Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Yang Xue has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:

  • Lijun Shang

    School of Human Sciences, London Metropolitan University

    4 shared publications
  • Weiwen Zhang

    Tianjin University Law School, Tianjin, China; Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China; Laboratory of Synthetic Microbiology, School of Chemical Engineering & Technology, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China

    2 shared publications
  • Anita J. Cicero

    Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, 621 East Pratt Street, Suite 210, Baltimore, MD 21202, USA; Department of Environmental Health and Engineering, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD 21205, USA

    1 shared publication
  • Geng Qin

    School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China

    1 shared publication
  • Gigi Kwik Gronvall

    Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security

    1 shared publication
  • Hanzhi Yu

    Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China

    1 shared publication

Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    A sustainable balance between innovation and risk: How the “right to science” affects China’s medical biotechnology regulatory policy

    by Yiping Han, Lindsay L. Fan, Yang Xue

    Medical biotechnology is at the forefront of scientific progress, with humanity facing a critical juncture during the pandemic. However, to maximize these benefits, governments face the complex challenge of reconciling innovation and risk. A sustainable balance is critical, as extreme measures such as blanket bans on biotechnology research could hamper progress, while unfettered research could pose an existential threat. The need for effective regulation has become apparent in the context of recent controversies surrounding pharmaceutical biotechnology. Governments face the challenge of reconciling precaution with innovation, necessitating a dual strategy fostering both principles. This paper explores the delicate dynamics of innovation and risk in pharmaceutical biotechnology, focusing on the evolving landscape in Europe, the U.S., and, notably, China. At the same time, we delve into the regulatory landscape and examine the role of the “right to science” in shaping Chinese policy. This paper further applies the right to science that has received the interests of medical biotechnology regulatory policymakers: understanding the role of scientific claims in regulating emerging technologies and analyzing the impact of major regulations on the ability to sustainably balance innovation and risk. We believe that a comprehensive global effort is needed to harmonize these two principles, highlighting the imperative of responsible governance in steering the trajectory of this powerful scientific frontier. The insights gained from the Chinese experience offer valuable implications for global policymakers facing similar challenges.


  • Open Access

    Are we ready for the revision of the 14-day rule? Implications from Chinese legislations guiding human embryo and embryoid research

    by Yang Xue, Lijun Shang

    The ISSCR recently released new guidelines that relaxed the 14-day rule taking away the tough barrier, and this has rekindled relevant ethical controversies and posed a fresh set of challenges to each nation’s legislations and policies directly or indirectly. To understand its broad implications and the variation and impact of China’s relevant national policies, we reviewed and evaluated Chinese laws, administrative regulations, departmental rules, and normative documents on fundamental and preclinical research involving human embryos from 1985 to 2022 in this paper. We have historically examined whether these regulations, including a 14-day rule, had restrictions on human embryo research, and whether and how these policies affected human embryo and embryoid research in China. We also discussed and assessed the backdrop in which China has endeavored to handle such as the need for expanding debates among justice practice, academia, and the public, and the shifting external environment influenced by fast-developing science and technology and people’s culture and religions. In general, Chinese society commonly opposes giving embryos or fetuses the legal status of humans, presumably due to the Chinese public not seeming to have any strong religious beliefs regarding the embryo. On this basis, they do not strongly oppose the potential expansion of the 14-day rule. After the guidelines to strengthen governance over ethics in science, and technology were released by the Chinese government in 2022, Chinese policymakers have incorporated bioethics into the national strategic goals using a “People-Centered” approach to develop and promote an ecological civilization. Specifically, China follows the “precautionary principle” based on ethical priority as it believes that if scientific research carries any potential technological and moral risks on which no social ethical consensus has been attained, there would be a need to impose oversight for prevention and precaution. At the same time, China has adopted a hybrid legislative model of legislation and ethical regulations with criminal, civil and administrative sanctions and a 14-day limit specified within its national hESCs guidelines. This would certainly be a useful example for other countries to use when considering the possibility of developing a comprehensive, credible and sustainable regulatory framework.


  • Open Access

    The Biological Weapons Convention should endorse the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct

    by Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Leifan Wang, Peter F. McGrath, Anita J. Cicero, Yingjin Yuan, M. Iqbal Parker, Weiwen Zhang, Youhai Sun, Yang Xue, Junyan Zhang, et al.


  • Open Access

    Towards Better Governance on Biosafety and Biosecurity: China’s Advances and Perspectives in Medical Biotechnology Legislation

    by Yang Xue, Lijun Shang

    In this paper, we systematically investigated and assessed China’s evolving medical biotechnology legislative and regulatory regime. 89 laws, rules, measures, guidelines, and views from 1985 to 2022 were systematically analogized and 28 were found to be involved in medical biotechnology legislation, including the recently passed Biosecurity Law. We classified the legislations and performed a comparative analysis for their legal binding based on the legal subject and extent of application, then further analyzes some of the legislative challenges in governing medical biotechnology risks in the context of China’s upgrading its regulatory and legal regime in the last 3 years. We concluded that policymakers in China have now incorporated medical biotechnology-related biosafety and biosecurity into the national strategic goals of a “People-Centered” approach to establish and foster an ecological civilization, particularly in the aftermath of the “He Jiankui affair.” Instead of relying on a patchwork of existing regulations and measures relating to the emerging field of medical biotechnology, China is attempting to integrate a patchwork of existing regulations and measures into a comprehensive legal framework, such as the constitution, National Security Law, Biosecurity Law, administrative regulations, departmental and local rules, and has begun to use the Civil Code and Criminal Law to explicitly identify actions relating to medical biotechnology. In general, China follows the “precautionary principle” as it thinks that uncertainty in science and technology should not be used to justify delaying the adoption of measures to prevent injuries or dangers, stating that whoever advances biotechnology must face the burden of proof of no harm. There would be a need to impose oversight for prevention and precaution if any biotechnology breakthrough that carries risks on which no scientific consensus has been reached. We argued that the “top-down” formulation of general objectives by the active political leadership and “bottom-up” innovation in the implementation are the keys to achieving these goals. Given the rapid advancements in medical biotechnology, countries all over the world must examine the governance landscape around biosafety and biosecurity and quickly consider options for their own comprehensive, credible, and long-lasting regulatory frameworks and experiences learned from China’s governance will help chart a scalable future roadmap.


  • Open Access

    Governance of Heritable Human Gene Editing World-Wide and Beyond

    by Yang Xue, Lijun Shang

    To date, the controversy surrounding the unknown risks and consequences of heritable genome editing has grown, with such work raising biosafety and ethical concerns for future generations. However, the current guideline of global governance is limited. In the context of the new framework for the governance of human genome editing developed by the World Health Organization (WHO) committee, this paper presents further analysis by highlighting predicaments of governance on germline engineering that merit the most attention: (1) building a scientific culture informed by a broader set of values and considerations in the internal scientific community at large, such as codes of ethics, and education, in addition to awareness-raising measures; and (2) reflecting on and institutionalizing policies in grassroots practice according to local conditions in external governance, such as the experimentalist governance, which is a multi-layered model of governance that establishes an open-ended framework from the top and offers stakeholders the freedom of discussion. The key to achieving these goals is more democratic deliberation between the public and the inclusive engagement of the global scientific community, which has been extensively used in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). On a global scale, we believe that practicing heritable human genome editing in accordance with the WHO and BTWC appears to be a good choice.


  • Open Access

    Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development

    by Yang Xue, Hanzhi Yu, Geng Qin

    Dual-use biotechnology faces the risks of availability, novel biological agents, knowledge, normative, and other dual-use risks. If left unchecked, these may destroy human living conditions and social order. Despite the benefits of dual-use technology, good governance is needed to mitigate its risks. The predicaments facing all governments in managing the dual-use risks of biotechnology deserve special attention. On the one hand, the information asymmetry risk of dual-use biotechnology prevents the traditional self-governance model in the field of biotechnology from playing its role. On the other hand, top-down public regulation often lags behind technological iteration due to the difficulty of predicting the human-made risks of dual-use biotechnology. Therefore, we argue that governance of the dual-use risks of biotechnology should avoid the traditional bottom-up or top-down modes. We suggest the governance for dual-use biotechnology could be improved if the four-stage experimentalist governance model is followed. The first stage is to achieve consensus on a broad governance framework with open-ended principles. The second stage is for countries to take action based on local conditions and the open-ended framework. The third stage is to establish a dynamic consultation mechanism for transnational information sharing and action review. The fourth and final stage is to evaluate and revise the global governance framework.


  • Open Access

    Building and implementing a multi-level system of ethical code for biologists under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of the United Nations

    by Yang Xue, Lijun Shang, Weiwen Zhang

    The recent global COVID-19 pandemic has had profound economic and social impacts on the world. It has highlighted an urgent need to strengthen existing international biosecurity governance mechanisms to prevent the misuse and malicious abuse of life science research and maintain international biological arms control norms. Biologists are at the front line of biotechnology development and are key to maintaining biosecurity awareness and moral self-discipline. As an important first step, biologists need to actively participate in the formulation and implementation of relevant biosecurity policies and measures to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability. Furthermore, efforts should be made to advocate for and promote the establishment of an ethical code of conduct for biologists to share safety responsibilities for global biosecurity. To maximize the impact of this ethical code of conduct, an effective approach to implementing codes of conduct for biologists at both national and international levels should be established under the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).