John Olijnyk
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
John Olijnyk has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Julian Rrushi
Oakland University
2 shared publications Benjamin Bond
Oakland University, Rochester, MI 48309 USA
1 shared publication- Irma Rrushi
School of Engineering and Computer Science, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, USA
1 shared publication - Kawthar Badran
School of Engineering and Computer Science, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 271-278
Relay Memory Analysis via Constraint Satisfaction Modeling for Malware Detection in the Electrical Power Grid
- 31 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 271-278
Open AccessRelay Memory Analysis via Constraint Satisfaction Modeling for Malware Detection in the Electrical Power Grid
- Open Access
- 31 January 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 10, 15227-15246
Design and Emulation of Physics-Centric Cyberattacks on an Electrical Power Transformer
Malware that attacks the electrical power grid consists of exploits and operations modules. The exploits are similar to those of traditional malware. These exploits hack into an industrial computer and subsequently deploys operational modules. Some operational modules penetrate the operating system of the compromised industrial computer to take over computing functions and hence facilitate further attacks. Examples include interception of cryptographic keys, and generation of deceptive status data that indicate normal operation, while in reality the power transformer is in distress due to the attacks. Other operational modules are designed to recognize and disrupt the physics of the physical equipment. We refer to these operations modules as physics-centric modules. The subject of this paper is research on how physics-centric modules of current and future malware can cause physical damage to power grid equipment. The physical equipment used in this research was a power transformer. We make several contributions in this paper, namely: i) we emulate in Python the protection algorithms that run on an industrial computer and monitor and protect a power transformer from a variety of faults; ii) we leverage these emulations to analyze the cyberattack surface of a power transformer; iii) with these insights at hand, we devise attack modus operandi that malware could use against a power transformer; and iv) we emulate these cyberattacks in Python to empirically observe and quantify their destructive effects on a power transformer. Our overall research findings in this paper serve the purpose of informing better defense against the physics-centric modules of malware that attack the electrical power grid.
- 31 January 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 10, 15227-15246
Open AccessDesign and Emulation of Physics-Centric Cyberattacks on an Electrical Power Transformer
Malware that attacks the electrical power grid consists of exploits and operations modules. The exploits are similar to those of traditional malware. These exploits hack into an industrial computer and subsequently deploys operational modules. Some operational modules penetrate the operating system of the compromised industrial computer to take over computing functions and hence facilitate further attacks. Examples include interception of cryptographic keys, and generation of deceptive status data that indicate normal operation, while in reality the power transformer is in distress due to the attacks. Other operational modules are designed to recognize and disrupt the physics of the physical equipment. We refer to these operations modules as physics-centric modules. The subject of this paper is research on how physics-centric modules of current and future malware can cause physical damage to power grid equipment. The physical equipment used in this research was a power transformer. We make several contributions in this paper, namely: i) we emulate in Python the protection algorithms that run on an industrial computer and monitor and protect a power transformer from a variety of faults; ii) we leverage these emulations to analyze the cyberattack surface of a power transformer; iii) with these insights at hand, we devise attack modus operandi that malware could use against a power transformer; and iv) we emulate these cyberattacks in Python to empirically observe and quantify their destructive effects on a power transformer. Our overall research findings in this paper serve the purpose of informing better defense against the physics-centric modules of malware that attack the electrical power grid.