TCTing Chen

Ting Chen

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Ting Chen has a total of 342 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Low-altitude UAV safeguard: analysis from connection, data and behavior perspectives

    by Lulu Chen, Yidi Gao, Weijie Hong, Linhao Zhuo, Weijun Zeng, Haiwei Wu, Ting Chen

    Low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly used in inspection, logistics, emergency response, public safety, sensing, and applications in the low-altitude economy. As UAV systems evolve from isolated aerial platforms into Internet of Drones (IoD), flying ad hoc networks (FANETs), B5G/6G, and edge-cloud systems, their security boundary expands from the UAV platform itself to communication links, control infrastructure, data platforms, edge/cloud services, and airspace actors. This evolution creates cross-layer risks involving malicious access, identity spoofing, privacy leakage, abnormal behavior, and non-cooperative UAV threats. Existing studies have investigated UAV security, authentication, privacy protection, intrusion detection, and counter-UAV detection, but these works are often fragmented across isolated techniques or tasks. This survey integrates recent studies relevant to low-altitude UAV security through three connected dimensions: connection security, data security, and behavior security. Connection security covers lightweight key management, trusted access authentication, cross-domain authentication, and device trust. Data security covers multimodal sensitive-data recognition, privacy-preserving learning, differential privacy, and utility-preserving data use. Behavior security covers continuous trust evaluation, intrusion detection, abnormal behavior recognition, counter-UAV detection, and airspace risk warning. The reviewed literature provides important building blocks, but an integrated, privacy-aware, resource-aware, and deployable low-altitude security infrastructure remains an open research direction.

  • WiAtten: A Contactless Attention Monitoring Service Using Commodity Wi-Fi

    by Huilin Ge, Jie Xia, Ze Wang, Yunzhe Li, Songze Li, Ting Chen, Hongzi Zhu

  • Open Access

    Beyond Single-Level PGO: Understanding and Harnessing Cross-Level Optimization Effects in Industrial Systems

    by Dong Liu, Yifan Cheng, Yunfeng Cui, Ting Chen, Jiachi Chen, Zhihong Xue, Chong Hu, Shengyu Cheng

  • Open Access

    Shalton : Cross-Runtime Static Analysis for Android Applications

    by Runze Tan, Juntao Hu, Lei Xue, Xiaoxi Zhang, Qingchuan Zhao, Ting Chen

    Android app development traditionally relies on Java and native languages (C/C++), leading most existing Android analysis tools to focus on these languages. However, cross-platform languages are increasingly used in mobile development, with C# being a representative example. Our preliminary study shows that approximately 14% of real-world Android apps contain C# code, underscoring the need for systematic analysis. Unlike Java code, C# code in these apps runs in a separate managed runtime, while existing tools lack support for cross-runtime analysis of C# and Java code in Android apps. To bridge this gap, we introduce Shalton , a static analysis framework that analyzes CIL bytecode from C# and Dalvik bytecode from Java. Shalton represents CIL bytecode in a Dalvik-compatible form and reconstructs interactions between CIL and Dalvik components, enabling existing Android static analyzers to reason about both bytecode formats. We evaluate Shalton using a new benchmark, SharpDroidBench , and real-world Android apps. The results show that C# code participates in analysis-relevant behaviors, including dynamic code loading and sensitive data transmission. Shalton substantially outperforms a translation-based baseline on SharpDroidBench and enables existing Android analyzers to inspect CIL-implemented app logic that would otherwise remain outside their scope.

  • Open Access

    Detecting Code-Comment Inconsistencies in Smart Contracts by Combining LLM and Program Analysis

    by Jiashuo Zhang, Jiachi Chen, Ting Zhang, Yue Li, Daoyuan Wu, Yanlin Wang, Jianbo Gao, Ting Chen, Zhong Chen

    Smart contracts have attracted rapid development and widespread application. Due to the complexity of real-world smart contracts, it is error-prone to correctly enforce all intended functionalities in code implementations, resulting in unintended functional behaviors and security issues in practice. Code-comment inconsistency detection has emerged as an important solution to these issues, which leverages the redundant functional specifications in comments to detect code implementations that violate developers' intentions. However, existing inconsistency detection solutions are typically pattern-based and limited to fixed types of inconsistencies, which prevents them from detecting the diverse inconsistencies between real-world code implementations and casually written comments. To bridge the gap, this paper presents SmartComment, the first technique that combines LLMs with program analysis techniques for detecting code-comment inconsistencies in smart contracts. SmartComment introduces an LLM-driven workflow which simulates real-world interactions between code reviewers and developers to identify inconsistencies. It incorporates various program analysis techniques into the workflow, including comment propagation and code context extraction for generating input context for inconsistency detection, as well as program variant generation and differential analysis for inconsistency confirmation. Our evaluation results show that SmartComment detects 203 valid inconsistencies from a dataset of 1,000 real-world contracts with a precision of 79.9%, highlighting its effectiveness in detecting prevalent and diverse real-world inconsistencies. Compared to previous work, SmartComment achieves both higher precision and recall, detecting over 90% of inconsistencies that existing methods fail to identify. Furthermore, an ablation experiment demonstrates the effectiveness of incorporating program analysis techniques into SmartComment, improving the F1-score from 58.7% to 81.3%.

  • ChamVerDB: A Chameleon Hash-based Secure and Efficient Verifiable Outsourced Database

    by Wenqi Zhang, Xiong Li, Ruirui Gao, Ting Chen, Jiguo Yu, Jinjun Chen, Xiaosong Zhang

    A verifiable outsourced database is a crucial technology for ensuring the integrity of query results in a cloud-based outsourced database. However, existing schemes struggle to balance efficient query execution with strong data security and query privacy, limiting practical deployment. To address this challenge, we propose ChamVerDB, a Chameleon Hash-based secure and efficient verifiable outsourced database. ChamVerDB restructures the database into a matrix and encrypts each record into three ciphertext segments using a modified BG encryption. For each row, it generates row parity, computes a corresponding Chameleon Hash Value and proof, while also generating individual parities for each record. The ciphertexts and parities are packaged into an encrypted database and outsourced to the server. During querying, the user utilizes a one-hot query vector to retrieve the target ciphertext row and a column vector to extract the desired ciphertext locally. Subsequently, the user and server collaboratively perform proxy re-encryption on one ciphertext segment and recover the plaintext using the remaining segments. The user then verifies the result using row parity, individual parity, proof, and the public hash value. Security analysis confirms that ChamVerDB ensures data security, query privacy, and result verifiability. Experimental evaluation on a $2^{20}$-record database demonstrates that ChamVerDB achieves $42\times$ and $32\times$ faster offline processing than two encrypted outsourcing baselines. In online phase, ChamVerDB completes a query in just 1.21s, outperforming three representative baselines by $511\times$ (618.5s), $1039\times$ (1258.14s), and $209810\times$ (253871.49s), illustrating its practical usability.


  • TrustSearch: Toward Secure and Efficient Reverse Image Search via SGX

    by Fang Zou, Jia Zhang, Jingwei Li, Dayan Wu, Xiong Li, Hongwei Li, Ting Chen, Xiaosong Zhang

    Outsourcing image management to a cloud should not only protect the confidentiality of image data, but also maintain the capability of reverse image search, which requires identifying the existing stored images that are similar to an input image. Previous studies build on cryptographic approaches to realize reverse image search on encrypted images, yet failing to achieve either security or performance. This paper explores trusted image search, which uses Intel SGX to realize reverse image search in an enclave, in order to provide security guarantees via SGX while performing search on plain data (inside the enclave) for performance. However, due to the resource limits of SGX, directly realizing the search process in the enclave incurs high performance overhead. We present TRUSTSEARCH, which implements various design approaches to mitigate the resource overhead of SGX. We evaluate TRUSTSEARCH using real-world image datasets, and show that it outperforms state-of-the-art approaches for search performance while preserving space efficiency for the enclave.

  • Top Cited Papers

    Beyond the Protocol: Unveiling Attack Vectors in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) Ecosystem

    by Hao Song, Yiming Shen, Wenxuan Luo, Leixin Guo, Ting Chen, Jiashui Wang, Beibei Li, Xiaosong Zhang, Jiachi Chen

    The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an emerging standard designed to enable seamless interaction between Large Language Model (LLM) applications and external tools or resources. Within a short period, thousands of MCP services have been developed and deployed. However, the client-server integration architecture inherent in MCP may expand the attack surface against LLM Agent systems, introducing new vulnerabilities allowing attackers to exploit by malicious MCP servers. In this paper, we present the first end-to-end empirical evaluation of attack vectors targeting the MCP ecosystem. We provide the formal definitions, affected path, and exploited path based on the workflow for four malicious server attacks, i.e., Tool Poisoning Attacks, Puppet Attacks, Rug Pull Attacks, and Exploitation via Malicious External Resources. To evaluate their feasibility, we conduct experiments following the typical steps of launching an attack through malicious MCP servers: upload → download → attack. Specifically, we first construct malicious MCP servers and successfully upload them to three widely used MCP aggregation platforms. The results indicate that current audit mechanisms are insufficient to identify and prevent these threats. Next, through a user study and interview with 20 participants, we demonstrate that users struggle to identify malicious MCP servers and often unknowingly install them from aggregator platforms. Finally, we empirically demonstrate that these attacks can trigger harmful actions within the user’s local environment, such as accessing private files or controlling devices to transfer digital assets. Additionally, based on interview results, we discuss four key challenges faced by the current MCP security ecosystem. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust security mechanisms to defend against malicious MCP servers and ensure the safe deployment of increasingly autonomous LLM agents.


  • Revealing Honeypots in High-Frequency Interactions on Decentralized Applications

    by Yifan Mo, Yuxin Su, Jiajing Wu, Ting Chen, Zibin Zheng

    The development of decentralized finance on blockchains leads to increasing high-frequency traders interacting with decentralized applications (DApps) to earn profits. However, DApps have a deficiency during high-frequency interactions: transaction records generated by these interactions are freely accessible on blockchains. If a user has high-frequency interactions with DApps, his transaction patterns can be exposed to attackers. Attackers can predict the conditions under which a user will execute transactions and the parameters a user will use. Due to the transparency of pending transactions, attackers can build honeypots to trick them into performing certain actions, resulting in significant security risks. This study presents the first formal definition of the honeypot in high-frequency interactions on DApps. We introduce matching rules and propose a log-based transaction parsing method to detect honeypots caused by the deficiency. Our method finds that 99 smart contracts are affected by 636 incidents, resulting in losses exceeding 25M USD. When a honeypot transaction occurs, the victim’s transaction is reverted, underscoring the importance of understanding the underlying causes. However, analyzing revert causes directly from transaction input data poses challenges, especially when the victim’s contract is not opensource. To address this challenge, we introduce a novel frequent mining method to analyze the causes of honeypots. The recovery success rate reaches 82.39%. Based on the causes that lead to transaction reverts, we propose potential strategies to mitigate these security risks and validate them in a simulated environment.