Hugh Turpin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Hugh Turpin has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Eva Kundtová Klocová
Masaryk University
3 shared publications - Everton de Oliveira Maraldi
Affiliation Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroinformatics Unit, Institute D’Or for Research and Education, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil
3 shared publications - Miguel Farias
University of Oxford
3 shared publications - Roosa Haimila
Visiting Fellow, Study of Religion, Department of Cultures, Faculty of Arts and Doctoral Programme in Theology and Religious Studies, Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki Helsinki Finland
3 shared publications - Valerie van Mulukom
Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, Coventry, UK
3 shared publications Adam Baimel
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Ubiquity Press, Ltd. in Secularism and Nonreligion
- Vol. 15 (1) , 13
Understanding the Morality of Unbelievers: Secular Beliefs about Right and Wrong in Ten Countries
Many people around the world believe that to be moral, one must believe in God. However, individuals who do not believe in God also hold distinct ethical beliefs. Similar to theists, non-theists in different cultures may share overarching narratives about morality and what it is founded upon—a possibility that remains understudied. In the present research, we utilised open-ended survey data to explore what non-theists from ten countries (N = 996) described as the basis of their views on right and wrong. We also investigated how different beliefs about morality clustered together. The findings show diversity but also point towards cross-culturally recurring patterns in non-theistic beliefs and belief clusters concerning 1) important moral principles and 2) perceived sources of morality. We furthermore discuss country-specific findings, such as the importance of ‘conscience’ for Turkish and Czech participants and ‘cultural Christianity’ in the Danish sample. Altogether, the results support research indicating that a lack of belief in God does not entail moral relativism and question views on non-theists primarily seeing morality as self-constructed. Instead, our findings point towards a more prominent role of social interaction and ‘social contract’ in views about the basis of right and wrong. In light of the results, we suggest that predominant ways of measurement in moral psychology may currently obscure diversity in non-theistic moral outlooks, such as more communal secular ethics. The main limitation of the research is convenience sampling. We therefore encourage future work to utilise representative samples to explore differing secular moralities and their predictors.
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Ubiquity Press, Ltd. in Secularism and Nonreligion
- Vol. 15 (1) , 13
Open AccessUnderstanding the Morality of Unbelievers: Secular Beliefs about Right and Wrong in Ten Countries
Many people around the world believe that to be moral, one must believe in God. However, individuals who do not believe in God also hold distinct ethical beliefs. Similar to theists, non-theists in different cultures may share overarching narratives about morality and what it is founded upon—a possibility that remains understudied. In the present research, we utilised open-ended survey data to explore what non-theists from ten countries (N = 996) described as the basis of their views on right and wrong. We also investigated how different beliefs about morality clustered together. The findings show diversity but also point towards cross-culturally recurring patterns in non-theistic beliefs and belief clusters concerning 1) important moral principles and 2) perceived sources of morality. We furthermore discuss country-specific findings, such as the importance of ‘conscience’ for Turkish and Czech participants and ‘cultural Christianity’ in the Danish sample. Altogether, the results support research indicating that a lack of belief in God does not entail moral relativism and question views on non-theists primarily seeing morality as self-constructed. Instead, our findings point towards a more prominent role of social interaction and ‘social contract’ in views about the basis of right and wrong. In light of the results, we suggest that predominant ways of measurement in moral psychology may currently obscure diversity in non-theistic moral outlooks, such as more communal secular ethics. The main limitation of the research is convenience sampling. We therefore encourage future work to utilise representative samples to explore differing secular moralities and their predictors.
- Open Access
- 27 July 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Understanding the morality of unbelievers: Secular beliefs about right and wrong in ten countries
Many people around the world believe that to be moral, one must believe in God. However, individuals who do not believe in God also hold distinct ethical beliefs. Similar to theists, non-theists in different cultures may share overarching narratives about morality and what it is founded upon—a possibility that remains understudied. In the present research, we utilised open-ended survey data to explore what non-theists from ten countries (N = 996) described as the basis of their views on right and wrong. We also investigated how different beliefs about morality clustered together. The findings show diversity but also point towards cross-culturally recurring patterns in non-theistic beliefs and belief clusters concerning 1) important moral principles and 2) perceived sources of morality. We furthermore discuss country-specific findings, such as the importance of ‘conscience’ for Turkish and Czech participants and ‘cultural Christianity’ in the Danish sample. Altogether, the results support research indicating that a lack of belief in God does not entail moral relativism and question views on non-theists primarily seeing morality as self-constructed. Instead, our findings point towards a more prominent role of social interaction and ‘social contract’ in views about the basis of right and wrong. In light of the results, we suggest that predominant ways of measurement in moral psychology may currently obscure diversity in non-theistic moral outlooks, such as more communal secular ethics. The main limitation of the research is convenience sampling. We therefore encourage future work to utilise representative samples to explore differing secular moralities and their predictors.
- 27 July 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessUnderstanding the morality of unbelievers: Secular beliefs about right and wrong in ten countries
Many people around the world believe that to be moral, one must believe in God. However, individuals who do not believe in God also hold distinct ethical beliefs. Similar to theists, non-theists in different cultures may share overarching narratives about morality and what it is founded upon—a possibility that remains understudied. In the present research, we utilised open-ended survey data to explore what non-theists from ten countries (N = 996) described as the basis of their views on right and wrong. We also investigated how different beliefs about morality clustered together. The findings show diversity but also point towards cross-culturally recurring patterns in non-theistic beliefs and belief clusters concerning 1) important moral principles and 2) perceived sources of morality. We furthermore discuss country-specific findings, such as the importance of ‘conscience’ for Turkish and Czech participants and ‘cultural Christianity’ in the Danish sample. Altogether, the results support research indicating that a lack of belief in God does not entail moral relativism and question views on non-theists primarily seeing morality as self-constructed. Instead, our findings point towards a more prominent role of social interaction and ‘social contract’ in views about the basis of right and wrong. In light of the results, we suggest that predominant ways of measurement in moral psychology may currently obscure diversity in non-theistic moral outlooks, such as more communal secular ethics. The main limitation of the research is convenience sampling. We therefore encourage future work to utilise representative samples to explore differing secular moralities and their predictors.
- 18 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Religion, Brain & Behavior
- Vol. 16 (4) , 1-5
Predictive processing all the way down
- 18 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Religion, Brain & Behavior
- Vol. 16 (4) , 1-5
Predictive processing all the way down
- Open Access
- 13 June 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Agnosticism Is No Midpoint: Metaphysics and Epistemology as Separate Dimensions of Religious Cognition
Agnosticism is often discussed in ways that muddle its philosophical underpinnings, and measured in ways that introduce unnecessary methodological artifacts. We address these shortcomings by recognizing that agnosticism and atheism are not mutually incompatible irreligious identities, but are rather endpoints of orthogonal psychological dimensions derived from fundamentally different branches of philosophy. Atheism (versus theism) describes one’s religious metaphysics: what one thinks about the ultimate nature of our religious reality. Is there a god or not, if one had to bet? Agnosticism (versus gnosticism) is a question of where one stands on religious epistemology: what one thinks about the ultimate state of knowledge about a god’s existence. Can we truly know if gods exist? We illustrate the utility of separating agnosticism about gods from belief in them using survey data that reveals distinct psychological profiles of people who independently differ along their religious metaphysics and religious epistemology. For example, agnosticism – even among devout theists – predicts a more open cognitive style and less hierarchical social views. We urge researchers to refrain from using measures that force false dichotomies (e.g., viewing atheism and agnosticism as mutually incompatible identities, rather than entirely compatible answers to distinct philosophical questions) or false midpoint answers (e.g., placing agnosticism as a midpoint between atheism and theism). Agnosticism is not a midpoint between faith and atheism, nor is it incompatible with either of them. Agnosticism is a distinct dimension of religious cognition that maps neatly on longstanding philosophical questions about the state of human knowledge.
- 13 June 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessAgnosticism Is No Midpoint: Metaphysics and Epistemology as Separate Dimensions of Religious Cognition
Agnosticism is often discussed in ways that muddle its philosophical underpinnings, and measured in ways that introduce unnecessary methodological artifacts. We address these shortcomings by recognizing that agnosticism and atheism are not mutually incompatible irreligious identities, but are rather endpoints of orthogonal psychological dimensions derived from fundamentally different branches of philosophy. Atheism (versus theism) describes one’s religious metaphysics: what one thinks about the ultimate nature of our religious reality. Is there a god or not, if one had to bet? Agnosticism (versus gnosticism) is a question of where one stands on religious epistemology: what one thinks about the ultimate state of knowledge about a god’s existence. Can we truly know if gods exist? We illustrate the utility of separating agnosticism about gods from belief in them using survey data that reveals distinct psychological profiles of people who independently differ along their religious metaphysics and religious epistemology. For example, agnosticism – even among devout theists – predicts a more open cognitive style and less hierarchical social views. We urge researchers to refrain from using measures that force false dichotomies (e.g., viewing atheism and agnosticism as mutually incompatible identities, rather than entirely compatible answers to distinct philosophical questions) or false midpoint answers (e.g., placing agnosticism as a midpoint between atheism and theism). Agnosticism is not a midpoint between faith and atheism, nor is it incompatible with either of them. Agnosticism is a distinct dimension of religious cognition that maps neatly on longstanding philosophical questions about the state of human knowledge.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 February 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychology of Religion and Spirituality
- Vol. 15 (1) , 143-156
What do nonreligious nonbelievers believe in? Secular worldviews around the world.
- 1 February 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychology of Religion and Spirituality
- Vol. 15 (1) , 143-156
Top Cited PapersWhat do nonreligious nonbelievers believe in? Secular worldviews around the world.
- Open Access
- 25 May 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Evolutionary Human Sciences
- Vol. 4, 1-33
Credibility Enhancing Displays, religious scandal and the decline of Irish Catholic orthodoxy
Credibility Enhancing Displays have been shown to be an important component in the transmission of empirically unverifiable cultural content such as religious beliefs. Decreased Credibility Enhancing Displays are a major predictor of religious decline. However, because declines in belief are often paired with the decreasing importance of religious institutions, existing research has not yet shown the effect of Credibility Enhancing Displays as separate from this institutional decline. Here, we assess the role of past Credibility Enhancing Display exposure among the baptised Catholic population of Ireland in predicting who retains a Catholic identity and religious beliefs among those who reject the Catholic Church. We find that leaving Catholicism outright (i.e. ‘ex-Catholicism’) is predicted by low Credibility Enhancing Display exposure, but rejecting the Church while retaining a Catholic identity (i.e. ‘liminal Catholicism’) and theistic belief is not. High perceived prevalence of clerical paedophiles (i.e. religious hypocrisy) predicts both groups similarly. Higher exposure to Credibility Enhancing Displays predicts higher orthodox Catholic beliefs and Catholic morality among Catholics, but with inconsistent and even negative effects among the other groups. High perceived prevalence of clerical paedophiles predicts the rejection of orthodox Catholic beliefs, but not the rejection of theism or a Catholic identity.
- 25 May 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Evolutionary Human Sciences
- Vol. 4, 1-33
Open AccessCredibility Enhancing Displays, religious scandal and the decline of Irish Catholic orthodoxy
Credibility Enhancing Displays have been shown to be an important component in the transmission of empirically unverifiable cultural content such as religious beliefs. Decreased Credibility Enhancing Displays are a major predictor of religious decline. However, because declines in belief are often paired with the decreasing importance of religious institutions, existing research has not yet shown the effect of Credibility Enhancing Displays as separate from this institutional decline. Here, we assess the role of past Credibility Enhancing Display exposure among the baptised Catholic population of Ireland in predicting who retains a Catholic identity and religious beliefs among those who reject the Catholic Church. We find that leaving Catholicism outright (i.e. ‘ex-Catholicism’) is predicted by low Credibility Enhancing Display exposure, but rejecting the Church while retaining a Catholic identity (i.e. ‘liminal Catholicism’) and theistic belief is not. High perceived prevalence of clerical paedophiles (i.e. religious hypocrisy) predicts both groups similarly. Higher exposure to Credibility Enhancing Displays predicts higher orthodox Catholic beliefs and Catholic morality among Catholics, but with inconsistent and even negative effects among the other groups. High perceived prevalence of clerical paedophiles predicts the rejection of orthodox Catholic beliefs, but not the rejection of theism or a Catholic identity.
- Open Access
- 4 February 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Maximally Intuitive, Minimally Evidenced: Universal cognitive biases as the basis for supernatural beliefs
What explains the ubiquity of religions across time and space, and why do these supernatural belief systems seem to have so much in common? Many cognitive scientists of religion have proposed that cross-cultural patterns in religious belief are, at least in part, the indirect result of reliably developing and otherwise adaptive features of the human mind. These ‘cognitive bias’ theories propose that religion is a by-product of universal mental architecture. We see similar beliefs recur in unrelated cultural and historical contexts because of biases in how we perceive and interpret the word, and how we remember concepts. This chapter reviews the evidence, merits, and limitations of such theories. In so doing, the chapter addresses the most influential of the cognitive bias theories: the proposed relationships between various religious beliefs and Theory of Mind, anthropomorphism, dualism, teleological reasoning, and minimally counterintuitive concepts. We address both the strengths and shortcomings of these theories in explaining religious belief and suggest where we can go from here.
- 4 February 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessMaximally Intuitive, Minimally Evidenced: Universal cognitive biases as the basis for supernatural beliefs
What explains the ubiquity of religions across time and space, and why do these supernatural belief systems seem to have so much in common? Many cognitive scientists of religion have proposed that cross-cultural patterns in religious belief are, at least in part, the indirect result of reliably developing and otherwise adaptive features of the human mind. These ‘cognitive bias’ theories propose that religion is a by-product of universal mental architecture. We see similar beliefs recur in unrelated cultural and historical contexts because of biases in how we perceive and interpret the word, and how we remember concepts. This chapter reviews the evidence, merits, and limitations of such theories. In so doing, the chapter addresses the most influential of the cognitive bias theories: the proposed relationships between various religious beliefs and Theory of Mind, anthropomorphism, dualism, teleological reasoning, and minimally counterintuitive concepts. We address both the strengths and shortcomings of these theories in explaining religious belief and suggest where we can go from here.
- 26 July 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Religion in Europe
- Vol. 14 (1-2) , 202-205
Anthony J. Blasi & Lluis Oviedo (eds.), The Abuse of Minors in the Catholic Church: Dismantling the Culture of Cover Ups
"Anthony J. Blasi & Lluis Oviedo (eds.), The Abuse of Minors in the Catholic Church: Dismantling the Culture of Cover Ups" published on 26 Jul 2021 by Brill.
- 26 July 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Religion in Europe
- Vol. 14 (1-2) , 202-205
Anthony J. Blasi & Lluis Oviedo (eds.), The Abuse of Minors in the Catholic Church: Dismantling the Culture of Cover Ups
"Anthony J. Blasi & Lluis Oviedo (eds.), The Abuse of Minors in the Catholic Church: Dismantling the Culture of Cover Ups" published on 26 Jul 2021 by Brill.
- 28 May 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Religion in Europe
- Vol. 12 (3) , 350-352
Love’s Betrayal: The Decline of Catholicism and Rise of New Religions in Ireland, written by Peter Mulholland
"Love’s Betrayal: The Decline of Catholicism and Rise of New Religions in Ireland, written by Peter Mulholland" published on 28 May 2020 by Brill.
- 28 May 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Religion in Europe
- Vol. 12 (3) , 350-352
Love’s Betrayal: The Decline of Catholicism and Rise of New Religions in Ireland, written by Peter Mulholland
"Love’s Betrayal: The Decline of Catholicism and Rise of New Religions in Ireland, written by Peter Mulholland" published on 28 May 2020 by Brill.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Equinox Publishing in Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion
- Vol. 6 (1-2) , 107-129
COGNITIVELY INFORMED ETHNOGRAPHY: USING MIXED METHODS TO CAPTURE THE COMPLEXITY OF RELIGIOUS PHENOMENA IN TWO ECOLOGICALLY VALID SETTINGS
Here, we present two case studies which combine ethnographic fieldwork with quantitative methods to describe religious behaviour in two ecologically valid settings. Case Study 1 describes the use of mixed methods to explore whether different types of supernatural agents are associated with different categories of moral transgression in Burma, a syncretic and multi-religious environment which naturally lends itself to this question. In this case study, ethnography plays a key role in designing appropriate questionnaire measures, generating hypotheses, and interpreting the behaviour of experimental participants. Case Study 2 describes the use of mixed methods to investigate the interrelationships between religious scandals and the emergence of ex-Catholicism in Ireland, a country noted for its recent and rapid secularization. Here, ethnography plays a key role in elucidating the limitations of early experimental designs and generating further hypotheses, while surveying in turn addresses issues of representativeness in the fieldwork. Together, these case studies serve to illustrate a number of advantages and challenges that come with adopting a mixed methods approach. We close by outlining four reasons for mixing qualitative and quantitative methods when studying religious cognition in the field, using the case studies above as examples. These are: 1) methodological triangulation, 2) assessment of instruments and procedures, 3) qualitative/quantitative iteration, and 4) capturing the current context in scenarios where existing ethnographic research is sparse or deficient.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Equinox Publishing in Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion
- Vol. 6 (1-2) , 107-129
COGNITIVELY INFORMED ETHNOGRAPHY: USING MIXED METHODS TO CAPTURE THE COMPLEXITY OF RELIGIOUS PHENOMENA IN TWO ECOLOGICALLY VALID SETTINGS
Here, we present two case studies which combine ethnographic fieldwork with quantitative methods to describe religious behaviour in two ecologically valid settings. Case Study 1 describes the use of mixed methods to explore whether different types of supernatural agents are associated with different categories of moral transgression in Burma, a syncretic and multi-religious environment which naturally lends itself to this question. In this case study, ethnography plays a key role in designing appropriate questionnaire measures, generating hypotheses, and interpreting the behaviour of experimental participants. Case Study 2 describes the use of mixed methods to investigate the interrelationships between religious scandals and the emergence of ex-Catholicism in Ireland, a country noted for its recent and rapid secularization. Here, ethnography plays a key role in elucidating the limitations of early experimental designs and generating further hypotheses, while surveying in turn addresses issues of representativeness in the fieldwork. Together, these case studies serve to illustrate a number of advantages and challenges that come with adopting a mixed methods approach. We close by outlining four reasons for mixing qualitative and quantitative methods when studying religious cognition in the field, using the case studies above as examples. These are: 1) methodological triangulation, 2) assessment of instruments and procedures, 3) qualitative/quantitative iteration, and 4) capturing the current context in scenarios where existing ethnographic research is sparse or deficient.