Thomas P. Cook

A Jeffersonian model of civic education supports robust civic engagement while differing in important respects from prevailing paradigms of community-embedded learning that prioritize activism. Rather than emphasizing participation alone, Jefferson’s approach to the development of civic awareness foregrounds reasoned speech, civil discourse, and the cultivation of practical judgment informed by theoretical understanding. Central to this model is Jefferson’s insistence that civic education is primarily a local and state responsibility, grounded in a broader commitment to self-government. Jefferson’s account reflects an appreciation for human reason as a universal capacity that makes consent and civic deliberation possible. Reason, so understood, provides the foundation for political equality and for an account of human flourishing articulated most clearly in the Declaration of Independence and consistent with core claims of the natural law tradition. This framework supports a conception grounded in metaphysical equality and civic friendship, best expressed within a federal political order, and capable of sustaining what classic sources and contemporary initiatives describe as a “pervasive commitment to diversity—as well as unity”. Further contributing to the novelty of our argument, we show that Jeffersonian natural-law-inflected civic engagement resonates well into the 20th century. Important judicial decisions, educational initiatives, and policy recommendations—including Cook v. McKee, Education for American Democracy (EAD), and the Truman Commission Report—draw upon related concepts of civic formation, consent, and reasoned participation. Jefferson’s emphasis on “reasons in speech,” understood as an essential element of self-government, thus remains a necessary and underappreciated contribution to contemporary debates over civic education and engagement.

Most comparisons of Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza focus on the difference in understanding of natural right. We argue that Hobbes also places more weight on a rudimentary and exclusive education of the public by the state. We show that the difference is related to deeper disagreements over the prospect of Enlightenment. Hobbes is more sanguine than Spinoza about using the state to make people rational. Spinoza considers misguided an overemphasis on publicly educating everyone out of superstition—public education is important, but modes of superstition may remain and must be offset by institutions and a civil religion. The differences are confirmed by Spinoza’s interest in the philosopher who stands apart and whose flourishing may be protected, but not simply brought about, by rudimentary public education. Spinoza’s openness to a wisdom-loving elite in a democracy also sets up an interesting parallel with Thomas Jefferson’s own commitment to the natural aristocracy needed to sustain republicanism. In demonstrating the 17th century philosopher’s skepticism toward using the state exclusively to promote rationality, even as he recognizes the importance of a sovereign pedagogical role and the protection of philosophy, we move to suggest that Spinoza is relevant to contemporary debates about public education and may reinvigorate moral and political discourse in a liberal democracy.