with simple avoidance of complex options. In third-and fourth-order tasks, subjects are generally less likely to select visually complex options, so complexity can make individuals appear more or less prudent or temperate depending on which option is complex. A follow-up second-order diagnostic experiment shows that subjects also choose the safer lottery more often when both options are complex, ruling out a pure option-specific cost of complexity. Structural estimates using the pooled second-order data favor an ambiguity-like pessimism model in which visually complex lotteries are evaluated partly as if weight were shifted toward their worst outcomes. Elicited risk attitudes therefore reflect not only preferences over payoff distributions, but also the complexity of how those distributions are represented.

  • A Simple Approach for Measuring Higher-Order Arrow-Pratt Coefficients of Risk Aversion

    by Cary Deck, Rachel J. Huang, Larry Y. Tzeng, Lin Zhao

    Although the importance of the second-order Arrow-Pratt coefficients of risk aversion is well established, the importance of higher-order risk attitudes has only recently begun to be recognized. In this paper, we introduce a nonparametric approach to directly measure higher-order Arrow-Pratt coefficients of risk aversion in an expected utility framework using choices between compound lotteries and show how it can be easily implemented in behavioral studies. Specifically, we provide a theoretical basis for using risk apportionment to reveal the intensity of higher-order risk attitudes, and then draw upon our theoretical results to develop a simple, systematic, and generalizable procedure for eliciting higher-order Arrow-Pratt coefficients. We demonstrate our approach in a laboratory experiment and find that the modal second-order, third-order, and fourth-order Arrow-Pratt coefficients are positive and small. Further, we find that degrees of risk aversion are positively correlated across orders. Additionally, we discuss alternative implementations of our procedure. This paper was accepted by Peng Sun, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: R. J. Huang acknowledges financial support from the National Science and Technology Council of Taiwan [Grants MOST 110-2410-H-008 -017 -MY3]. R. J. Huang and L. Y. Tzeng gratefully acknowledge financial support from E.SUN Bank. L. Zhao acknowledges financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72125003 and 72131003]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02300 .


  • When Do Security Markets Aggregate Dispersed Information?

    by Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark DeSantis, Kyle Hampton, Erik O. Kimbrough

    We attempt to replicate a seminal paper that offered support for the rational expectations hypothesis and reported evidence that markets with certain features aggregate dispersed information. The original results are based on only a few observations, and our attempt to replicate the key findings with an appropriately powered experiment largely fails. The resulting poststudy probability that market performance is better described by rational expectations than the prior information (Walrasian) model under the conditions specified in the original paper is very low. As a result of our failure to replicate, we investigate an alternate set of market features that combines aspects of the original experimental design. For these markets, which include both contingent claims and homogeneous dividend payments (as in many prediction markets), we do find robust evidence of information aggregation in support of the rational expectations model. In total, our results indicate that information aggregation in asset markets is fragile and should only be expected in limited circumstances.This paper was accepted by Bruno Biais, finance.Supplemental Material: The data and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4463 .


  • Open Access

    Litigation with Negative Expected Value Suits: An Experimental Analysis

    by Cary A. Deck, Paul Pecorino, Michael Solomon

    The existence of lawsuits providing plaintiffs a negative expected value (NEV) at trial has important theoretical implications for signaling models of litigation. The signaling equilibrium possible absent NEV suits breaks down with NEV suits because plaintiffs do not have a credible threat to proceed to trial undermining the ability to signal type. Using a laboratory experiment, we analyze behavior with and without the possibility of NEV suits. Absent NEV suits, behavior largely follows predicted patterns. However, the possibility of NEV suits does not cause the signaling equilibrium to unravel and does not cause the dispute rate to increase. Plaintiffs only drop NEV lawsuits three-fourths of the time, the rejection rate by defendants for revealing demands rises less than predicted and, contra theory, the rejection rate on demands in the semi-pooling range remains unchanged.

  • Forecasting Skills in Experimental Markets: Illusion or Reality?

    by Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark DeSantis, David Porter

    There is an ongoing debate regarding the degree to which a forecaster’s ability to draw correct inferences from market signals is real or illusory. This paper attempts to shed light on the debate by examining how personal characteristics do or do not affect forecaster success. Specifically, we investigate the role of fluid intelligence, manipulativeness, and theory of mind on forecast accuracy in experimental asset markets. We find that intelligence improves forecaster performance when market mispricing is low, manipulativeness improves forecaster performance when mispricing is high, and the degree to which theory of mind skills matter depends on both the level of mispricing and how information is displayed. All three of these results are consistent with hypotheses derived from the previous literature. Additionally, we observe that male forecasters outperform female forecasters after controlling for intelligence, manipulativeness, and theory of mind skills as well as risk aversion. Interestingly, we do not find any evidence that forecaster performance improves with experience across markets or within markets.This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis.


  • Emotional Differences between Isomorphic Auctions

    by Adriana Breaban, Cary Deck, Erik Johnson

    First price and Dutch auctions are theoretically isomorphic, but previous experiments report that the institutions are not behaviorally isomorphic. This article uses facial analysis of video recordings of laboratory experiments to investigate whether these auctions invoke different emotional responses from bidders. The results indicate that bidders are angrier during the Dutch auction and that winners exhibit more contempt after the first price auction. Overall, subjects in both auctions appear to be mostly bored and depressed, but there is evidence that bidders exhibit more positive emotions as prices fall in the Dutch auction.


  • Designing Call Auction Institutions to Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch the Best?

    by Cary Deck, Maroš Servátka, Steven Tucker

    The bubble-and-burst pattern in asset markets is among the most replicable results in experimental economics. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we compare mispricing in markets organized by standard double auction rules with mispricing in markets organized by two alternative sets of clock auctions. The double Dutch auction, shown to be more efficient than the double auction in past commodity market experiments, does not eliminate bubbles. However, the English Dutch auction yields prices reflective of underlying fundamentals and succeeds in taming bubbles even with inexperienced traders in a declining fundamental value environment with an increasing cash-to-asset ratio.


    • 1 January 2020
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Forecasting Skills in Experimental Markets: Illusion or Reality?

    by Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark Desantis, David Porter

    Using experimental asset markets, we study the situation of a financial analyst who is trying to infer the fundamental value of an asset by observing the market's history. We find that such capacity requires both standard cognitive skills (IQ) as well as social and emotional skills. However, forecasters with high emotional skills tend to perform worse when market mispricing is high as they tend to give too much emphasis to the noisy signals from market data. By contrast, forecasters with high social skills perform especially well in markets with high levels of mispricing in which their skills could help them detect possible manipulation attempts. Finally, males outperform females in the forecasting task after controlling for a large number of relevant individual characteristics such as risk attitudes, cognitive skills, emotional intelligence, and personality traits.

  • Open Access

    Keeping up with the Joneses: Social Status and Wealth Inequality in a Leveraged Asset Market

    by Cary A. Deck, Li Hao, Weineng Xu, Timothy J. Yeager

    We hypothesize that growing wealth inequality has exacerbated leveraged asset bubbles in the wealthiest nations over the last several decades through a “keeping up with the Joneses” effect. Rising inequality strengthens the desire of households to improve their social status by owning assets such as homes demanded by those with wealth. Given easy access to credit, relatively low-wealth individuals use leverage to bid up asset prices. We test this theory within the popular asset market experiment of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) where we combine the option to borrow with treatments for wealth inequality and social status. We find that the social status effect indeed leads to asset overpricing, and the impact is the biggest when combining social status with wealth inequality. On the other hand, wealth inequality alone does not lead to greater asset bubbles.