David A. Pizarro
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
David A. Pizarro has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Rajen Alexander Anderson
University of Leeds, UK
2 shared publications - Benjamin C. Ruisch
Department of Psychology,Cornell University,Ithaca, NY
1 shared publication - Benjamin Coe Ruisch
Department of Psychology
1 shared publication Cara Laney
University of California
1 shared publicationDavid Tannenbaum
University of California, Irvine
1 shared publicationElizabeth F. Loftus
University of California
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 30 April 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 43, e57
Differentiating between different forms of moral obligations
We argue that Tomasello's account overlooks important psychological distinctions between how humans judge different types of moral obligations, such as prescriptive obligations (i.e., what oneshoulddo) and proscriptive obligations (i.e., what oneshould notdo). Specifically, evaluating these different types of obligations rests on different psychological inputs and has distinct downstream consequences for judgments of moral character.
- 30 April 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 43, e57
Differentiating between different forms of moral obligations
We argue that Tomasello's account overlooks important psychological distinctions between how humans judge different types of moral obligations, such as prescriptive obligations (i.e., what oneshoulddo) and proscriptive obligations (i.e., what oneshould notdo). Specifically, evaluating these different types of obligations rests on different psychological inputs and has distinct downstream consequences for judgments of moral character.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 41, e186
The challenge of accounting for individual differences in folk-economic beliefs
We argue that existing data on folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) present challenges to Boyer & Petersen's model. Specifically, the widespread individual variation in endorsement of FEBs casts doubt on the claim that humans are evolutionarily predisposed towards particular economic beliefs. Additionally, the authors' model cannot account for the systematic covariance between certain FEBs, such as those observed in distinct political ideologies.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 41, e186
The challenge of accounting for individual differences in folk-economic beliefs
We argue that existing data on folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) present challenges to Boyer & Petersen's model. Specifically, the widespread individual variation in endorsement of FEBs casts doubt on the claim that humans are evolutionarily predisposed towards particular economic beliefs. Additionally, the authors' model cannot account for the systematic covariance between certain FEBs, such as those observed in distinct political ideologies.
- 17 June 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Emotion Review
- Vol. 6 (3) , 221-222
Comment: Interdiscipline
The Meaning of Disgust (McGinn, 2011) is a vivid example of how interdisciplinary research can go horribly wrong. Strohminger’s (2014) criticisms serve as a good starting point to discuss some of the issues that need to be addressed by the growing number of researchers who choose to conduct interdisciplinary research in philosophy and psychology. I argue that McGinn’s approach to science in The Meaning of Disgust serves as a useful contrast to the ideal, and that it illustrates the most important virtue necessary for being a good interdisciplinarian: intellectual humility.
- 17 June 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Emotion Review
- Vol. 6 (3) , 221-222
Comment: Interdiscipline
The Meaning of Disgust (McGinn, 2011) is a vivid example of how interdisciplinary research can go horribly wrong. Strohminger’s (2014) criticisms serve as a good starting point to discuss some of the issues that need to be addressed by the growing number of researchers who choose to conduct interdisciplinary research in philosophy and psychology. I argue that McGinn’s approach to science in The Meaning of Disgust serves as a useful contrast to the ideal, and that it illustrates the most important virtue necessary for being a good interdisciplinarian: intellectual humility.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2009
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Judgment and Decision Making
- Vol. 4 (6) , 479-491
The motivated use of moral principles
Five studies demonstrated that people selectively use general moral principles to rationalize preferred moral conclusions. In Studies 1a and 1b, college students and community respondents were presented with variations on a traditional moral scenario that asked whether it was permissible to sacrifice one innocent man in order to save a greater number of people. Political liberals, but not relatively more conservative participants, were more likely to endorse consequentialism when the victim had a stereotypically White American name than when the victim had a stereotypically Black American name. Study 2 found evidence suggesting participants believe that the moral principles they are endorsing are general in nature: when presented sequentially with both versions of the scenario, liberals again showed a bias in their judgments to the initial scenario, but demonstrated consistency thereafter. Study 3 found conservatives were more likely to endorse the unintended killing of innocent civilians when Iraqis civilians were killed than when Americans civilians were killed, while liberals showed no significant effect. In Study 4, participants primed with patriotism were more likely to endorse consequentialism when Iraqi civilians were killed by American forces than were participants primed with multiculturalism. However, this was not the case when American civilians were killed by Iraqi forces. Implications for the role of reason in moral judgment are discussed.
- 1 August 2009
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Judgment and Decision Making
- Vol. 4 (6) , 479-491
Open AccessThe motivated use of moral principles
Five studies demonstrated that people selectively use general moral principles to rationalize preferred moral conclusions. In Studies 1a and 1b, college students and community respondents were presented with variations on a traditional moral scenario that asked whether it was permissible to sacrifice one innocent man in order to save a greater number of people. Political liberals, but not relatively more conservative participants, were more likely to endorse consequentialism when the victim had a stereotypically White American name than when the victim had a stereotypically Black American name. Study 2 found evidence suggesting participants believe that the moral principles they are endorsing are general in nature: when presented sequentially with both versions of the scenario, liberals again showed a bias in their judgments to the initial scenario, but demonstrated consistency thereafter. Study 3 found conservatives were more likely to endorse the unintended killing of innocent civilians when Iraqis civilians were killed than when Americans civilians were killed, while liberals showed no significant effect. In Study 4, participants primed with patriotism were more likely to endorse consequentialism when Iraqi civilians were killed by American forces than were participants primed with multiculturalism. However, this was not the case when American civilians were killed by Iraqi forces. Implications for the role of reason in moral judgment are discussed.
- 19 August 2008
- Published by Wiley in Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
- Vol. 38 (3) , 293-322
Varieties of Social Cognition
Recent work within psychology demonstrates that unconscious cognition plays a central role in the judgments and actions of individuals. We distinguish between two basic types unconscious social cognition: unconsciousness of the influences on judgments and actions, and unconscious of the mental states (i.e., attitudes and feelings) that give rise to judgments and actions. Influence unconsciousness is corroborated by strong empirical evidence, but unconscious states are difficult to verify. We discuss procedures aimed at providing conclusive evidence of state unconsciousness, and apply them to recent empirical findings.
- 19 August 2008
- Published by Wiley in Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
- Vol. 38 (3) , 293-322
Varieties of Social Cognition
Recent work within psychology demonstrates that unconscious cognition plays a central role in the judgments and actions of individuals. We distinguish between two basic types unconscious social cognition: unconsciousness of the influences on judgments and actions, and unconscious of the mental states (i.e., attitudes and feelings) that give rise to judgments and actions. Influence unconsciousness is corroborated by strong empirical evidence, but unconscious states are difficult to verify. We discuss procedures aimed at providing conclusive evidence of state unconsciousness, and apply them to recent empirical findings.
- 1 April 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 34 (3) , 550-555
Ripple effects in memory: judgments of moral blame can distort memory for events
Can judging an individual as being morally responsible for a negative act affect memory for details of the act? We presented participants with a story describing an individual (Frank) who committed a crime (he walked out on a restaurant bill). Some participants were told that the negative act was not intentional and that Frank was essentially a good person. Others were told that the negative act was intentional and that Frank actually enjoyed it. Control participants were given no extra information. All the participants then judged Frank’s moral responsibility for walking out on the bill. When asked a week later to recall information about the event, the participants who had received negative information about Frank remembered that Frank had walked out on a larger restaurant bill than he actually had. Moreover, the degree of memory distortion was predicted by the degree of moral blame that had been attributed to Frank.
- 1 April 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 34 (3) , 550-555
Ripple effects in memory: judgments of moral blame can distort memory for events
Can judging an individual as being morally responsible for a negative act affect memory for details of the act? We presented participants with a story describing an individual (Frank) who committed a crime (he walked out on a restaurant bill). Some participants were told that the negative act was not intentional and that Frank was essentially a good person. Others were told that the negative act was intentional and that Frank actually enjoyed it. Control participants were given no extra information. All the participants then judged Frank’s moral responsibility for walking out on the bill. When asked a week later to recall information about the event, the participants who had received negative information about Frank remembered that Frank had walked out on a larger restaurant bill than he actually had. Moreover, the degree of memory distortion was predicted by the degree of moral blame that had been attributed to Frank.