Ikuma Ogura
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Ikuma Ogura has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hirofumi Miwa
Gakushuin University
4 shared publications - Yuko Kasuya
Keio University
2 shared publications - Hirofumi Kawaguchi
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of the Ryukyus, Nishihara, Japan
1 shared publication - John William Cheng
Tsuda University
1 shared publication Masaki Hata
Faculty of Information Technology and Social Sciences, Osaka University of Economics, Osaka, Japan
1 shared publication- Masaru Nishikawa
Tsuda University, Japan
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties
- p. 1-24
Support for executive aggrandizement under weak polarization
1. Democratic backsliding has become a global concern since the early 2000s (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Waldner and Lust 2018). A defining feature of this recent trend is that chief executives hav...
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties
- p. 1-24
Open AccessSupport for executive aggrandizement under weak polarization
1. Democratic backsliding has become a global concern since the early 2000s (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Waldner and Lust 2018). A defining feature of this recent trend is that chief executives hav...
- Open Access
- 24 June 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 90 (SI) , 924-954
Lingua Franca of Ideology? Common and Country-Specific Measures of Symbolic and Operational Ideology in Asian and Western Countries
Comparative public opinion surveys, including the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), often rely on identical labels and question items to measure respondents’ symbolic and operational ideology across countries. However, it remains unclear whether common symbolic measures of ideology carry the same meaning across contexts, or whether the issue items used to construct common operational measures are equally relevant in national settings. To address these concerns, we compare symbolic and operational ideology as measured using common cross-national items and country-specific items. We conducted public opinion surveys before and after national elections in seven Asian and Western countries. Our analyses reveal that (i) country-specific measures of ideology are generally more stable over time than common measures, (ii) country-specific symbolic and operational ideology are more strongly associated with each other than their common counterparts, (iii) respondents tend to have a greater understanding of country-specific ideological labels than common ones, (iv) country-specific measures are generally more predictive of vote choice in elections, and (v) ideological extremity, as measured by these two types of indicators, shows different correlations with respondents’ attitudes toward democratic values. These findings suggest that researchers should use country-specific measures of ideology in comparative public opinion research.
- 24 June 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 90 (SI) , 924-954
Open AccessLingua Franca of Ideology? Common and Country-Specific Measures of Symbolic and Operational Ideology in Asian and Western Countries
Comparative public opinion surveys, including the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), often rely on identical labels and question items to measure respondents’ symbolic and operational ideology across countries. However, it remains unclear whether common symbolic measures of ideology carry the same meaning across contexts, or whether the issue items used to construct common operational measures are equally relevant in national settings. To address these concerns, we compare symbolic and operational ideology as measured using common cross-national items and country-specific items. We conducted public opinion surveys before and after national elections in seven Asian and Western countries. Our analyses reveal that (i) country-specific measures of ideology are generally more stable over time than common measures, (ii) country-specific symbolic and operational ideology are more strongly associated with each other than their common counterparts, (iii) respondents tend to have a greater understanding of country-specific ideological labels than common ones, (iv) country-specific measures are generally more predictive of vote choice in elections, and (v) ideological extremity, as measured by these two types of indicators, shows different correlations with respondents’ attitudes toward democratic values. These findings suggest that researchers should use country-specific measures of ideology in comparative public opinion research.
- Open Access
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Communication
- Vol. 43 (1) , 43-64
Do Politicians’ Genders Influence Voter Persuasion?
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Communication
- Vol. 43 (1) , 43-64
Open AccessDo Politicians’ Genders Influence Voter Persuasion?
- Open Access
- 8 August 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
- Vol. 23 (2) , 569-576
Partisanship, Social Desirability, and Belief in Election Fraud: Evidence from the 2022 US Midterm Elections
After losing the 2020 presidential election, Donald Trump publicly asserted that the election was rigged due to voter fraud, and many voters also endorsed this conspiracy theory. This article examines American voters’ belief in election fraud during the 2022 midterm elections, with a particular focus on (1) the propensity of Democrats versus Republicans to believe in voter fraud and (2) the potential for voters to hide their endorsement of such conspiracy theory. For these purposes, we conducted a post-election online public opinion survey in which we asked respondents’ beliefs in voter fraud using both a direct question and a preregistered list experiment. Analysis of the survey data revealed that Republican respondents were far more likely than their Democratic counterparts to believe that election fraud influenced the election outcomes. We also found that the percentage of respondents believing in election fraud was significantly higher when estimated using the direct question method than when using the list experiment, which at least suggests that voters do not conceal their beliefs regarding election fraud out of social desirability concerns. We discuss the implications of this research for the broader literature on American political behavior and public opinion about conspiracy theories.
- 8 August 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
- Vol. 23 (2) , 569-576
Open AccessPartisanship, Social Desirability, and Belief in Election Fraud: Evidence from the 2022 US Midterm Elections
After losing the 2020 presidential election, Donald Trump publicly asserted that the election was rigged due to voter fraud, and many voters also endorsed this conspiracy theory. This article examines American voters’ belief in election fraud during the 2022 midterm elections, with a particular focus on (1) the propensity of Democrats versus Republicans to believe in voter fraud and (2) the potential for voters to hide their endorsement of such conspiracy theory. For these purposes, we conducted a post-election online public opinion survey in which we asked respondents’ beliefs in voter fraud using both a direct question and a preregistered list experiment. Analysis of the survey data revealed that Republican respondents were far more likely than their Democratic counterparts to believe that election fraud influenced the election outcomes. We also found that the percentage of respondents believing in election fraud was significantly higher when estimated using the direct question method than when using the list experiment, which at least suggests that voters do not conceal their beliefs regarding election fraud out of social desirability concerns. We discuss the implications of this research for the broader literature on American political behavior and public opinion about conspiracy theories.
- Open Access
- 15 April 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Telematics and Informatics Reports
- Vol. 14
Put money where their mouth is? Willingness to pay for online conspiracy theory content
- 15 April 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Telematics and Informatics Reports
- Vol. 14
Open AccessPut money where their mouth is? Willingness to pay for online conspiracy theory content
- 17 August 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 31 (2) , 1-28
Geographic divides in protectionism: the social context approach with evidence from Japan
- 17 August 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 31 (2) , 1-28
Geographic divides in protectionism: the social context approach with evidence from Japan
- Open Access
- 29 April 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Party Identification and Social Relationships: Exploring the Causal Mechanisms
Due to the rise of affective polarization, Americans today not only feel psychologically distant from out-partisans but also prefer to build political and non-political social relationships with co-partisans. However, it is not clear why we see such patterns. Is it because people consider co-partisans to share similar demographic and socioeconomic backgrounds and thus feel more comfortable interacting with them? Or is it because they believe that co-partisans share their policy positions? To answer this research question, this paper conducted original survey experiments that were suitably designed to study causal mechanisms. The analysis of the experimental data revealed that both group traits and policy issues play important roles in explaining the effect of partisanship on both political and non-political relations. We also compared the explanatory power of group characteristics and issue positions to demonstrate the latter more strongly drive the effect of partisanship.
- 29 April 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessParty Identification and Social Relationships: Exploring the Causal Mechanisms
Due to the rise of affective polarization, Americans today not only feel psychologically distant from out-partisans but also prefer to build political and non-political social relationships with co-partisans. However, it is not clear why we see such patterns. Is it because people consider co-partisans to share similar demographic and socioeconomic backgrounds and thus feel more comfortable interacting with them? Or is it because they believe that co-partisans share their policy positions? To answer this research question, this paper conducted original survey experiments that were suitably designed to study causal mechanisms. The analysis of the experimental data revealed that both group traits and policy issues play important roles in explaining the effect of partisanship on both political and non-political relations. We also compared the explanatory power of group characteristics and issue positions to demonstrate the latter more strongly drive the effect of partisanship.
- 10 November 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Public Opinion Research
- Vol. 34 (1)
What Do You Mean by “Democrat” and “Republican”? Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment
To better understand the nature of American mass party identification, it is crucial to examine how voters understand terms used in measuring partisanship in public opinion surveys, such as “Democrat” and “Republican.” For this purpose, we conducted a conjoint experiment where respondents evaluated hypothetical profiles’ partisanship. We show that, in contrast to previous studies which rely on one theoretical perspective to understand mass partisanship, multiple theories are reflected in how voters understand labels representing their partisanship. Further, the results suggest that many Americans seem to equate party identification with vote choice, contrary to standard assumptions in American political behavior research that these are separate concepts.
- 10 November 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Public Opinion Research
- Vol. 34 (1)
What Do You Mean by “Democrat” and “Republican”? Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment
To better understand the nature of American mass party identification, it is crucial to examine how voters understand terms used in measuring partisanship in public opinion surveys, such as “Democrat” and “Republican.” For this purpose, we conducted a conjoint experiment where respondents evaluated hypothetical profiles’ partisanship. We show that, in contrast to previous studies which rely on one theoretical perspective to understand mass partisanship, multiple theories are reflected in how voters understand labels representing their partisanship. Further, the results suggest that many Americans seem to equate party identification with vote choice, contrary to standard assumptions in American political behavior research that these are separate concepts.