Alexei Zakharov
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Alexei Zakharov has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Constantine Sorokin
Natl Res Univ Higher Sch Econ, Moscow, Russia
2 shared publications - Ekaterina Borisova
Université de Lille, France, and CESifo, Germany
2 shared publications - Regina Smyth
Indiana University Bloomington, United States
2 shared publications - Alexander Shapoval
University of Lodz
1 shared publication Egor Bronnikov
1 shared publicationIsrael Marques
The Russia Program, George Washington University, Washington, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
When Politically Congruent Opinions Pass for Facts: Self-worth and Motivated Classification in Media Environments
People constantly encounter political claims whose status is ambiguous: they sound factual, but they also carry interpretation, evaluation, or partisan judgment. How do citizens decide whether such claims deserve evidentiary status? We argue that motivated reasoning can begin before belief updating. Citizens first decide whether a claim should function as evidence at all, and that classification judgment can itself be politically motivated. We formalize this earlier decision in a motivated-beliefs model in which stronger self-worth reduces the marginal psychological payoff from protective relabeling relative to the accuracy cost of misclassification. We test that implication in a survey experiment. Respondents complete a brief task designed to bolster or leave unchanged their sense of self-worth, then classify 24 short statements as facts or opinions. In the control group, classification errors are systematically related to statement content rather than random noise. A positive selfworth treatment reduces the treatment-effect difference for politically congruent opinions, relative to intermediate (neither congruent nor opposing) opinion-statement pairs, by 2.79 to 2.95 percentage points across four specifications, with the largest raw p-value equal to 0.023. Non-partisan-statement placebo tests are close to zero, while fact-side effects are less uniform. The results show that self-protective motives can shape a politically central judgment: which claims are allowed to carry factual authority in the first place. The mechanism may be especially consequential in environments where social standing feels precarious, including periods of economic insecurity.
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhen Politically Congruent Opinions Pass for Facts: Self-worth and Motivated Classification in Media Environments
People constantly encounter political claims whose status is ambiguous: they sound factual, but they also carry interpretation, evaluation, or partisan judgment. How do citizens decide whether such claims deserve evidentiary status? We argue that motivated reasoning can begin before belief updating. Citizens first decide whether a claim should function as evidence at all, and that classification judgment can itself be politically motivated. We formalize this earlier decision in a motivated-beliefs model in which stronger self-worth reduces the marginal psychological payoff from protective relabeling relative to the accuracy cost of misclassification. We test that implication in a survey experiment. Respondents complete a brief task designed to bolster or leave unchanged their sense of self-worth, then classify 24 short statements as facts or opinions. In the control group, classification errors are systematically related to statement content rather than random noise. A positive selfworth treatment reduces the treatment-effect difference for politically congruent opinions, relative to intermediate (neither congruent nor opposing) opinion-statement pairs, by 2.79 to 2.95 percentage points across four specifications, with the largest raw p-value equal to 0.023. Non-partisan-statement placebo tests are close to zero, while fact-side effects are less uniform. The results show that self-protective motives can shape a politically central judgment: which claims are allowed to carry factual authority in the first place. The mechanism may be especially consequential in environments where social standing feels precarious, including periods of economic insecurity.
- Open Access
- 15 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Signaling Vice: Why Looking Bad Wins Votes
We use a formal model to analyze why politicians engage in vice signaling - a deliberate display of bad behavior, transgressive views, or lack of moral integrity. We show that it is possible even when voters prefer candidates with moral character, as long as they are also wary of the candidates who they believe are inauthentic or capable of concealing their immorality. Vice signaling allows an immoral candidate to present oneself as a "bad but authentic" type, implying that the competition is both immoral and inauthentic. This tactic is especially effective with politically cynical voters who are prone to drawing sweeping conclusions about the self-serving nature of political actors. Raising the reputational cost of signaling vice has an ambiguous effect-improving voter welfare, while leading to more low-integrity candidates getting elected.
- 15 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSignaling Vice: Why Looking Bad Wins Votes
We use a formal model to analyze why politicians engage in vice signaling - a deliberate display of bad behavior, transgressive views, or lack of moral integrity. We show that it is possible even when voters prefer candidates with moral character, as long as they are also wary of the candidates who they believe are inauthentic or capable of concealing their immorality. Vice signaling allows an immoral candidate to present oneself as a "bad but authentic" type, implying that the competition is both immoral and inauthentic. This tactic is especially effective with politically cynical voters who are prone to drawing sweeping conclusions about the self-serving nature of political actors. Raising the reputational cost of signaling vice has an ambiguous effect-improving voter welfare, while leading to more low-integrity candidates getting elected.
- Open Access
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- p. 1-12
Propaganda to a cynical audience
Using a model, we explain why propaganda in autocracies can be blatantly false and unconvincing. We model two news outlets that report on a hidden state of the world, motivated by the ex-post beliefs of the audience about the state of the world. News outlets face a tradeoff when making egregiously false statements. On the one hand, such statements are easily verifiable as false. On the other hand, a demonstrably false report reduces the credibility of the report made by the competing outlet. This is especially true for audiences in autocracies that are characterized by high media cynicism and are prone to making sweeping generalizations about the self-serving nature of all media.
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- p. 1-12
Open AccessPropaganda to a cynical audience
Using a model, we explain why propaganda in autocracies can be blatantly false and unconvincing. We model two news outlets that report on a hidden state of the world, motivated by the ex-post beliefs of the audience about the state of the world. News outlets face a tradeoff when making egregiously false statements. On the one hand, such statements are easily verifiable as false. On the other hand, a demonstrably false report reduces the credibility of the report made by the competing outlet. This is especially true for audiences in autocracies that are characterized by high media cynicism and are prone to making sweeping generalizations about the self-serving nature of all media.
- 23 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 85
Overestimation of social security payments reduces preferences for spending on social policy
- 23 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 85
Overestimation of social security payments reduces preferences for spending on social policy
- 14 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Post-Soviet Affairs
- Vol. 40 (3) , 175-203
Redistributive policy and redistribution preferences: the effects of the Moscow redevelopment program
- 14 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Post-Soviet Affairs
- Vol. 40 (3) , 175-203
Redistributive policy and redistribution preferences: the effects of the Moscow redevelopment program
- Open Access
- 28 November 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 118 (4) , 2079
Autocratic Policy and the Accumulation of Social Capital: The Moscow Housing Renovation Program – CORRIGENDUM
Autocratic Policy and the Accumulation of Social Capital: The Moscow Housing Renovation Program – CORRIGENDUM
- 28 November 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 118 (4) , 2079
Open AccessAutocratic Policy and the Accumulation of Social Capital: The Moscow Housing Renovation Program – CORRIGENDUM
Autocratic Policy and the Accumulation of Social Capital: The Moscow Housing Renovation Program – CORRIGENDUM
- 31 October 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 118 (3) , 1110-1130
Autocratic Policy and the Accumulation of Social Capital: The Moscow Housing Renovation Program
Can autocratic policy generate incentives for the accumulation of social capital and political engagement? This question is important to understand stability in authoritarian regimes that increasingly rely on governance to build legitimacy and social support. While existing research shows that the incentives for societal interaction embedded in policies can yield new forms of social capital and political engagement in democratic regimes, the top-down nature of policy and the corrupt and information-poor context of policy implementation could undermine this mechanism in authoritarian regimes. We explore this question by examining the effect of the Moscow Housing Renovation Program, a massive urban renewal project, that required residents to organize to obtain new housing. Comparing a matched sample of 1,300 residents living in buildings included and excluded from the program, we find that interactions induced by the program led to changes in the level of social capital among residents in included buildings. We also find spillover effects on political engagement and collective action against pension reform.
- 31 October 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 118 (3) , 1110-1130
Autocratic Policy and the Accumulation of Social Capital: The Moscow Housing Renovation Program
Can autocratic policy generate incentives for the accumulation of social capital and political engagement? This question is important to understand stability in authoritarian regimes that increasingly rely on governance to build legitimacy and social support. While existing research shows that the incentives for societal interaction embedded in policies can yield new forms of social capital and political engagement in democratic regimes, the top-down nature of policy and the corrupt and information-poor context of policy implementation could undermine this mechanism in authoritarian regimes. We explore this question by examining the effect of the Moscow Housing Renovation Program, a massive urban renewal project, that required residents to organize to obtain new housing. Comparing a matched sample of 1,300 residents living in buildings included and excluded from the program, we find that interactions induced by the program led to changes in the level of social capital among residents in included buildings. We also find spillover effects on political engagement and collective action against pension reform.
- Open Access
- 28 March 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Lying with Heterogeneous Image Concerns
We study reporting behavior in a lying game where the agents differ on two characteristics: The intrinsic cost of lying, and the social cost due to one's report being perceived as a lie. We show that making lying more socially costly can lead to an opposite effect of making lying more frequent. This happens because increasing the social cost for a subset of agents will make them choose high-value reports less frequently, making such reports less socially costly for the rest of the agents, and inviting them to lie more.
- 28 March 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLying with Heterogeneous Image Concerns
We study reporting behavior in a lying game where the agents differ on two characteristics: The intrinsic cost of lying, and the social cost due to one's report being perceived as a lie. We show that making lying more socially costly can lead to an opposite effect of making lying more frequent. This happens because increasing the social cost for a subset of agents will make them choose high-value reports less frequently, making such reports less socially costly for the rest of the agents, and inviting them to lie more.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Does Voluntary Disclosure of Polarizing Information Make Polarization Deeper? An Online Experiment on Russo-Ukrainian War
Does the animosity toward a holder of an opposite political opinion or the behavior toward someone whose opinion on a divisive issue is unknown depends on whether that opinion was disclosed or withheld voluntarily? In order to study this question, we conducted a pre-registered study in Russia, measuring the pro-war dictators' behavior towards their partners with aligned or conflicting views on the war in Ukraine using give-or-take modification of Dictator Game. In the presence of a large polarisation gap (outgroup discrimination), we did not find that intentional vs. unintentional disclosure of the recipients' positions affected the transfers of the dictators; at the same time, dictators' beliefs about the share of war supporters among experiment participants and the donations made by other dictators were causally affected. Our study is the first one to consider this dimension of social interactions, and contributes to the quickly growing literature on political polarisation.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDoes Voluntary Disclosure of Polarizing Information Make Polarization Deeper? An Online Experiment on Russo-Ukrainian War
Does the animosity toward a holder of an opposite political opinion or the behavior toward someone whose opinion on a divisive issue is unknown depends on whether that opinion was disclosed or withheld voluntarily? In order to study this question, we conducted a pre-registered study in Russia, measuring the pro-war dictators' behavior towards their partners with aligned or conflicting views on the war in Ukraine using give-or-take modification of Dictator Game. In the presence of a large polarisation gap (outgroup discrimination), we did not find that intentional vs. unintentional disclosure of the recipients' positions affected the transfers of the dictators; at the same time, dictators' beliefs about the share of war supporters among experiment participants and the donations made by other dictators were causally affected. Our study is the first one to consider this dimension of social interactions, and contributes to the quickly growing literature on political polarisation.
- 17 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 60 (3) , 439-475
Electoral turnout with divided opposition
- 17 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 60 (3) , 439-475
Electoral turnout with divided opposition