Thiago Nascimento
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Thiago Nascimento has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Umberto Rivieccio
UNED
5 shared publications - João Marcos
Departamento de Lógica UFSC Santa Catarina Brazil
3 shared publications Matthew Spinks
Dipartimento di Pedagogia, Psicologia, Filosofia, Università di Cagliari, 09123 Cagliari, Italy
3 shared publications- Matthew Spinks
University of Cagliari
2 shared publications Joao Marcos
Departamento de Informática e Matemática Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte Natal Brazil
1 shared publication- Ramon Jansana
Universitat de Barcelona (UB)
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 5 June 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 1239, 634-653
Two Dualities for Weakly Pseudo-complemented quasi-Kleene Algebras
Quasi-Nelson algebras are a non-involutive generalisation of Nelson algebras that can be characterised in several ways, e.g. as (i) the variety of bounded commutative integral (not necessarily involutive) residuated lattices that satisfy the Nelson identity; (ii) the class of (0, 1)-congruence orderable commutative integral residuated lattices; (iii) the algebraic counterpart of quasi-Nelson logic, i.e. the (algebraisable) extension of the substructural logic \(\mathcal {FL}_{ew}\) by the Nelson axiom. In the present paper we focus on the subreducts of quasi-Nelson algebras obtained by eliding the implication while keeping the two term-definable negations. These form a variety that (following A. Sendlewski, who studied the corresponding fragment of Nelson algebras) we dub weakly pseudo-complemented quasi-Kleene algebras. We develop a Priestley-style duality for these algebras (in two different guises) which is essentially an application of the general approach proposed in the paper A duality for two-sorted lattices by A. Jung and U. Rivieccio.- 5 June 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 1239, 634-653
Two Dualities for Weakly Pseudo-complemented quasi-Kleene Algebras
Quasi-Nelson algebras are a non-involutive generalisation of Nelson algebras that can be characterised in several ways, e.g. as (i) the variety of bounded commutative integral (not necessarily involutive) residuated lattices that satisfy the Nelson identity; (ii) the class of (0, 1)-congruence orderable commutative integral residuated lattices; (iii) the algebraic counterpart of quasi-Nelson logic, i.e. the (algebraisable) extension of the substructural logic \(\mathcal {FL}_{ew}\) by the Nelson axiom. In the present paper we focus on the subreducts of quasi-Nelson algebras obtained by eliding the implication while keeping the two term-definable negations. These form a variety that (following A. Sendlewski, who studied the corresponding fragment of Nelson algebras) we dub weakly pseudo-complemented quasi-Kleene algebras. We develop a Priestley-style duality for these algebras (in two different guises) which is essentially an application of the general approach proposed in the paper A duality for two-sorted lattices by A. Jung and U. Rivieccio.- 9 May 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Logic Journal of the IGPL
- Vol. 28 (6) , 1182-1206
Nelson’s logic 𝒮
Besides the better-known Nelson logic ($\mathcal{N}3$) and paraconsistent Nelson logic ($\mathcal{N}4$), in 1959 David Nelson introduced, with motivations of realizability and constructibility, a logic called $\mathcal{S}$. The logic $\mathcal{S}$ was originally presented by means of a calculus (crucially lacking the contraction rule) with infinitely many rule schemata and no semantics (other than the intended interpretation into Arithmetic). We look here at the propositional fragment of $\mathcal{S}$, showing that it is algebraizable (in fact, implicative), in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, with respect to a variety of three-potent involutive residuated lattices. We thus introduce the first known algebraic semantics for $\mathcal{S}$ as well as a finite Hilbert-style calculus equivalent to Nelson’s presentation; this also allows us to clarify the relation between $\mathcal{S}$ and the other two Nelson logics $\mathcal{N}3$ and $\mathcal{N}4$.- 9 May 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Logic Journal of the IGPL
- Vol. 28 (6) , 1182-1206
Nelson’s logic 𝒮
Besides the better-known Nelson logic ($\mathcal{N}3$) and paraconsistent Nelson logic ($\mathcal{N}4$), in 1959 David Nelson introduced, with motivations of realizability and constructibility, a logic called $\mathcal{S}$. The logic $\mathcal{S}$ was originally presented by means of a calculus (crucially lacking the contraction rule) with infinitely many rule schemata and no semantics (other than the intended interpretation into Arithmetic). We look here at the propositional fragment of $\mathcal{S}$, showing that it is algebraizable (in fact, implicative), in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, with respect to a variety of three-potent involutive residuated lattices. We thus introduce the first known algebraic semantics for $\mathcal{S}$ as well as a finite Hilbert-style calculus equivalent to Nelson’s presentation; this also allows us to clarify the relation between $\mathcal{S}$ and the other two Nelson logics $\mathcal{N}3$ and $\mathcal{N}4$.- Open Access
Nelson's Logic S
Besides the better-known Nelson logic (N3) and paraconsistent logic (N4), in 1959 David Nelson introduced, with motivations of realizability and constructibility, a logic called S. The logic S was originally presented by means of a calculus (crucially lacking the contraction rule) with infinitely many rule schemata and no semantics (other than the intended interpretation into Arithmetic.) We look here at the propositional fragment of S, showing that it is algebraizable (in fact, implicative), in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, with respect to a variety of three-potent involutive residuated lattices. We thus introduce the first known algebraic semantics for S as well as a finite Hilbert-style calculus equivalent to Nelson's presentation; this also allows us to clarify the relation between S and the other two Nelson logics N3 and N4.
Open AccessNelson's Logic S
Besides the better-known Nelson logic (N3) and paraconsistent logic (N4), in 1959 David Nelson introduced, with motivations of realizability and constructibility, a logic called S. The logic S was originally presented by means of a calculus (crucially lacking the contraction rule) with infinitely many rule schemata and no semantics (other than the intended interpretation into Arithmetic.) We look here at the propositional fragment of S, showing that it is algebraizable (in fact, implicative), in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, with respect to a variety of three-potent involutive residuated lattices. We thus introduce the first known algebraic semantics for S as well as a finite Hilbert-style calculus equivalent to Nelson's presentation; this also allows us to clarify the relation between S and the other two Nelson logics N3 and N4.
- 3 November 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Soft Computing
- Vol. 23 (7) , 2297-2320
Compatibly involutive residuated lattices and the Nelson identity
- 3 November 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Soft Computing
- Vol. 23 (7) , 2297-2320
Compatibly involutive residuated lattices and the Nelson identity
- 27 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 271-288
Algebraic Semantics for Nelson’s Logic $\mathcal {S}$S- 27 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 271-288
Algebraic Semantics for Nelson’s Logic $\mathcal {S}$S- Open Access
Algebraic Semantics for Nelson's Logic S
Besides the better-known Nelson's Logic and Paraconsistent Nelson's Logic, in "Negation and separation of concepts in constructive systems" (1959), David Nelson introduced a logic called S with the aim of analyzing the constructive content of provable negation statements in mathematics. Motivated by results from Kleene, in "On the Interpretation of Intuitionistic Number Theory" (1945), Nelson investigated a more symmetric recursive definition of truth, according to which a formula could be either primitively verified or refuted. The logic S was defined by means of a calculus lacking the contraction rule and having infinitely many schematic rules, and no semantics was provided. This system received little attention from researchers and it even remained unnoticed that on its original presentation it was inconsistent. Fortunately, the inconsistency was caused by typos and by a rule whose hypothesis and conclusion were swapped.We investigate in the present study a corrected version of the logic S, and focus at its propositional fragment, showing that it is algebraizable (in fact, implicative) with respect to a certain special class of involutive residuated lattices. We thus introduce the first (algebraic) semantics for S as well as a finite Hilbert-style calculus equivalent to Nelson's presentation. We also compare S with the other two above-mentioned logics of the Nelson family.
Open AccessAlgebraic Semantics for Nelson's Logic S
Besides the better-known Nelson's Logic and Paraconsistent Nelson's Logic, in "Negation and separation of concepts in constructive systems" (1959), David Nelson introduced a logic called S with the aim of analyzing the constructive content of provable negation statements in mathematics. Motivated by results from Kleene, in "On the Interpretation of Intuitionistic Number Theory" (1945), Nelson investigated a more symmetric recursive definition of truth, according to which a formula could be either primitively verified or refuted. The logic S was defined by means of a calculus lacking the contraction rule and having infinitely many schematic rules, and no semantics was provided. This system received little attention from researchers and it even remained unnoticed that on its original presentation it was inconsistent. Fortunately, the inconsistency was caused by typos and by a rule whose hypothesis and conclusion were swapped.We investigate in the present study a corrected version of the logic S, and focus at its propositional fragment, showing that it is algebraizable (in fact, implicative) with respect to a certain special class of involutive residuated lattices. We thus introduce the first (algebraic) semantics for S as well as a finite Hilbert-style calculus equivalent to Nelson's presentation. We also compare S with the other two above-mentioned logics of the Nelson family.