Nilanjan Datta
Research Subjects
Nilanjan Datta has a total of 47 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Avijit Dutta
Institute for Advancing Intelligence (IAI) TCG-CREST, Kolkata, India and Academy of Scientific and Innovative Research (AcSIR), Ghaziabad, India
12 shared publications - Hrithik Nandi
Institute for Advancing Intelligence (IAI) TCG-CREST, Kolkata, India and Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda Educational and Research Institute, Belur, India
4 shared publications - Mridul Nandi
Indian Statistical Institute
4 shared publications - Avishek Majumder
Krea University
3 shared publications - Bibhas Chandra Das
Institute for Advancing Intelligence, TCG CREST
3 shared publications - Subhabrata Samajder
Institute for Advancing Intelligence (IAI), TCG CREST
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 October 2026
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 3 (3)
One-pass AE Modes with White-box Incompressibility
At ASIACRYPT 2022, Hosoyamada et al. introduced a rigorous white-box incompressibility framework for symmetric-key primitives, formalizing notions such as wh-PRP, wh-SPRP, and wh-PRI, and establishing reductions that weak public indifferentiability implies white-box reduction in their framework. As a concrete example, they demonstrated that counter mode with SIV construction achieves white-box incompressibility. Extending these results to one-pass constructions appears to be considerably challenging. In particular, any construction that is vulnerable under nonce repetitions with respect to the AE security is incompatible in their white-box setting, thereby posing a fundamental obstacle to achieving white-box incompressibility for such schemes. We address this by considering a weaker notion of AE security and introducing the notion of delayed on-line AE (dOAE), a natural and strictly more expressive extension of on-line AEAD supported by many efficient designs. Within this framework, we analyze the authenticated cipher SAEB, introduced by Naito et al. at TCHES'18, that achieves dOAE security under nonce misuse. We prove that SAEB achieves a white-box delayed on-line PRI (wh-dOPRI), assuming the underlying block-cipher to be wh-PRP. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result providing a mode-level white-box guarantee for an efficient single-pass AEAD construction.
- 26 October 2026
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 3 (3)
Open AccessOne-pass AE Modes with White-box Incompressibility
At ASIACRYPT 2022, Hosoyamada et al. introduced a rigorous white-box incompressibility framework for symmetric-key primitives, formalizing notions such as wh-PRP, wh-SPRP, and wh-PRI, and establishing reductions that weak public indifferentiability implies white-box reduction in their framework. As a concrete example, they demonstrated that counter mode with SIV construction achieves white-box incompressibility. Extending these results to one-pass constructions appears to be considerably challenging. In particular, any construction that is vulnerable under nonce repetitions with respect to the AE security is incompatible in their white-box setting, thereby posing a fundamental obstacle to achieving white-box incompressibility for such schemes. We address this by considering a weaker notion of AE security and introducing the notion of delayed on-line AE (dOAE), a natural and strictly more expressive extension of on-line AEAD supported by many efficient designs. Within this framework, we analyze the authenticated cipher SAEB, introduced by Naito et al. at TCHES'18, that achieves dOAE security under nonce misuse. We prove that SAEB achieves a white-box delayed on-line PRI (wh-dOPRI), assuming the underlying block-cipher to be wh-PRP. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result providing a mode-level white-box guarantee for an efficient single-pass AEAD construction.
- Open Access
- 26 October 2026
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 3 (3)
Designing Quantum-Safe Conjunctive SSE: How Fast Can You Go?
Designing quantum-safe SSE schemes that efficiently support conjunctive queries while maintaining only a linear storage overhead relative to the database size is an important research area with growing demand. In this direction, Talapatra et al. introduced OQXT [EUROS& P’23], the first quantum-safe conjunctive SSE scheme based on hard lattice assumptions. More recently, Talapatra et al. proposed a scalable extension, NTRU-OQXT [CiC’25], built upon a scalable alternative to OQXT. To the best of our knowledge, NTRU-OQXT is the most efficient quantum-safe SSE scheme that can handle conjunctive queries. In this paper, we first discuss some security vulnerabilities in NTRU-OQXT and argue that trivial fixes would incur additional efficiency costs. To this end, we propose a variant of NTRU-OQXT, dubbed NTRU-OQXT+, that not only addresses the security vulnerabilities of NTRU-OQXT but also provides much improved performance.
- 26 October 2026
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 3 (3)
Open AccessDesigning Quantum-Safe Conjunctive SSE: How Fast Can You Go?
Designing quantum-safe SSE schemes that efficiently support conjunctive queries while maintaining only a linear storage overhead relative to the database size is an important research area with growing demand. In this direction, Talapatra et al. introduced OQXT [EUROS& P’23], the first quantum-safe conjunctive SSE scheme based on hard lattice assumptions. More recently, Talapatra et al. proposed a scalable extension, NTRU-OQXT [CiC’25], built upon a scalable alternative to OQXT. To the best of our knowledge, NTRU-OQXT is the most efficient quantum-safe SSE scheme that can handle conjunctive queries. In this paper, we first discuss some security vulnerabilities in NTRU-OQXT and argue that trivial fixes would incur additional efficiency costs. To this end, we propose a variant of NTRU-OQXT, dubbed NTRU-OQXT+, that not only addresses the security vulnerabilities of NTRU-OQXT but also provides much improved performance.
- 24 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 302-334
Efficient and Post-quantum Conjunctive Dynamic SSE with Strong Privacy Guarantees
- 24 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 302-334
Efficient and Post-quantum Conjunctive Dynamic SSE with Strong Privacy Guarantees
- 6 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 394-423
How to Build a Short-Input Random Oracle from Public Random Permutations
- 6 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 394-423
How to Build a Short-Input Random Oracle from Public Random Permutations
- Open Access
- 6 October 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (3)
Multi User Security of LightMAC and LightMAC_Plus
LightMAC is one of the ISO/IEC standardized message authentication codes that provably achieves security roughly in the order of O(q^2/2^n), where q is the total number of queries and n is the block size of the underlying block cipher. In a subsequent work, Naito proposed a beyond-birthday-bound variant of the LightMAC construction, dubbed LightMAC_Plus, and demonstrated that it achieves 2n/3-bit PRF security. Later in EUROCRYPT'20, Kim et al. improved the security bound of LighMAC_Plus from 2n/3 bits to 3n/4 bits. However, all these security results have been proven in the single-user setting, where we assume that the adversary has access to a single instance of the construction. In this paper, we investigate, for the first time, the security of the LightMAC and the LightMAC_Plus constructions in the context of the multi-user setting, where we assume that the adversary has access to more than one instance of the construction. In particular, we have shown that LightMAC offers O(qq_maxl k/2^n + up/2^k) multi-user PRF security, where q denotes the total number of construction queries, p denotes the total number of offline primitive queries, q_max denotes the maximum number of queries per user, u denotes the total number of users and l denotes the maximum number of message blocks in a query. We have also shown that LightMAC_Plus maintains security up to approximately 2^2n/3 construction queries and 2^2k/3 ideal-cipher queries in the ideal-cipher model, where n denotes the block size and k denotes the key size of the block cipher.
- 6 October 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (3)
Open AccessMulti User Security of LightMAC and LightMAC_Plus
LightMAC is one of the ISO/IEC standardized message authentication codes that provably achieves security roughly in the order of O(q^2/2^n), where q is the total number of queries and n is the block size of the underlying block cipher. In a subsequent work, Naito proposed a beyond-birthday-bound variant of the LightMAC construction, dubbed LightMAC_Plus, and demonstrated that it achieves 2n/3-bit PRF security. Later in EUROCRYPT'20, Kim et al. improved the security bound of LighMAC_Plus from 2n/3 bits to 3n/4 bits. However, all these security results have been proven in the single-user setting, where we assume that the adversary has access to a single instance of the construction. In this paper, we investigate, for the first time, the security of the LightMAC and the LightMAC_Plus constructions in the context of the multi-user setting, where we assume that the adversary has access to more than one instance of the construction. In particular, we have shown that LightMAC offers O(qq_maxl k/2^n + up/2^k) multi-user PRF security, where q denotes the total number of construction queries, p denotes the total number of offline primitive queries, q_max denotes the maximum number of queries per user, u denotes the total number of users and l denotes the maximum number of message blocks in a query. We have also shown that LightMAC_Plus maintains security up to approximately 2^2n/3 construction queries and 2^2k/3 ideal-cipher queries in the ideal-cipher model, where n denotes the block size and k denotes the key size of the block cipher.
- Open Access
- 25 September 2025
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2025 (3) , 183-229
HCTR+: An Optimally Secure TBC-Based Accordion Mode
The design of tweakable wide-block ciphers has advanced significantly over the past two decades. This evolution began with the wide-block cipher by Naor and Reingold. Since then, numerous constructions have been proposed, many of which are built on existing block ciphers and are secure up to the birthday bound for the total number of blocks queried. Although there has been a recent slowdown in the development of such ciphers, the latest NIST proposal for Accordion modes has reignited the interest and momentum in the design and analysis of these ciphers. Although new designs have emerged, their security often falls short of optimal (i.e., n-bit) security, where n is the output size of the primitive. In this direction, designing an efficient tweakable wide-block cipher with n-bit security seems to be an interesting research problem to the symmetric key research community. An optimally secure tweakable wide-block cipher mode can easily be turned into a misuse-resistant RUP secure authenticated encryption scheme with optimal security. This paper proposes HCTR+, which turns an n-bit tweakable block cipher (TBC) with n-bit tweak into a variable input length tweakable wide block cipher. Unlike tweakable HCTR, HCTR+ ensures n-bit security regardless of tweak repetitions. We also propose two TBC-based almost-xor-universal hash functions, named PHASH+ and ZHASH+, and use them as the underlying hash functions in the HCTR+ construction to create two TBC-based n-bit secure tweakable wide block cipher modes, PHCTR+ and ZHCTR+. Experimental results show that both PHCTR+ and ZHCTR+ exhibit excellent software performance when their underlying TBC is instantiated with Deoxys-BC-256.
- 25 September 2025
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2025 (3) , 183-229
Open AccessHCTR+: An Optimally Secure TBC-Based Accordion Mode
The design of tweakable wide-block ciphers has advanced significantly over the past two decades. This evolution began with the wide-block cipher by Naor and Reingold. Since then, numerous constructions have been proposed, many of which are built on existing block ciphers and are secure up to the birthday bound for the total number of blocks queried. Although there has been a recent slowdown in the development of such ciphers, the latest NIST proposal for Accordion modes has reignited the interest and momentum in the design and analysis of these ciphers. Although new designs have emerged, their security often falls short of optimal (i.e., n-bit) security, where n is the output size of the primitive. In this direction, designing an efficient tweakable wide-block cipher with n-bit security seems to be an interesting research problem to the symmetric key research community. An optimally secure tweakable wide-block cipher mode can easily be turned into a misuse-resistant RUP secure authenticated encryption scheme with optimal security. This paper proposes HCTR+, which turns an n-bit tweakable block cipher (TBC) with n-bit tweak into a variable input length tweakable wide block cipher. Unlike tweakable HCTR, HCTR+ ensures n-bit security regardless of tweak repetitions. We also propose two TBC-based almost-xor-universal hash functions, named PHASH+ and ZHASH+, and use them as the underlying hash functions in the HCTR+ construction to create two TBC-based n-bit secure tweakable wide block cipher modes, PHCTR+ and ZHCTR+. Experimental results show that both PHCTR+ and ZHCTR+ exhibit excellent software performance when their underlying TBC is instantiated with Deoxys-BC-256.
- Open Access
- 7 July 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (2)
Sequential Indifferentiability of STH and EDM
The notion of indifferentiability was proposed by Maurer et al. to bound the distinguishing advantage of a construction built on a public primitive, from a public random function. In Indocrypt'10, Mandal et al. have shown that the sum of two independent permutations is indifferentiable from a public random function up to 2 2 n / 3 queries. Later in ACNS'15, Mennink and Preneel identified an analytical flaw of Mandal et al's result and revised the security bound to 2 2 n / 3 / n . In Eurocrypt'18, Bhattacharya and Nandi have improved their indifferentiable bound to 2 n queries, which was again identified as incorrect in the analysis by Gunsing et al. In this paper, we study the indifferentiability of a few other PRF constructions, namely STH and EDM constructions. We will show that neither STH nor STH2 is indifferentiable, which led us to propose a generalized version called gSTH. We have shown that gSTH achieves a tight l -bit security bound, where l denotes the size of the constants in terms of bits used in the construction. While we show that EDM achieves a tight n / 2 -bit indifferentiable bound with respect to our proposed simulator, single-keyed EDM is not indifferentiable from a public random function. We would like to mention that all the proofs and the attacks have been done in the sequential indifferentiability model.
- 7 July 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (2)
Open AccessSequential Indifferentiability of STH and EDM
The notion of indifferentiability was proposed by Maurer et al. to bound the distinguishing advantage of a construction built on a public primitive, from a public random function. In Indocrypt'10, Mandal et al. have shown that the sum of two independent permutations is indifferentiable from a public random function up to 2 2 n / 3 queries. Later in ACNS'15, Mennink and Preneel identified an analytical flaw of Mandal et al's result and revised the security bound to 2 2 n / 3 / n . In Eurocrypt'18, Bhattacharya and Nandi have improved their indifferentiable bound to 2 n queries, which was again identified as incorrect in the analysis by Gunsing et al. In this paper, we study the indifferentiability of a few other PRF constructions, namely STH and EDM constructions. We will show that neither STH nor STH2 is indifferentiable, which led us to propose a generalized version called gSTH. We have shown that gSTH achieves a tight l -bit security bound, where l denotes the size of the constants in terms of bits used in the construction. While we show that EDM achieves a tight n / 2 -bit indifferentiable bound with respect to our proposed simulator, single-keyed EDM is not indifferentiable from a public random function. We would like to mention that all the proofs and the attacks have been done in the sequential indifferentiability model.
- Open Access
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
Fault-tolerant Verifiable Dynamic SSE with Forward and Backward Privacy
Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (DSSE) allows users to securely outsource their data to cloud servers while enabling efficient searches and updates. The verifiability property of a DSSE construction ensures that users do not accept incorrect search results from a malicious server while the fault-tolerance property guarantees the construction functions correctly even with faulty queries from the client (e.g., adding a keyword to a document multiple times, deleting a keyword from a document that was never added). There have been very few studies on fault-tolerant verifiable DSSE schemes that achieve forward privacy, and none of the existing constructions achieve backward privacy. In this paper, we aim to design an efficient fault-tolerant verifiable DSSE scheme that provides both forward and backward privacy. First, we propose a basic fault-tolerant verifiable DSSE scheme, dubbed FVS1 , which achieves forward privacy and stronger backward privacy with the update pattern (BPUP). However, the communication complexity for the search operation of this scheme is O ( u ) , where u is the total number of updates for the search keyword. To address this issue, we propose an efficient variant of the previous DSSE scheme, called FVS2 , which achieves the same functionality with an optimized communication complexity of O ( m + u ′ ) for search queries. Here m is the size of the result set and u ′ is the number of update operations made on the queried keyword after the previous search made on the keyword. This improvement comes at the cost of some additional information leakage, but it ensures the construction achieves backward privacy with the link pattern (BPLP).
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
Open AccessFault-tolerant Verifiable Dynamic SSE with Forward and Backward Privacy
Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (DSSE) allows users to securely outsource their data to cloud servers while enabling efficient searches and updates. The verifiability property of a DSSE construction ensures that users do not accept incorrect search results from a malicious server while the fault-tolerance property guarantees the construction functions correctly even with faulty queries from the client (e.g., adding a keyword to a document multiple times, deleting a keyword from a document that was never added). There have been very few studies on fault-tolerant verifiable DSSE schemes that achieve forward privacy, and none of the existing constructions achieve backward privacy. In this paper, we aim to design an efficient fault-tolerant verifiable DSSE scheme that provides both forward and backward privacy. First, we propose a basic fault-tolerant verifiable DSSE scheme, dubbed FVS1 , which achieves forward privacy and stronger backward privacy with the update pattern (BPUP). However, the communication complexity for the search operation of this scheme is O ( u ) , where u is the total number of updates for the search keyword. To address this issue, we propose an efficient variant of the previous DSSE scheme, called FVS2 , which achieves the same functionality with an optimized communication complexity of O ( m + u ′ ) for search queries. Here m is the size of the result set and u ′ is the number of update operations made on the queried keyword after the previous search made on the keyword. This improvement comes at the cost of some additional information leakage, but it ensures the construction achieves backward privacy with the link pattern (BPLP).
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (2)
FEDT: Forkcipher-based Leakage-resilient Beyond-birthday-secure AE
There has been a notable surge of research on leakage-resilient authenticated encryption (AE) schemes, in the bounded as well as the unbounded leakage model. The latter has garnered significant attention due to its detailed and practical orientation. Designers have commonly utilized (tweakable) block ciphers, exemplified by the TEDT scheme, achieving ???? ( n − log ( n 2 ) ) -bit integrity under leakage and comparable AE security in the black-box setting. However, the privacy of TEDT was limited by n / 2 -bits under leakage; TEDT2 sought to overcome these limitations by achieving improved security with ???? ( n − log n ) -bit integrity and privacy under leakage. This work introduces FEDT, an efficient leakage-resilient authenticated encryption (AE) scheme based on fork-cipher. Compared to the state-of-the-art schemes TEDT and TEDT2, which process messages with a rate of 1 / 2 block per primitive call for encryption and one for authentication, FEDT doubles their rates at the price of a different primitive. FEDT employs a more parallelizable tree-based encryption compared to its predecessors while maintaining ???? ( n − log n ) -bit security for both privacy and integrity under leakage. FEDT prioritizes high throughput at the cost of increased latency. For settings where latency is important, we propose FEDT*, which combines the authentication part of FEDT with a CTR-based encryption. FEDT* offers security equivalent to FEDT while increasing the encryption rate of 4 / 3 and reducing the latency.
- 8 July 2024
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (2)
Open AccessFEDT: Forkcipher-based Leakage-resilient Beyond-birthday-secure AE
There has been a notable surge of research on leakage-resilient authenticated encryption (AE) schemes, in the bounded as well as the unbounded leakage model. The latter has garnered significant attention due to its detailed and practical orientation. Designers have commonly utilized (tweakable) block ciphers, exemplified by the TEDT scheme, achieving ???? ( n − log ( n 2 ) ) -bit integrity under leakage and comparable AE security in the black-box setting. However, the privacy of TEDT was limited by n / 2 -bits under leakage; TEDT2 sought to overcome these limitations by achieving improved security with ???? ( n − log n ) -bit integrity and privacy under leakage. This work introduces FEDT, an efficient leakage-resilient authenticated encryption (AE) scheme based on fork-cipher. Compared to the state-of-the-art schemes TEDT and TEDT2, which process messages with a rate of 1 / 2 block per primitive call for encryption and one for authentication, FEDT doubles their rates at the price of a different primitive. FEDT employs a more parallelizable tree-based encryption compared to its predecessors while maintaining ???? ( n − log n ) -bit security for both privacy and integrity under leakage. FEDT prioritizes high throughput at the cost of increased latency. For settings where latency is important, we propose FEDT*, which combines the authentication part of FEDT with a CTR-based encryption. FEDT* offers security equivalent to FEDT while increasing the encryption rate of 4 / 3 and reducing the latency.