Mathieu Dahan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Mathieu Dahan has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Saurabh Amin
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
5 shared publications - Bastián Bahamondes
H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
2 shared publications - Benoit Montreuil
Georgia Institute of Technology
2 shared publications Chelsea C. White
H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta Georgia
2 shared publications- Henrik Sandberg
KTH Royal Institute of Technology
2 shared publications - Lacy M. Greening
School of Computing and Augmented Intelligence, Arizona State University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Care Management Science
- Vol. 29 (4) , 43
Paving the way for more accessible cancer care in low-income countries with optimization
Cancers are a growing cause of morbidity and mortality in low-income countries. Geographic access plays a key role in both timely diagnosis and successful treatment. In areas lacking well-developed road networks, seasonal weather events can lengthen already long travel times to access care. Expanding facilities to offer cancer care is expensive and requires staffing by skilled medical professionals, which are often in short supply. In this article, we propose a mathematical model to improve geographic access to cancer care by jointly considering expansions to care facilities and improvements to the road network. We model this as a multi-period stochastic facility location network design problem. For each period, a decision maker must simultaneously choose a set of facilities at which to add tertiary cancer services and a set of roads to improve while facing demand and travel time uncertainty. Once demand for cancer care and weather events are realized, patients observe road conditions and use the transportation network to travel towards the closest facility with available cancer services. We create a new path-based formulation of this problem and develop a new branch-price-and-cut algorithm with acceleration techniques that take advantage of this formulation’s structure. We demonstrate our approach using Rwanda as a case study and show that the reductions in travel time to cancer care directly attributable to the road network improvements can be as high as one hour.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Care Management Science
- Vol. 29 (4) , 43
Open AccessPaving the way for more accessible cancer care in low-income countries with optimization
Cancers are a growing cause of morbidity and mortality in low-income countries. Geographic access plays a key role in both timely diagnosis and successful treatment. In areas lacking well-developed road networks, seasonal weather events can lengthen already long travel times to access care. Expanding facilities to offer cancer care is expensive and requires staffing by skilled medical professionals, which are often in short supply. In this article, we propose a mathematical model to improve geographic access to cancer care by jointly considering expansions to care facilities and improvements to the road network. We model this as a multi-period stochastic facility location network design problem. For each period, a decision maker must simultaneously choose a set of facilities at which to add tertiary cancer services and a set of roads to improve while facing demand and travel time uncertainty. Once demand for cancer care and weather events are realized, patients observe road conditions and use the transportation network to travel towards the closest facility with available cancer services. We create a new path-based formulation of this problem and develop a new branch-price-and-cut algorithm with acceleration techniques that take advantage of this formulation’s structure. We demonstrate our approach using Rwanda as a case study and show that the reductions in travel time to cancer care directly attributable to the road network improvements can be as high as one hour.
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in IISE Transactions
- Vol. 58 (11) , 1-16
Integrating order-to-delivery time sensitivity in e-commerce middle-mile consolidation network design
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in IISE Transactions
- Vol. 58 (11) , 1-16
Integrating order-to-delivery time sensitivity in e-commerce middle-mile consolidation network design
- Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 763
Inspection Game with Location-Specific Detection Capabilities
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 763
Open AccessInspection Game with Location-Specific Detection Capabilities
- Open Access
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Wiley in Naval Research Logistics (NRL)
- Vol. 72 (3) , 372-389
Dynamic Operational Planning in Warfare: A Stochastic Game Approach to Military Campaigns
We study a two‐player discounted zero‐sum stochastic game model for dynamic operational planning in military campaigns. At each stage, the players manage multiple commanders who order military actions on objectives that have an open line of control. When a battle over the control of an objective occurs, its stochastic outcome depends on the actions and the enabling support provided by the control of other objectives. Each player aims to maximize the cumulative number of objectives they control, weighted by their criticality. To solve this large‐scale stochastic game, we derive properties of its Markov perfect equilibria by leveraging the logistics and military operational command and control structure. We show the consequential isotonicity of the optimal value function with respect to the partially ordered state space, which in turn leads to a significant reduction of the state and action spaces. We also accelerate Shapley's value iteration algorithm by eliminating dominated actions and investigating pure equilibria of the matrix game solved at each iteration. We demonstrate the computational value of our equilibrium results on a case study that reflects representative operational‐level military campaigns with geopolitical implications. Our analysis reveals a complex interplay between the game's parameters and dynamics in equilibrium, resulting in new military insights for campaign analysts.
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Wiley in Naval Research Logistics (NRL)
- Vol. 72 (3) , 372-389
Open AccessDynamic Operational Planning in Warfare: A Stochastic Game Approach to Military Campaigns
We study a two‐player discounted zero‐sum stochastic game model for dynamic operational planning in military campaigns. At each stage, the players manage multiple commanders who order military actions on objectives that have an open line of control. When a battle over the control of an objective occurs, its stochastic outcome depends on the actions and the enabling support provided by the control of other objectives. Each player aims to maximize the cumulative number of objectives they control, weighted by their criticality. To solve this large‐scale stochastic game, we derive properties of its Markov perfect equilibria by leveraging the logistics and military operational command and control structure. We show the consequential isotonicity of the optimal value function with respect to the partially ordered state space, which in turn leads to a significant reduction of the state and action spaces. We also accelerate Shapley's value iteration algorithm by eliminating dominated actions and investigating pure equilibria of the matrix game solved at each iteration. We demonstrate the computational value of our equilibrium results on a case study that reflects representative operational‐level military campaigns with geopolitical implications. Our analysis reveals a complex interplay between the game's parameters and dynamics in equilibrium, resulting in new military insights for campaign analysts.
- 1 June 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Decision Analysis
- Vol. 21 (2) , 110-124
Hide-and-Seek Game with Capacitated Locations and Imperfect Detection
We consider a variant of the hide-and-seek game in which a seeker inspects multiple hiding locations to find multiple items hidden by a hider. Each hiding location has a maximum hiding capacity and a probability of detecting its hidden items when an inspection by the seeker takes place. The objective of the seeker (respectively, hider) is to minimize (respectively, maximize) the expected number of undetected items. This model is motivated by strategic inspection problems, where a security agency is tasked with coordinating multiple inspection resources to detect and seize illegal commodities hidden by a criminal organization. To solve this large-scale zero-sum game, we leverage its structure and show that its mixed-strategy Nash equilibria can be characterized using their unidimensional marginal distributions, which are pure equilibria of a lower dimensional continuous zero-sum game. This leads to a two-step approach for efficiently solving our hide-and-seek game: First, we analytically solve the continuous game and derive closed-form expressions of the equilibrium marginal distributions. Second, we design a combinatorial algorithm to coordinate the players’ resources and compute equilibrium mixed strategies that satisfy the marginal distributions. We show that this solution approach computes a Nash equilibrium of the hide-and-seek game in quadratic time with linear support. Our analysis reveals novel equilibrium behaviors driven by a complex interplay between the game parameters, captured by our closed-form solutions. Funding: This work was supported by the Georgia Tech Stewart Fellowship and the Georgia Tech New Faculty Start Up Grant. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2023.0012 .
- 1 June 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Decision Analysis
- Vol. 21 (2) , 110-124
Hide-and-Seek Game with Capacitated Locations and Imperfect Detection
We consider a variant of the hide-and-seek game in which a seeker inspects multiple hiding locations to find multiple items hidden by a hider. Each hiding location has a maximum hiding capacity and a probability of detecting its hidden items when an inspection by the seeker takes place. The objective of the seeker (respectively, hider) is to minimize (respectively, maximize) the expected number of undetected items. This model is motivated by strategic inspection problems, where a security agency is tasked with coordinating multiple inspection resources to detect and seize illegal commodities hidden by a criminal organization. To solve this large-scale zero-sum game, we leverage its structure and show that its mixed-strategy Nash equilibria can be characterized using their unidimensional marginal distributions, which are pure equilibria of a lower dimensional continuous zero-sum game. This leads to a two-step approach for efficiently solving our hide-and-seek game: First, we analytically solve the continuous game and derive closed-form expressions of the equilibrium marginal distributions. Second, we design a combinatorial algorithm to coordinate the players’ resources and compute equilibrium mixed strategies that satisfy the marginal distributions. We show that this solution approach computes a Nash equilibrium of the hide-and-seek game in quadratic time with linear support. Our analysis reveals novel equilibrium behaviors driven by a complex interplay between the game parameters, captured by our closed-form solutions. Funding: This work was supported by the Georgia Tech Stewart Fellowship and the Georgia Tech New Faculty Start Up Grant. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2023.0012 .
- Open Access
Dynamic Operational Planning in Warfare: A Stochastic Game Approach to Military Campaigns
We study a two-player discounted zero-sum stochastic game model for dynamic operational planning in military campaigns. At each stage, the players manage multiple commanders who order military actions on objectives that have an open line of control. When a battle over the control of an objective occurs, its stochastic outcome depends on the actions and the enabling support provided by the control of other objectives. Each player aims to maximize the cumulative number of objectives they control, weighted by their criticality. To solve this large-scale stochastic game, we derive properties of its Markov perfect equilibria by leveraging the logistics and military operational command and control structure. We show the consequential isotonicity of the optimal value function with respect to the partially ordered state space, which in turn leads to a significant reduction of the state and action spaces. We also accelerate Shapley's value iteration algorithm by eliminating dominated actions and investigating pure equilibria of the matrix game solved at each iteration. We demonstrate the computational value of our equilibrium results on a case study that reflects representative operational-level military campaigns with geopolitical implications. Our analysis reveals a complex interplay between the game's parameters and dynamics in equilibrium, resulting in new military insights for campaign analysts.
Open AccessDynamic Operational Planning in Warfare: A Stochastic Game Approach to Military Campaigns
We study a two-player discounted zero-sum stochastic game model for dynamic operational planning in military campaigns. At each stage, the players manage multiple commanders who order military actions on objectives that have an open line of control. When a battle over the control of an objective occurs, its stochastic outcome depends on the actions and the enabling support provided by the control of other objectives. Each player aims to maximize the cumulative number of objectives they control, weighted by their criticality. To solve this large-scale stochastic game, we derive properties of its Markov perfect equilibria by leveraging the logistics and military operational command and control structure. We show the consequential isotonicity of the optimal value function with respect to the partially ordered state space, which in turn leads to a significant reduction of the state and action spaces. We also accelerate Shapley's value iteration algorithm by eliminating dominated actions and investigating pure equilibria of the matrix game solved at each iteration. We demonstrate the computational value of our equilibrium results on a case study that reflects representative operational-level military campaigns with geopolitical implications. Our analysis reveals a complex interplay between the game's parameters and dynamics in equilibrium, resulting in new military insights for campaign analysts.
- 16 November 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
- Vol. 11 (3) , 1165-1176
Strategic Monitoring of Networked Systems With Heterogeneous Security Levels
We consider a strategic network monitoring problem involving the operator of a networked system and an attacker. The operator aims to randomize the placement of multiple protected sensors to monitor and protect components that are vulnerable to attacks. We account for the heterogeneity in the components' security levels and formulate a large-scale maximin optimization problem. After analyzing its structure, we propose a three-step approach to approximately solve the problem. First, we solve a generalized covering set problem and run a combinatorial algorithm to compute an approximate solution. Then, we compute approximation bounds by solving a nonlinear set packing problem. To evaluate our solution approach, we implement two classical solution methods based on column generation and multiplicative weights updates, and test them on real-world water distribution and power systems. Our numerical analysis shows that our solution method outperforms the classical methods on large-scale networks, as it efficiently generates solutions that achieve a close to optimal performance and that are simple to implement in practice.
- 16 November 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
- Vol. 11 (3) , 1165-1176
Strategic Monitoring of Networked Systems With Heterogeneous Security Levels
We consider a strategic network monitoring problem involving the operator of a networked system and an attacker. The operator aims to randomize the placement of multiple protected sensors to monitor and protect components that are vulnerable to attacks. We account for the heterogeneity in the components' security levels and formulate a large-scale maximin optimization problem. After analyzing its structure, we propose a three-step approach to approximately solve the problem. First, we solve a generalized covering set problem and run a combinatorial algorithm to compute an approximate solution. Then, we compute approximation bounds by solving a nonlinear set packing problem. To evaluate our solution approach, we implement two classical solution methods based on column generation and multiplicative weights updates, and test them on real-world water distribution and power systems. Our numerical analysis shows that our solution method outperforms the classical methods on large-scale networks, as it efficiently generates solutions that achieve a close to optimal performance and that are simple to implement in practice.
- 18 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 31-44
An Asset-Based Causal Loop Model to Improve Corporate Value
- 18 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 31-44
An Asset-Based Causal Loop Model to Improve Corporate Value
- Open Access
Strategic Monitoring of Networked Systems with Heterogeneous Security Levels
We consider a strategic network monitoring problem involving the operator of a networked system and an attacker. The operator aims to randomize the placement of multiple protected sensors to monitor and protect components that are vulnerable to attacks. We account for the heterogeneity in the components' security levels and formulate a large-scale maximin optimization problem. After analyzing its structure, we propose a three-step approach to approximately solve the problem. First, we solve a generalized covering set problem and run a combinatorial algorithm to compute an approximate solution. Then, we compute approximation bounds by solving a nonlinear set packing problem. To evaluate our solution approach, we implement two classical solution methods based on column generation and multiplicative weights updates, and test them on real-world water distribution and power systems. Our numerical analysis shows that our solution method outperforms the classical methods on large-scale networks, as it efficiently generates solutions that achieve a close to optimal performance and that are simple to implement in practice.
Open AccessStrategic Monitoring of Networked Systems with Heterogeneous Security Levels
We consider a strategic network monitoring problem involving the operator of a networked system and an attacker. The operator aims to randomize the placement of multiple protected sensors to monitor and protect components that are vulnerable to attacks. We account for the heterogeneity in the components' security levels and formulate a large-scale maximin optimization problem. After analyzing its structure, we propose a three-step approach to approximately solve the problem. First, we solve a generalized covering set problem and run a combinatorial algorithm to compute an approximate solution. Then, we compute approximation bounds by solving a nonlinear set packing problem. To evaluate our solution approach, we implement two classical solution methods based on column generation and multiplicative weights updates, and test them on real-world water distribution and power systems. Our numerical analysis shows that our solution method outperforms the classical methods on large-scale networks, as it efficiently generates solutions that achieve a close to optimal performance and that are simple to implement in practice.