ICIsaac Ray Christian

Isaac Ray Christian

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Isaac Ray Christian has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Meta-awareness, mind-wandering, and the control of automatic external and internal orientations of attention

    by Isaac R. Christian, Samuel A. Nastase, Lauren K. Kim, Michael S. A. Graziano

    The 'default' mode of cognition involves simulating internal experiences. However, in some contexts, external focus can become captivating enough to act as the default mode. To examine how these orientations relate, we record fMRI activity in thirty-nine participants as they view naturalistic video clips, each one repeated four times in sequence. When instructed to direct attention externally on the video, most mind-wandering occurs on the last repetition and during less engaging clips. When instructed to direct attention internally on breathing, most mind-wandering occurs on the first repetition and for more engaging clips. Inter-subject correlation, within-subject correlation, and general linear models find similar fronto-parietal networks engaged during transitions from automatic to controlled attention across both conditions, indicating greater overlap in internal and external processing than previously assumed. We conclude that whether the automatic draw of attention is internal or external, and whether its disruptors are internal or external, is context-dependent.

  • Open Access

    Hierarchical systems in the default mode network when reasoning about self and other mental states

    by Isaac R Christian, Samuel A Nastase

    Humans spend considerable time contemplating the minds of others. But this ability is not limited to external agents–we also turn the lens for reading minds inward, reflecting on our own thoughts, emotions, and sense of self. Some processes involved in reasoning about minds may rely on shared mechanisms, while others may be specific to the agent under consideration. We developed a paradigm where participants performed either a mental state inference task or a control task targeting either another person presented onscreen or their own mind. Using fMRI and multi-voxel pattern analysis, we replicate a well-established self-other gradient along the medial prefrontal wall: ventral regions encoded mental state inference patterns for self, but not other, whereas more dorsal regions encoded mental state inference for both self and other, compared to control conditions. Posterior cingulate cortex, on the other hand, differentiated the target of mental state inference. Using a cross-classification analysis, we also found patterns in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and right temporoparietal junction were sensitive to mental state reasoning, regardless of the target agent. Our findings reveal a functional hierarchy for mental state reasoning where certain areas support agent-specific reasoning and others support more abstract, agent-general reasoning.

  • Open Access

    Linear and nonlinear effects of Spatial and Temporal attention: human data and drift diffusion model

    by Isaac R. Christian, A. J. Lonski, Javier Masís, Abigail Loveys, Michael S. A. Graziano

    Attention can be affected by expectations about where and when stimuli will appear. These two influences may interact with each other in complex ways. To explore these possibilities, we used an attention paradigm that manipulated three factors: two explicit cues guiding anticipatory attention before each trial, and implicit temporal statistics learned during task performance. When analyzing the data for linear trends, we found that each of these factors impacted performance but did not interact. When analyzing nonlinear trends in the data, we found these factors interacted: expectations about task duration shaped spatiotemporal attention while performing the task. We evaluated whether attentional effects across spatial and temporal domains could be explained by one unitary mechanism, using an augmented drift diffusion model. In the model, attention is allocated according to an interplay between the costs and benefits of maintaining attention. The model successfully replicated the linear effects observed in the human data, and accounted for some but not all nonlinear features in the data, suggesting that many disparate features of attention can be parsimoniously explained by a cost-benefit framework.

  • Monitoring Attention in Self and Others

    by Isaac R. Christian, Samuel A. Nastase, Mindy Yu, Kirsten Ziman, Michael S. A. Graziano

    The ability of the brain to monitor its own attention is important for controlling attention. The ability to reconstruct and monitor the attention of others is important for behavioral prediction and therefore interaction with others. Do the same cortical networks participate in constructing a metacognitive representation of attention, whether one's own or someone else's attention? We studied the brain activity of human participants in an fMRI scanner. The participants performed two attention-monitoring tasks. One involved focusing attention on their own breathing and pressing a button when they realized their attention had wandered. In the other, participants watched a video of an actor performing the same focused-attention task, and participants pressed the button if the actor's attention appeared to have wandered. In both cases, we analyzed brain activity just before the button presses, when participants were engaged in metacognition with respect to attention. In the Self condition, activity was obtained in a distinctive set of areas including the TPJ, precuneus, dorsomedial pFC, anterior cingulate, and anterior insula. The activity partly overlapped the default mode network, social cognition network, and salience network. In the Other condition, activity was found in a similar set of areas including the TPJ, precuneus, dorsomedial pFC, anterior cingulate, and anterior insula. These results suggest that there may be a common set of cortical areas that provide an overarching mechanism for metacognition concerning attention, although Self and Other processing are also clearly not identical.


  • Open Access

    Linear and Nonlinear Effects of Spatial and Temporal Attention: Human Data and Drift Diffusion Model

    by Isaac Christian

    Attention can be affected by expectations about where and when stimuli will appear. These two influences, spatial and temporal, may be present together and may interact with each other in unknown complex ways. To explore these possibilities, we used an attention paradigm that incorporated three variables known to produce effects on performance in a speeded reaction-time task: spatial cueing to indicate where a target stimulus is likely to appear, temporal statistics to indicate when the target is likely to appear, and preparation for a block of trials of similar length. When analyzing the data for linear trends, we found that each of these factors impacted performance but did not interact. When analyzing nonlinear trends in the data, we found an interaction between spatial and temporal attention that was modulated by preparation for a block of trials of similar length. We evaluated whether attentional effects across spatial, temporal, and preparatory domains could be explained by one unitary mechanism, rather than multiple modality-specific mechanisms, using an augmented drift diffusion model. In the model, attention is allocated according to an interplay between the costs and benefits of maintaining attention. The model successfully replicated the linear effects observed in the human data, and accounted for some but not all nonlinear features in the data, suggesting that many disparate features of attention can be parsimoniously explained by a cost-benefit framework, but some complexity in attention control remains to be understood.

  • Open Access

    Hierarchical systems in the default mode network when reasoning about self and other mental states

    by Isaac R. Christian, Samuel A. Nastase

    Humans spend time contemplating the minds of others. But this ability is not limited to external agents – we also turn the lens for reading minds inward, reflecting on our own thoughts, emotions, and sense of self. Some processes involved in reasoning about minds may rely on shared mechanisms, while others may be specific to the agent under consideration. We developed a paradigm where participants performed either a mental state inference task or a control task targeting either another person presented onscreen or their own mind. Using fMRI and multi-voxel pattern analysis, we replicate a well-established self-other axis along the medial wall of prefrontal cortex: ventral regions selectively decoded mental state inference patterns for self, but not other, whereas more dorsal regions decoded mental state inference for both self and other, compared to control conditions. Posterior cingulate cortex, on the other hand, differentiated the target of mental state inference. Using a cross-classification analysis, we also found patterns in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and right temporoparietal junction were sensitive to mental state reasoning in general, regardless of the target agent. These findings highlight one process reflecting reasoning specific to the agent and another reflecting the reasoning process itself.

  • Open Access

    Meta-awareness, mind-wandering, and the control of ‘default’ external and internal orientations of attention

    by Isaac R. Christian, Samuel A. Nastase, Lauren K. Kim, Michael S. A. Graziano

    The “default mode” of cognition usually refers to an automatic tendency to simulate past, future, and hypothetical experiences, rather than attending to external events in the moment. “Mind-wandering” usually refers to moments when attention drifts from external tasks to become engaged in internal, default-mode cognition. Both definitions are perhaps limited: the mind can be caught by external objects when attending internally, and objects in the external world can be just as captivating as internal thought, causing attention to drift. To explore the relationship between prepotent internal and external default modes and the bi-directionality of mind-wandering, we measured brain activity in forty participants using fMRI during performance of a focused attention task. Naturalistic movie clips were presented four times in sequence. When subjects tried to focus attention on the videos, more mind-wandering events (distractions from the externally-focused task) occurred as the videos became less interesting with each repetition, and when less engaging videos were presented. When subjects focused internally on their own breath, more mind-wandering events (distractions from the internally-focused task) occurred when videos were most interesting (i.e. on the first repetition) and when more engaging videos were presented. In the whole-brain fMRI data and also in focused analyses of sensory areas and default mode areas, inter-subject correlation analysis revealed cortical signals of attention that corroborated the behavioral results. We suggest that whether the default state is internal or external, and whether the sources that disrupt it are internal or external, depend on context. Significance Statement The “default mode” of cognition usually refers to an automatic tendency to simulate past, future, and hypothetical experiences, rather than attending to external events in the moment. “Mind-wandering” usually refers to moments when attention drifts from external tasks to become engaged in internal, default-mode cognition. We used a focused attention task and whole brain synchrony to study involuntary shifts of attention bi-directionally, between external and internal default states. We found that mind-wandering can occur bi-directionally and whether an internal focus or an external focus should be considered a default state depends on context.


  • Open Access

    A Computational Model of Unintentional Mind Wandering in Focused Attention Meditation

    by Isaac Christian, Mayank Agrawal

    Why does the mind wander? Recent theoretical models suggest mental content depends on a calculation that measures the expected rewards gained from the current task compared to other cognitive tasks and procedures. In Focused Attention Meditation (FA), participants practice attentional control by maintaining attention to an internal stimulus. Throughout the task, attentional lapses occur, in which there is an abrupt shift to mind wandering. We propose a model that formalizes attentional lapses as the interaction between a controller that boosts attentional resources to a target according to expected value calculations and a metacognitive monitoring procedure that stochastically observes internal contents. The model is applied to explain variation in button press data on an FA meditation task.


  • Open Access

    Consciousness: In your own words

    by Michael Graziano, Isaac Christian

    Surprisingly little is known about how the general public understands consciousness, yet information on common intuitions is crucial to discussions and theories of consciousness. We asked 202 members of the general public, “In your own words, what is consciousness?” and analyzed the frequencies with which different perspectives on consciousness were represented. Almost all people (89%) described consciousness as fundamentally receptive – possessing, knowing, perceiving, being aware, or experiencing. In contrast, the perspective that consciousness is agentic (actively making decisions, driving output, or controlling behavior) appeared in only 33% of responses. Consciousness as a social phenomenon was represented by 24% of people. Consciousness as being awake or alert was mentioned by 19%. Consciousness as mystical, transcending the physical world, was mentioned by only 10%. Consciousness in relation to memory was mentioned by 6%. Consciousness as an inner voice or inner being – the homunculus view – was represented by 5%. Finally, only three people (1.5%) mentioned a specific, scholarly theory about consciousness, suggesting that we successfully sampled the opinions of the general public rather than capturing an academic construct. We found little difference between men and women, young and old, or US and non-US participants, except for one possible generation shift. Young, non-US participants were more likely to associate consciousness with moral decision-making. These findings show a snapshot of the public understanding of consciousness – a network of associated concepts, represented at varying strengths, such that some are more likely to emerge when people are asked an open-ended question about it.


  • Open Access

    Context-dependent amygdala-prefrontal connectivity in youths with autism spectrum disorder

    by Isaac Ray Christian, Michael T. Liuzzi, Qiongru Yu, Maria Kryza-Lacombe, Christopher S. Monk, Johanna Jarcho, Jillian Lee Wiggins