Mridu Prabal Goswami
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Mridu Prabal Goswami has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Manipushpak Mitra
Economic Research Unit Indian Statistical Institute 700108 Kolkata India
3 shared publications - Arunava Sen
Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India
1 shared publication - Debapriya Sen
Department of Economics, Ryerson University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
1 shared publication - Debapriya Sen
Department of Economics, Toronto Metropolitan University, Toronto, Canada
1 shared publication - Sanmitra Ghosh1 shared publication
- Shubhro Sarkar
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Gen. A.K. Vaidya Marg, Goregaon East, Mumbai, 400065, India
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 23 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 119
Moral wiggle room in the dictator game
- 23 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 119
Moral wiggle room in the dictator game
- 1 June 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Decision Analysis
- Vol. 19 (2) , 170-187
A Characterization of Lexicographic Preferences
This paper characterizes lexicographic preferences over alternatives that are identified by a finite number of attributes. Our characterization is based on two key concepts: a weaker notion of continuity called “mild continuity” (strict preference order between any two alternatives that are different with respect to every attribute is preserved around their small neighborhoods) and an “unhappy set” (any alternative outside such a set is preferred to all alternatives inside). Three key aspects of our characterization are as follows: (i) we use continuity arguments; (ii) we use the stepwise approach of looking at two attributes at a time; and (iii) in contrast with the previous literature, we do not impose noncompensation on the preference and consider an alternative weaker condition.
- 1 June 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Decision Analysis
- Vol. 19 (2) , 170-187
A Characterization of Lexicographic Preferences
This paper characterizes lexicographic preferences over alternatives that are identified by a finite number of attributes. Our characterization is based on two key concepts: a weaker notion of continuity called “mild continuity” (strict preference order between any two alternatives that are different with respect to every attribute is preserved around their small neighborhoods) and an “unhappy set” (any alternative outside such a set is preferred to all alternatives inside). Three key aspects of our characterization are as follows: (i) we use continuity arguments; (ii) we use the stepwise approach of looking at two attributes at a time; and (iii) in contrast with the previous literature, we do not impose noncompensation on the preference and consider an alternative weaker condition.
- 8 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
- Vol. 107, 102651
Expanding and confusing space of alternatives: A case for lexicographic preferences
- 8 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
- Vol. 107, 102651
Expanding and confusing space of alternatives: A case for lexicographic preferences
- Open Access
- 1 May 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (2) , 361-381
Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
In this paper, we revisit a long-standing question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz (1972)). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auction-design, we show that in a specific quasi-linear domain, every Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof SCF satisfying non-bossiness and a mild continuity property is dictatorial. The result holds for an arbitrary number of agents but the two-person version does not require either the non-bossiness or continuity assumptions. It also follows that the dictatorship conclusion holds on any superset of this domain. We also provide a minimum consumption guarantee result in the spirit of Serizawa and Weymark (2003)
- 1 May 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (2) , 361-381
Open AccessStrategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
In this paper, we revisit a long-standing question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz (1972)). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auction-design, we show that in a specific quasi-linear domain, every Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof SCF satisfying non-bossiness and a mild continuity property is dictatorial. The result holds for an arbitrary number of agents but the two-person version does not require either the non-bossiness or continuity assumptions. It also follows that the dictatorship conclusion holds on any superset of this domain. We also provide a minimum consumption guarantee result in the spirit of Serizawa and Weymark (2003)