Youngsoo Kim
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Youngsoo Kim has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- H. Dharma Kwon
Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Champaign, Illinois 61820
2 shared publications - Karthik Murali
College of Business, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon 97331
2 shared publications Na Rea Cho
2 shared publicationsDavid Peng
1 shared publicationGeorge Georgiadis
1 shared publication- George Georgiadis
Northwestern University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (6) , 4087-4104
Operational Risk Management: Optimal Inspection Policy
Major banks around the world lost nearly $210 billion during the period of 2011–2016 due to operational risk events. To mitigate the severe consequences that can arise from such events, the Basel Regulatory Committee has mandated that financial institutions worldwide conduct inspections on operational risk. In light of the importance of operational risk and its current regulation in the industry, this paper proposes a continuous-time principal-agent model that explores the optimal inspection policy of a financial firm (principal) and the effort of its employees (agent) to reduce the occurrence of risk events. First, we characterize the optimal inspection strategy under two commonly used policies in practice, namely random and periodic policies. This characterization reveals the conditions for two different modes of inspection (effort inducement and error correction), as well as the nuanced interactions among the inspection frequency, the penalty charged for errors, and the wage paid to employees. Next, by comparing random and periodic policies, we find that the random policy outperforms the periodic policy if and only if the inspection cost is high. Furthermore, we propose a hybrid policy that strictly dominates the random policy and weakly dominates the periodic policy, suggesting that a proper reduction of the random element in the inspection policy, in the manner of our proposed hybrid policy, can always improve its performance. Finally, we examine the complete information benchmark (without moral hazard), supplemental mitigation strategies, and numerical studies to provide further insights and show the robustness of our main findings. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.00322 .
- 1 June 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (6) , 4087-4104
Operational Risk Management: Optimal Inspection Policy
Major banks around the world lost nearly $210 billion during the period of 2011–2016 due to operational risk events. To mitigate the severe consequences that can arise from such events, the Basel Regulatory Committee has mandated that financial institutions worldwide conduct inspections on operational risk. In light of the importance of operational risk and its current regulation in the industry, this paper proposes a continuous-time principal-agent model that explores the optimal inspection policy of a financial firm (principal) and the effort of its employees (agent) to reduce the occurrence of risk events. First, we characterize the optimal inspection strategy under two commonly used policies in practice, namely random and periodic policies. This characterization reveals the conditions for two different modes of inspection (effort inducement and error correction), as well as the nuanced interactions among the inspection frequency, the penalty charged for errors, and the wage paid to employees. Next, by comparing random and periodic policies, we find that the random policy outperforms the periodic policy if and only if the inspection cost is high. Furthermore, we propose a hybrid policy that strictly dominates the random policy and weakly dominates the periodic policy, suggesting that a proper reduction of the random element in the inspection policy, in the manner of our proposed hybrid policy, can always improve its performance. Finally, we examine the complete information benchmark (without moral hazard), supplemental mitigation strategies, and numerical studies to provide further insights and show the robustness of our main findings. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.00322 .
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 72 (2) , 684-698
Investment in the Common Good: Free Rider Effect and the Stability of Mixed Strategy Equilibria
The free rider problem is widely observed in investments in the common good. For example, if Best Buy offers corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, such as recycling, tech training, and supplier audit, at its own expense, other firms in the industry can benefit from these programs at no cost (i.e., they become the free riders). Such a free rider effect often manifests itself as a mixed strategy equilibrium, in which potential investors unnecessarily delay their investments. The article “Investment in the common good: Free rider effect and the stability of mixed strategy equilibria” finds that recurring investment opportunities can be a major driver of delays in investment in the common good. It also shows that sufficient heterogeneity in investment cost among potential investors can alleviate the free rider effect. Therefore, the policy makers may try to facilitate investments in public goods (e.g., CSR activities) through some form of selective benefits to potential investors.
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 72 (2) , 684-698
Investment in the Common Good: Free Rider Effect and the Stability of Mixed Strategy Equilibria
The free rider problem is widely observed in investments in the common good. For example, if Best Buy offers corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, such as recycling, tech training, and supplier audit, at its own expense, other firms in the industry can benefit from these programs at no cost (i.e., they become the free riders). Such a free rider effect often manifests itself as a mixed strategy equilibrium, in which potential investors unnecessarily delay their investments. The article “Investment in the common good: Free rider effect and the stability of mixed strategy equilibria” finds that recurring investment opportunities can be a major driver of delays in investment in the common good. It also shows that sufficient heterogeneity in investment cost among potential investors can alleviate the free rider effect. Therefore, the policy makers may try to facilitate investments in public goods (e.g., CSR activities) through some form of selective benefits to potential investors.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Decision Analysis
- Vol. 20 (2) , 166-185
Optimal Ratcheting in Executive Compensation
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Decision Analysis
- Vol. 20 (2) , 166-185
Optimal Ratcheting in Executive Compensation
- 31 January 2023
- Published by Wiley in Decision Sciences
- Vol. 55 (4) , 381-397
Drivers and implications of combined investment in renewables and energy storage in the residential sector
Residential consumers are increasingly combining renewables with energy storage systems. However, changes in policies and support for these technologies may impact their adoption and the outlook for the energy industry. In this paper, we consider a grid‐connected household's problem of determining the optimal capacities of these two technologies as well as the battery operating policy that minimizes its electricity costs when faced with time‐of‐use electricity prices and sellback credits. We identify the impact of household characteristics, technological progress, and electricity pricing policies on the levels of investment in these two technologies. Furthermore, we supplement our analytical results with a case study of two U.S. cities and identify policy guidelines for the design of a technology subsidy program aimed at stimulating the adoption of these technologies and the ensuing implications for residential customers, the environment, and grid reliability. Our paper has implications for several stakeholders in practice on (i) how the adoption of renewables is affected by energy storage (and vice versa) and (ii) how electricity pricing, technological progress, and subsidy policies can shape the adoption of both technologies.
- 31 January 2023
- Published by Wiley in Decision Sciences
- Vol. 55 (4) , 381-397
Drivers and implications of combined investment in renewables and energy storage in the residential sector
Residential consumers are increasingly combining renewables with energy storage systems. However, changes in policies and support for these technologies may impact their adoption and the outlook for the energy industry. In this paper, we consider a grid‐connected household's problem of determining the optimal capacities of these two technologies as well as the battery operating policy that minimizes its electricity costs when faced with time‐of‐use electricity prices and sellback credits. We identify the impact of household characteristics, technological progress, and electricity pricing policies on the levels of investment in these two technologies. Furthermore, we supplement our analytical results with a case study of two U.S. cities and identify policy guidelines for the design of a technology subsidy program aimed at stimulating the adoption of these technologies and the ensuing implications for residential customers, the environment, and grid reliability. Our paper has implications for several stakeholders in practice on (i) how the adoption of renewables is affected by energy storage (and vice versa) and (ii) how electricity pricing, technological progress, and subsidy policies can shape the adoption of both technologies.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 131, 171-185
The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 131, 171-185
The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information
- Open Access
The Absence of Attrition in a War of Attrition under Complete Information
We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. It is well-known that this class of games admits equilibria in pure, as well as mixed strategies, and much of the literature has focused on the latter. We show that if the players' payoffs whilst in "war" vary stochastically and their exit payoffs are heterogeneous, then the game admits Markov Perfect equilibria in pure strategies only. This is true irrespective of the degree of randomness and heterogeneity, thus highlighting the fragility of mixed-strategy equilibria to a natural perturbation of the canonical model. In contrast, when the players' flow payoffs are deterministic or their exit payoffs are homogeneous, the game admits equilibria in pure and mixed strategies.
Open AccessThe Absence of Attrition in a War of Attrition under Complete Information
We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. It is well-known that this class of games admits equilibria in pure, as well as mixed strategies, and much of the literature has focused on the latter. We show that if the players' payoffs whilst in "war" vary stochastically and their exit payoffs are heterogeneous, then the game admits Markov Perfect equilibria in pure strategies only. This is true irrespective of the degree of randomness and heterogeneity, thus highlighting the fragility of mixed-strategy equilibria to a natural perturbation of the canonical model. In contrast, when the players' flow payoffs are deterministic or their exit payoffs are homogeneous, the game admits equilibria in pure and mixed strategies.