HTHugh Turpin

Hugh Turpin

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Hugh Turpin has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Understanding the Morality of Unbelievers: Secular Beliefs about Right and Wrong in Ten Countries

    by Roosa Haimila, Tiina Parkkinen, Eva Kundtová Klocová, Everton Maraldi, Hugh Turpin, Miguel Farias, Valerie van Mulukom

    Many people around the world believe that to be moral, one must believe in God. However, individuals who do not believe in God also hold distinct ethical beliefs. Similar to theists, non-theists in different cultures may share overarching narratives about morality and what it is founded upon—a possibility that remains understudied. In the present research, we utilised open-ended survey data to explore what non-theists from ten countries (N = 996) described as the basis of their views on right and wrong. We also investigated how different beliefs about morality clustered together. The findings show diversity but also point towards cross-culturally recurring patterns in non-theistic beliefs and belief clusters concerning 1) important moral principles and 2) perceived sources of morality. We furthermore discuss country-specific findings, such as the importance of ‘conscience’ for Turkish and Czech participants and ‘cultural Christianity’ in the Danish sample. Altogether, the results support research indicating that a lack of belief in God does not entail moral relativism and question views on non-theists primarily seeing morality as self-constructed. Instead, our findings point towards a more prominent role of social interaction and ‘social contract’ in views about the basis of right and wrong. In light of the results, we suggest that predominant ways of measurement in moral psychology may currently obscure diversity in non-theistic moral outlooks, such as more communal secular ethics. The main limitation of the research is convenience sampling. We therefore encourage future work to utilise representative samples to explore differing secular moralities and their predictors.

  • Open Access

    Understanding the morality of unbelievers: Secular beliefs about right and wrong in ten countries

    by Roosa Haimila, Tiina A M Parkkinen, Eva Kundtová Klocová, Everton de Oliveira Maraldi, Hugh Turpin, Miguel Farias, Valerie van Mulukom

    Many people around the world believe that to be moral, one must believe in God. However, individuals who do not believe in God also hold distinct ethical beliefs. Similar to theists, non-theists in different cultures may share overarching narratives about morality and what it is founded upon—a possibility that remains understudied. In the present research, we utilised open-ended survey data to explore what non-theists from ten countries (N = 996) described as the basis of their views on right and wrong. We also investigated how different beliefs about morality clustered together. The findings show diversity but also point towards cross-culturally recurring patterns in non-theistic beliefs and belief clusters concerning 1) important moral principles and 2) perceived sources of morality. We furthermore discuss country-specific findings, such as the importance of ‘conscience’ for Turkish and Czech participants and ‘cultural Christianity’ in the Danish sample. Altogether, the results support research indicating that a lack of belief in God does not entail moral relativism and question views on non-theists primarily seeing morality as self-constructed. Instead, our findings point towards a more prominent role of social interaction and ‘social contract’ in views about the basis of right and wrong. In light of the results, we suggest that predominant ways of measurement in moral psychology may currently obscure diversity in non-theistic moral outlooks, such as more communal secular ethics. The main limitation of the research is convenience sampling. We therefore encourage future work to utilise representative samples to explore differing secular moralities and their predictors.

  • Open Access

    Agnosticism Is No Midpoint: Metaphysics and Epistemology as Separate Dimensions of Religious Cognition

    by Will M Gervais, Hugh Turpin, Konrad Talmont-Kaminski

    Agnosticism is often discussed in ways that muddle its philosophical underpinnings, and measured in ways that introduce unnecessary methodological artifacts. We address these shortcomings by recognizing that agnosticism and atheism are not mutually incompatible irreligious identities, but are rather endpoints of orthogonal psychological dimensions derived from fundamentally different branches of philosophy. Atheism (versus theism) describes one’s religious metaphysics: what one thinks about the ultimate nature of our religious reality. Is there a god or not, if one had to bet? Agnosticism (versus gnosticism) is a question of where one stands on religious epistemology: what one thinks about the ultimate state of knowledge about a god’s existence. Can we truly know if gods exist? We illustrate the utility of separating agnosticism about gods from belief in them using survey data that reveals distinct psychological profiles of people who independently differ along their religious metaphysics and religious epistemology. For example, agnosticism – even among devout theists – predicts a more open cognitive style and less hierarchical social views. We urge researchers to refrain from using measures that force false dichotomies (e.g., viewing atheism and agnosticism as mutually incompatible identities, rather than entirely compatible answers to distinct philosophical questions) or false midpoint answers (e.g., placing agnosticism as a midpoint between atheism and theism). Agnosticism is not a midpoint between faith and atheism, nor is it incompatible with either of them. Agnosticism is a distinct dimension of religious cognition that maps neatly on longstanding philosophical questions about the state of human knowledge.

  • Top Cited Papers

    What do nonreligious nonbelievers believe in? Secular worldviews around the world.

    by Valerie van Mulukom, Hugh Turpin, Roosa Haimila, Benjamin Grant Purzycki, Theiss Bendixen, Eva Kundtová Klocová, Dan Řezníček, Thomas J. Coleman, Kenan Sevinç, Everton Maraldi, et al.


  • Open Access

    Credibility Enhancing Displays, religious scandal and the decline of Irish Catholic orthodoxy

    by Hugh D. Turpin, Aiyana K. Willard

    Credibility Enhancing Displays have been shown to be an important component in the transmission of empirically unverifiable cultural content such as religious beliefs. Decreased Credibility Enhancing Displays are a major predictor of religious decline. However, because declines in belief are often paired with the decreasing importance of religious institutions, existing research has not yet shown the effect of Credibility Enhancing Displays as separate from this institutional decline. Here, we assess the role of past Credibility Enhancing Display exposure among the baptised Catholic population of Ireland in predicting who retains a Catholic identity and religious beliefs among those who reject the Catholic Church. We find that leaving Catholicism outright (i.e. ‘ex-Catholicism’) is predicted by low Credibility Enhancing Display exposure, but rejecting the Church while retaining a Catholic identity (i.e. ‘liminal Catholicism’) and theistic belief is not. High perceived prevalence of clerical paedophiles (i.e. religious hypocrisy) predicts both groups similarly. Higher exposure to Credibility Enhancing Displays predicts higher orthodox Catholic beliefs and Catholic morality among Catholics, but with inconsistent and even negative effects among the other groups. High perceived prevalence of clerical paedophiles predicts the rejection of orthodox Catholic beliefs, but not the rejection of theism or a Catholic identity.


  • Open Access

    Maximally Intuitive, Minimally Evidenced: Universal cognitive biases as the basis for supernatural beliefs

    by Aiyana Koka Willard, Hugh Turpin, Adam Baimel

    What explains the ubiquity of religions across time and space, and why do these supernatural belief systems seem to have so much in common? Many cognitive scientists of religion have proposed that cross-cultural patterns in religious belief are, at least in part, the indirect result of reliably developing and otherwise adaptive features of the human mind. These ‘cognitive bias’ theories propose that religion is a by-product of universal mental architecture. We see similar beliefs recur in unrelated cultural and historical contexts because of biases in how we perceive and interpret the word, and how we remember concepts. This chapter reviews the evidence, merits, and limitations of such theories. In so doing, the chapter addresses the most influential of the cognitive bias theories: the proposed relationships between various religious beliefs and Theory of Mind, anthropomorphism, dualism, teleological reasoning, and minimally counterintuitive concepts. We address both the strengths and shortcomings of these theories in explaining religious belief and suggest where we can go from here.

  • Anthony J. Blasi & Lluis Oviedo (eds.), The Abuse of Minors in the Catholic Church: Dismantling the Culture of Cover Ups

    by Hugh Turpin

    "Anthony J. Blasi & Lluis Oviedo (eds.), The Abuse of Minors in the Catholic Church: Dismantling the Culture of Cover Ups" published on 26 Jul 2021 by Brill.

  • Love’s Betrayal: The Decline of Catholicism and Rise of New Religions in Ireland, written by Peter Mulholland

    by Hugh Turpin

    "Love’s Betrayal: The Decline of Catholicism and Rise of New Religions in Ireland, written by Peter Mulholland" published on 28 May 2020 by Brill.

  • COGNITIVELY INFORMED ETHNOGRAPHY: USING MIXED METHODS TO CAPTURE THE COMPLEXITY OF RELIGIOUS PHENOMENA IN TWO ECOLOGICALLY VALID SETTINGS

    by Hugh Daniel Turpin, Mark Stanford

    Here, we present two case studies which combine ethnographic fieldwork with quantitative methods to describe religious behaviour in two ecologically valid settings. Case Study 1 describes the use of mixed methods to explore whether different types of supernatural agents are associated with different categories of moral transgression in Burma, a syncretic and multi-religious environment which naturally lends itself to this question. In this case study, ethnography plays a key role in designing appropriate questionnaire measures, generating hypotheses, and interpreting the behaviour of experimental participants. Case Study 2 describes the use of mixed methods to investigate the interrelationships between religious scandals and the emergence of ex-Catholicism in Ireland, a country noted for its recent and rapid secularization. Here, ethnography plays a key role in elucidating the limitations of early experimental designs and generating further hypotheses, while surveying in turn addresses issues of representativeness in the fieldwork. Together, these case studies serve to illustrate a number of advantages and challenges that come with adopting a mixed methods approach. We close by outlining four reasons for mixing qualitative and quantitative methods when studying religious cognition in the field, using the case studies above as examples. These are: 1) methodological triangulation, 2) assessment of instruments and procedures, 3) qualitative/quantitative iteration, and 4) capturing the current context in scenarios where existing ethnographic research is sparse or deficient.