Joyce C. Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Joyce C. Wang has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mike W. Peng
Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, USA
2 shared publications - En Xie
Tongji University
1 shared publication - Jingtao Yi
Renmin University of China
1 shared publication - Sergey Lebedev
Coles College of Business Kennesaw State University Kennesaw Georgia USA
1 shared publication Xiuping Zhang
University of International Business and Economics
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
Strategic Implications of Board Interlocks: A Literature Review and Future Research Agenda
Research Question/Issue: Board interlocks, stemming from directors' concurrent board appointments, have been viewed as a double‐edged sword that can generate both positive and negative effects, hinging on strategic outcomes and a multitude of contextual variables. The fragmented research efforts call for a literature review of strategic implications of board interlocks. Research Findings/Insights: Our review of 126 articles published in 54 high‐quality academic journals between 2008 and 2024 summarizes the scholarly discourse regarding strategic roles of board interlocks. Meanwhile, we document the multifaceted nature of board interlocks. Centering on strategic outcomes, we systematically organize our shortlisted articles into five research clusters that bridge board interlocks and (1) board governance, (2) growth strategies, (3) broad financial practices, (4) nonmarket strategies, and (5) firm performances. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This narrative review consolidates the largely fragmented literature on board interlocks across disciplines. Going beyond competing views of board interlocks—a resource access lens or a monitoring effectiveness lens—we highlight the expanding strategic implications of board interlocks across broader institutional contexts. By surveying core research ideas in prior studies, we endeavor to synthesize board interlocks research, sharpen our understanding of their strategic roles, and decipher underexplored topics for future research. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The expanding strategic implications of board interlocks in wider institutional contexts suggest that recommendations for tie formation or dissolution need to be tailored to strategic outcomes and multilevel contextual variables, such as interlocking directors, interlocked firms, and formal and informal institutions.
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
Open AccessStrategic Implications of Board Interlocks: A Literature Review and Future Research Agenda
Research Question/Issue: Board interlocks, stemming from directors' concurrent board appointments, have been viewed as a double‐edged sword that can generate both positive and negative effects, hinging on strategic outcomes and a multitude of contextual variables. The fragmented research efforts call for a literature review of strategic implications of board interlocks. Research Findings/Insights: Our review of 126 articles published in 54 high‐quality academic journals between 2008 and 2024 summarizes the scholarly discourse regarding strategic roles of board interlocks. Meanwhile, we document the multifaceted nature of board interlocks. Centering on strategic outcomes, we systematically organize our shortlisted articles into five research clusters that bridge board interlocks and (1) board governance, (2) growth strategies, (3) broad financial practices, (4) nonmarket strategies, and (5) firm performances. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This narrative review consolidates the largely fragmented literature on board interlocks across disciplines. Going beyond competing views of board interlocks—a resource access lens or a monitoring effectiveness lens—we highlight the expanding strategic implications of board interlocks across broader institutional contexts. By surveying core research ideas in prior studies, we endeavor to synthesize board interlocks research, sharpen our understanding of their strategic roles, and decipher underexplored topics for future research. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The expanding strategic implications of board interlocks in wider institutional contexts suggest that recommendations for tie formation or dissolution need to be tailored to strategic outcomes and multilevel contextual variables, such as interlocking directors, interlocked firms, and formal and informal institutions.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 7 October 2024
- Published by Wiley in Global Strategy Journal
- Vol. 14 (4) , 683-708
Theorizing about emerging multinationals' cross‐border acquisitions
Research Summary: The emergence of multinational enterprises from emerging economies (emerging multinationals or EMNEs) has resulted in two puzzles: (1) Why do EMNEs often bid higher for targets in developed economies? (2) Why do EMNEs often allow such targets significant autonomy? From a theoretical standpoint, the two puzzles beg the question of whether an integrative answer exists. Extending property rights theory, we conceptualize an EMNE as a collection of assets over which an emerging‐economy firm has residual control, gained predominantly through cross‐border acquisitions. Leveraging a legitimacy‐based view, we suggest that EMNEs suffer from legitimacy deficits. Overall, the key to theorizing about EMNEs' cross‐border acquisitions and solving the two puzzles is to appreciate EMNEs' endeavors to simultaneously maximize joint value creation, minimize target incentive loss, and overcome legitimacy deficits.Managerial Summary: Driven by property rights thinking and legitimacy deficits considerations, multinational enterprises from emerging economies (emerging multinationals or EMNEs) often pay higher premiums for and grant significant autonomy to acquisition targets in developed economies. During the pre‐acquisition phase, EMNEs need to carefully evaluate targets' value‐creation potential and asset complementarity. During the post‐acquisition phase, offering autonomy to targets is advisable, if acquisition premiums are high, if pursued assets are knowledge‐based, and if target managers and employees as well as other stakeholders (such as host‐country governments) have raised major concerns. Although few EMNEs explicitly refer to research on property rights and legitimacy deficits, many of them have acted in a way that is consistent with such theoretical reasoning. Emerging‐economy acquirers that follow such reasoning often perform well.
- 7 October 2024
- Published by Wiley in Global Strategy Journal
- Vol. 14 (4) , 683-708
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessTheorizing about emerging multinationals' cross‐border acquisitions
Research Summary: The emergence of multinational enterprises from emerging economies (emerging multinationals or EMNEs) has resulted in two puzzles: (1) Why do EMNEs often bid higher for targets in developed economies? (2) Why do EMNEs often allow such targets significant autonomy? From a theoretical standpoint, the two puzzles beg the question of whether an integrative answer exists. Extending property rights theory, we conceptualize an EMNE as a collection of assets over which an emerging‐economy firm has residual control, gained predominantly through cross‐border acquisitions. Leveraging a legitimacy‐based view, we suggest that EMNEs suffer from legitimacy deficits. Overall, the key to theorizing about EMNEs' cross‐border acquisitions and solving the two puzzles is to appreciate EMNEs' endeavors to simultaneously maximize joint value creation, minimize target incentive loss, and overcome legitimacy deficits.Managerial Summary: Driven by property rights thinking and legitimacy deficits considerations, multinational enterprises from emerging economies (emerging multinationals or EMNEs) often pay higher premiums for and grant significant autonomy to acquisition targets in developed economies. During the pre‐acquisition phase, EMNEs need to carefully evaluate targets' value‐creation potential and asset complementarity. During the post‐acquisition phase, offering autonomy to targets is advisable, if acquisition premiums are high, if pursued assets are knowledge‐based, and if target managers and employees as well as other stakeholders (such as host‐country governments) have raised major concerns. Although few EMNEs explicitly refer to research on property rights and legitimacy deficits, many of them have acted in a way that is consistent with such theoretical reasoning. Emerging‐economy acquirers that follow such reasoning often perform well.
- Top Cited Papers
- 21 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Management Studies
- Vol. 59 (7) , 1839-1868
Pyramidal Ownership and SOE Innovation
How can state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) become more innovative in emerging economies where market competition emerges and state socialism remains? Rooted in a state socialism logic that traditionally prioritizes central planning, SOEs are increasingly challenged by a market competition logic espousing efficiency and innovation. We posit that the challenge, stemming from the grip of the state as the ultimate owner, may be mitigated for some SOEs under pyramidal ownership. A pyramid features SOEs being organized into chains of firms, creating indirect ownership and control through pyramidal layers. Such layers insulate state intervention in lower‐tier SOEs, loosening the grip of the state socialism logic and facilitating corresponding SOEs’ acceptance of the market competition logic, as reflected in more innovation. Leveraging a sample of SOEs in China, we find that SOEs innovate more when the number of pyramidal layers between them and the state increases. In addition, the innovation‐facilitating role of pyramidal ownership hinges on industry regulations and institutional development. Overall, this paper integrates research on institutional logics and pyramidal ownership to deepen our understanding of SOE innovation.
- 21 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Management Studies
- Vol. 59 (7) , 1839-1868
Top Cited PapersPyramidal Ownership and SOE Innovation
How can state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) become more innovative in emerging economies where market competition emerges and state socialism remains? Rooted in a state socialism logic that traditionally prioritizes central planning, SOEs are increasingly challenged by a market competition logic espousing efficiency and innovation. We posit that the challenge, stemming from the grip of the state as the ultimate owner, may be mitigated for some SOEs under pyramidal ownership. A pyramid features SOEs being organized into chains of firms, creating indirect ownership and control through pyramidal layers. Such layers insulate state intervention in lower‐tier SOEs, loosening the grip of the state socialism logic and facilitating corresponding SOEs’ acceptance of the market competition logic, as reflected in more innovation. Leveraging a sample of SOEs in China, we find that SOEs innovate more when the number of pyramidal layers between them and the state increases. In addition, the innovation‐facilitating role of pyramidal ownership hinges on industry regulations and institutional development. Overall, this paper integrates research on institutional logics and pyramidal ownership to deepen our understanding of SOE innovation.