Lorenzo Casini
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Lorenzo Casini has a total of 42 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jürgen Landes
LMU Munich, Munich, Germany
2 shared publications - Michael Baumgartner
Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
2 shared publications - A. C. Lopez Jimenez
Instituto de Astrofisica de Andalucía
1 shared publication A. Coradini
IAS Reparto di Planetologia, CNR, viale dell'Università 11; 00198 Roma, Italy
1 shared publication- A. Molina
Departamento de Fsica Aplicada, Universidad de Granada, Facultad de Ciencias, Avda. Severo Ochoa, s/n, E-18071 Granada, Spain
1 shared publication - Alessandra Rotundi
Department of Science and Technology, Parthenope University of Naples, 80143 Naples, Italy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 February 2026
- Published by Milano University Press in The Reasoner
- Vol. 20 (1)
Bayesian Epistemology in the Age of Disinformation, Bologna, 4--5 December
This article reports the content of the talks given at the workshop `````"Bayesian Epistemology in the Age of Disinformation", which was held at the University of Bologna on 4--5 December 2025.
- 23 February 2026
- Published by Milano University Press in The Reasoner
- Vol. 20 (1)
Open AccessBayesian Epistemology in the Age of Disinformation, Bologna, 4--5 December
This article reports the content of the talks given at the workshop `````"Bayesian Epistemology in the Age of Disinformation", which was held at the University of Bologna on 4--5 December 2025.
- Open Access
- 17 November 2025
- Published by Milano University Press in The Reasoner
Network for Statistical and Causal Inference, Pisa, 11 September
This article reports the main content of the talks presented at the fourth meeting of the Network for Statistical and Causal Inference, at Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, 11 September 2025.
- 17 November 2025
- Published by Milano University Press in The Reasoner
Open AccessNetwork for Statistical and Causal Inference, Pisa, 11 September
This article reports the main content of the talks presented at the fourth meeting of the Network for Statistical and Causal Inference, at Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, 11 September 2025.
- Open Access
- 26 July 2025
- Published by Milano University Press in The Reasoner
- Vol. 19 (3)
Method and Convergence, Helsinki, 2--4 June 2025
Report on the content and the outcomes of the event "Method and Convergence", held in Helsiki on 2--4 June 2025.
- 26 July 2025
- Published by Milano University Press in The Reasoner
- Vol. 19 (3)
Open AccessMethod and Convergence, Helsinki, 2--4 June 2025
Report on the content and the outcomes of the event "Method and Convergence", held in Helsiki on 2--4 June 2025.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2025
- Published by Milano University Press in The Reasoner
- Vol. 19 (2)
Interview with Dunja Šešelja, Samuli Reijula, and Matteo Michelini
This interview discusses the use of agent-based modelling in philosophy of science with leading scholars in the field, Dunja Šešelja, Samuli Reijula, and Matteo Michelini.
- 1 April 2025
- Published by Milano University Press in The Reasoner
- Vol. 19 (2)
Open AccessInterview with Dunja Šešelja, Samuli Reijula, and Matteo Michelini
This interview discusses the use of agent-based modelling in philosophy of science with leading scholars in the field, Dunja Šešelja, Samuli Reijula, and Matteo Michelini.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2025
- Published by Milano University Press in The Reasoner
- Vol. 19 (2)
Guest Editorial
Agent-based models in philosophy of science
- 1 April 2025
- Published by Milano University Press in The Reasoner
- Vol. 19 (2)
Open AccessGuest Editorial
Agent-based models in philosophy of science
- Open Access
- 22 January 2025
- Published by Milano University Press in The Reasoner
- Vol. 19 (1)
Editorial
The Editorial Team welcomes readerst to The Reasoner new home.
- 22 January 2025
- Published by Milano University Press in The Reasoner
- Vol. 19 (1)
Open AccessEditorial
The Editorial Team welcomes readerst to The Reasoner new home.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 12
Constitution, Non-Causal Explanation, and Demarcation
In philosophy of science, constitutive explanations have attracted much attention since Craver’s influential book Explaining the Brain (2007). His Mutual Manipulability (MM) theory of constitution aimed to explicate constitution as a non-causal explanatory relation and to demarcate between constituents and non-constituents. But MM received decisive criticism. In response, Craver et al. (2021) have recently proposed a new theory, called Matched Interlevel Experiments (MIE), which is currently gaining traction in various fields. The authors claim that MIE retains “the spirit of MM without conceptual confusion.” Our paper argues that this claim is not borne out: neither does MIE meet MM’s objectives nor is it free of conceptual confusion. At the same time, we show that it is possible to meet MM’s objectives in a conceptually sound manner—by adopting the so-called No De-Coupling theory of constitution.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 12
Open AccessConstitution, Non-Causal Explanation, and Demarcation
In philosophy of science, constitutive explanations have attracted much attention since Craver’s influential book Explaining the Brain (2007). His Mutual Manipulability (MM) theory of constitution aimed to explicate constitution as a non-causal explanatory relation and to demarcate between constituents and non-constituents. But MM received decisive criticism. In response, Craver et al. (2021) have recently proposed a new theory, called Matched Interlevel Experiments (MIE), which is currently gaining traction in various fields. The authors claim that MIE retains “the spirit of MM without conceptual confusion.” Our paper argues that this claim is not borne out: neither does MIE meet MM’s objectives nor is it free of conceptual confusion. At the same time, we show that it is possible to meet MM’s objectives in a conceptually sound manner—by adopting the so-called No De-Coupling theory of constitution.
- Open Access
- 1 June 2023
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 74 (2) , 405-429
The PC Algorithm and the Inference to Constitution
- 1 June 2023
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 74 (2) , 405-429
Open AccessThe PC Algorithm and the Inference to Constitution
- Open Access
- 11 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (1) , 367-409
Confirmation by Robustness Analysis: A Bayesian Account
Some authors claim that minimal models have limited epistemic value (Fumagalli, 2016; Grüne-Yanoff, 2009a). Others defend the epistemic benefits of modelling by invoking the role of robustness analysis for hypothesis confirmation (see, e.g., Levins, 1966; Kuorikoski et al., 2010) but such arguments find much resistance (see, e.g., Odenbaugh & Alexandrova, 2011). In this paper, we offer a Bayesian rationalization and defence of the view that robustness analysis can play a confirmatory role, and thereby shed light on the potential of minimal models for hypothesis confirmation. We illustrate our argument by reference to a case study from macroeconomics. At the same time, we also show that there are cases in which robustness analysis is detrimental to confirmation. We characterize these cases and link them to recent investigations on evidential variety (Landes, 2020b, 2021; Osimani and Landes, forthcoming). We conclude that robustness analysis over minimal models can confirm, but its confirmatory value depends on concrete circumstances.
- 11 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (1) , 367-409
Open AccessConfirmation by Robustness Analysis: A Bayesian Account
Some authors claim that minimal models have limited epistemic value (Fumagalli, 2016; Grüne-Yanoff, 2009a). Others defend the epistemic benefits of modelling by invoking the role of robustness analysis for hypothesis confirmation (see, e.g., Levins, 1966; Kuorikoski et al., 2010) but such arguments find much resistance (see, e.g., Odenbaugh & Alexandrova, 2011). In this paper, we offer a Bayesian rationalization and defence of the view that robustness analysis can play a confirmatory role, and thereby shed light on the potential of minimal models for hypothesis confirmation. We illustrate our argument by reference to a case study from macroeconomics. At the same time, we also show that there are cases in which robustness analysis is detrimental to confirmation. We characterize these cases and link them to recent investigations on evidential variety (Landes, 2020b, 2021; Osimani and Landes, forthcoming). We conclude that robustness analysis over minimal models can confirm, but its confirmatory value depends on concrete circumstances.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 83 (5) , 946-958
How to Model Mechanistic Hierarchies
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 83 (5) , 946-958
Open AccessHow to Model Mechanistic Hierarchies