Bo Feng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Bo Feng has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gaoke Wu
School of Management Science, Qufu Normal University, Rizhao 276826, China
2 shared publications Chengfei Wang
School of Management Science, Qufu Normal University, Rizhao, Shandong 276800, China
1 shared publication- Chengfei Wang
School of Management Science, Qufu Normal University, Shandong, Rizhao 276800, China
1 shared publication - Jingfu Huang
School of Management Science, Qufu Normal University, Rizhao, Shandong 276800, China
1 shared publication - Junwen Feng
College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing, China
1 shared publication - Libin Guo
Qufu Normal University, School of Management Science, Rizhao
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 February 2023
- Published by International Research Alliance for Sustainable Development in Pakistan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences
- Vol. 11 (1) , 682-691
Research on Evolutionary Game of Low-carbon Knowledge Sharing in Enterprise Strategic Alliance Considering Multiple Factors
Knowledge sharing is an important way for enterprise strategic alliance to participate in enterprise learning and dissemination of low-carbon knowledge. According to the different enterprise size and knowledge level of strategic alliance participating enterprises, considering all kinds of influencing factors of knowledge sharing willingness of participating enterprises, this paper constructs enterprise strategic alliance knowledge sharing evolutionary game payment matrix and obtains evolutionary equilibrium solution. In view of the different values of the absorption and transformation ability coefficient of knowledge, the degree of complementarity of knowledge, and the degree of knowledge sharing, the influence of simulation on the knowledge sharing intention of enterprises is simulated. The research shows that the coefficient of knowledge absorption and transformation ability and the degree of knowledge complementarity have a great influence on the willingness of participating enterprises to knowledge sharing. The knowledge sharing willingness of enterprise strategic alliance participating enterprises is sensitive to the knowledge sharing degree of the two enterprises, and the sharing degree of enterprises with different knowledge levels has different effects on the knowledge sharing willingness of the two enterprises.
- 6 February 2023
- Published by International Research Alliance for Sustainable Development in Pakistan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences
- Vol. 11 (1) , 682-691
Open AccessResearch on Evolutionary Game of Low-carbon Knowledge Sharing in Enterprise Strategic Alliance Considering Multiple Factors
Knowledge sharing is an important way for enterprise strategic alliance to participate in enterprise learning and dissemination of low-carbon knowledge. According to the different enterprise size and knowledge level of strategic alliance participating enterprises, considering all kinds of influencing factors of knowledge sharing willingness of participating enterprises, this paper constructs enterprise strategic alliance knowledge sharing evolutionary game payment matrix and obtains evolutionary equilibrium solution. In view of the different values of the absorption and transformation ability coefficient of knowledge, the degree of complementarity of knowledge, and the degree of knowledge sharing, the influence of simulation on the knowledge sharing intention of enterprises is simulated. The research shows that the coefficient of knowledge absorption and transformation ability and the degree of knowledge complementarity have a great influence on the willingness of participating enterprises to knowledge sharing. The knowledge sharing willingness of enterprise strategic alliance participating enterprises is sensitive to the knowledge sharing degree of the two enterprises, and the sharing degree of enterprises with different knowledge levels has different effects on the knowledge sharing willingness of the two enterprises.
- Open Access
- 17 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Problems in Engineering
- Vol. 2022, 1-11
On the Supply Chain Coordination with Trade Credit and Partial Backorder under CVaR Criterion
For the secondary supply chain composed of a supplier with sufficient funds and a retailer with limited funds and risk aversion, to enhance the supply chain stability and comprehensively improve benefits, the supply chain members may choose to implement a supply chain’s coordination strategy. Thus, we study the following supply chain coordination problems, i.e., the supplier provides a trade credit policy and signs a buyback contract for the surplus products with the retailer. For this, based on maximizing the benefits of supply chain members, the supply chain coordination model has been established. By analyzing two participants’ benefit, the supply chain’s optimum coordination mechanism is obtained. The theoretical results are verified by numerical experiments.
- 17 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Problems in Engineering
- Vol. 2022, 1-11
Open AccessOn the Supply Chain Coordination with Trade Credit and Partial Backorder under CVaR Criterion
For the secondary supply chain composed of a supplier with sufficient funds and a retailer with limited funds and risk aversion, to enhance the supply chain stability and comprehensively improve benefits, the supply chain members may choose to implement a supply chain’s coordination strategy. Thus, we study the following supply chain coordination problems, i.e., the supplier provides a trade credit policy and signs a buyback contract for the surplus products with the retailer. For this, based on maximizing the benefits of supply chain members, the supply chain coordination model has been established. By analyzing two participants’ benefit, the supply chain’s optimum coordination mechanism is obtained. The theoretical results are verified by numerical experiments.
- Open Access
- 2 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Problems in Engineering
- Vol. 2022, 1-12
On the Preorder Strategy for Loss-Averse Newsvendor Model under CVaR Measure
Due to rapid development of manufacturing and online retail, the life cycle of many products is becoming shorter and shorter. Hence, manufacturers may launch new products in selling season to maintain market share and attract new customers. Under these circumstances, manufacturers may release a presale information before the selling season, and the retailer correspondingly makes a preorder according to the estimation to the demand. For the case that the wholesale price rises gradually with time during the preselling period and the market demand is stochastic, based on minimizing the legacy loss via CVaR measure in risk management, we establish a loss-averse newsvendor’s preordering decision model. By model analysis, we establish the closed form solution to the model and provide the optimal preordering time and preordering quantity to the retailer. Some numerical experiments are made to show the validity of the model, and some managerial insights are explored through the numerical experiments.
- 2 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Problems in Engineering
- Vol. 2022, 1-12
Open AccessOn the Preorder Strategy for Loss-Averse Newsvendor Model under CVaR Measure
Due to rapid development of manufacturing and online retail, the life cycle of many products is becoming shorter and shorter. Hence, manufacturers may launch new products in selling season to maintain market share and attract new customers. Under these circumstances, manufacturers may release a presale information before the selling season, and the retailer correspondingly makes a preorder according to the estimation to the demand. For the case that the wholesale price rises gradually with time during the preselling period and the market demand is stochastic, based on minimizing the legacy loss via CVaR measure in risk management, we establish a loss-averse newsvendor’s preordering decision model. By model analysis, we establish the closed form solution to the model and provide the optimal preordering time and preordering quantity to the retailer. Some numerical experiments are made to show the validity of the model, and some managerial insights are explored through the numerical experiments.
- Open Access
- 12 January 2022
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Problems in Engineering
- Vol. 2022, 1-14
Optimal Replenishment Strategy for Inventory Mechanism with a Known Price Increase and Backordering in Finite Horizon
For the finite horizon inventory mechanism with a known price increase and backordering, based on minimizing the inventory cost, we establish two mixed integer optimization models. By buyer’s cost analysis, we present the closed-form solutions to the models, and by comparing the minimum cost of the two strategies, we provide an optimal ordering policy to the buyer. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the validity of the model, and sensitivity analysis on major parameters is also made to show some insights to the inventory model.
- 12 January 2022
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Problems in Engineering
- Vol. 2022, 1-14
Open AccessOptimal Replenishment Strategy for Inventory Mechanism with a Known Price Increase and Backordering in Finite Horizon
For the finite horizon inventory mechanism with a known price increase and backordering, based on minimizing the inventory cost, we establish two mixed integer optimization models. By buyer’s cost analysis, we present the closed-form solutions to the models, and by comparing the minimum cost of the two strategies, we provide an optimal ordering policy to the buyer. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the validity of the model, and sensitivity analysis on major parameters is also made to show some insights to the inventory model.
- Open Access
- 13 September 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 13 (18) , 10201
Optimal Procurement Strategy for Supply Chain with Trade Credit and Backorder under CVaR Criterion
Some capital-constrained and risk-averse retailers may unable to obtain financing from banks due to insufficient collateral and high loan costs, so some retailers tend to use trade credit financing to ease their financial pressure. For the two echelon supply chain composed of a well-funded supplier and a capital-constrained retailer with risk-averse preference, a trade credit strategy model with the supplier-led is established in this paper. By analyzing both parties’ benefits, we derive the model solution and provide optimal decisions to all petitioners. The results obtained in this paper show that the optimum order quantity under the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) criterion declines w.r.t. the confidence level, and the wholesale price of the supplier increases w.r.t. the confidence level. The reason is that when the retailer makes fewer orders, the supplier will correspondingly increase the wholesale price to maximize their profit. On the other hand, the ordering policy with allowing backorder will make the retailer place fewer orders. Finally, the proposed model is indicated by the given numerical experiments.
- 13 September 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 13 (18) , 10201
Open AccessOptimal Procurement Strategy for Supply Chain with Trade Credit and Backorder under CVaR Criterion
Some capital-constrained and risk-averse retailers may unable to obtain financing from banks due to insufficient collateral and high loan costs, so some retailers tend to use trade credit financing to ease their financial pressure. For the two echelon supply chain composed of a well-funded supplier and a capital-constrained retailer with risk-averse preference, a trade credit strategy model with the supplier-led is established in this paper. By analyzing both parties’ benefits, we derive the model solution and provide optimal decisions to all petitioners. The results obtained in this paper show that the optimum order quantity under the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) criterion declines w.r.t. the confidence level, and the wholesale price of the supplier increases w.r.t. the confidence level. The reason is that when the retailer makes fewer orders, the supplier will correspondingly increase the wholesale price to maximize their profit. On the other hand, the ordering policy with allowing backorder will make the retailer place fewer orders. Finally, the proposed model is indicated by the given numerical experiments.