AGAlexandre Garel

Alexandre Garel

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Alexandre Garel has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • The voting behavior of women-led mutual funds

    by Alberta Di Giuli, Alexandre Garel, Arthur Romec

  • Open Access

    Green Monetary Policy and Climate Transition Risk

    by Alexandre Garel, Jose-Maria Martin-Flores, Arthur Romec

    This paper studies the impact of the ECB's July 2022 announcement of concrete measures to decarbonize its corporate bond holdings and adjust collateral eligibility criteria on the European corporate bond market. We document a significant decline in the value of eligible bonds issued by carbon-intensive firms following the announcement. Consistent with the ECB's stated approach to measuring climate performance, these effects are particularly pronounced for carbon-intensive firms lacking emission reduction commitments or with poorer climate disclosure. Placebo tests using non-eligible bonds indicate that these results are specific to firms directly affected by the announcement of the ECB's green monetary policy. We further show that European funds reduce their holdings of bonds issued by carbon-intensive firms in the months following the announcement. Finally, we find that coupon rates at issuance are higher for carbon-intensive firms after the announcement and that these firms reduce their reliance on bond financing. Collectively, our evidence indicates that green monetary policy represents a source of climate transition risk, directly affecting investor behavior and firms' financing conditions.

  • Open Access

    Betting on Established Heuristics to Fight Climate Change: Making Emissions Binding in Energy Performance Certificates

    by Alexandre Garel

    Can policymakers exploit established heuristics to price emission externalities? We test this using France's 2021 Energy Performance Certificate reform, which made GHG emission ratings binding on the final EPC grade previously determined solely by energy ratings. Using over one million house sale transactions (2014-2025), pre-reform, we document that heuristic pricing existed only for energy ratings. Post-reform, for properties whose grade is now set by the emission rating, heuristic pricing shifts to emission rating thresholds with comparable magnitude, while energy-based discontinuities disappear when not binding. The results support anchoring binding regulation to a salient, pre-existing heuristic to accelerate emission pricing at low policy cost. We further document evidence consistent with emission pricing influencing sellers' renovation decisions, using both renovation audit recommendations and post-reform shifts in the distribution of emission ratings as proxies.

  • Effets réels de la structure de l'actionnariat : impact des investisseurs de long-terme sur les politiques et la performance des entreprises

    by Alexandre Garel

    Effets réels de la structure de l'actionnariat : impact des investisseurs de long-terme sur les politiques et la performance des entreprises: Cette thèse traite de l’influence de l’horizon d’investissement des actionnaires sur les décisions des entreprises et sur leur performance. Elle est composée de quatre articles. Le premier article effectue une revue de la littérature et identifie des lacunes que les trois autres articles empiriques cherchent à combler. Le second article est consacré à l’effet de l’horizon d’investissement des actionnaires sur la satisfaction des employés. La satisfaction des employés est un actif intangible qui, bien que créateur de valeur sur le long-terme, est mal valorisé par le marché à court-terme. Pour cette raison, les investisseurs de long-terme et de court-terme pourraient ne pas avoir le même intérêt à ce que les entreprises dans lesquelles ils investissent satisfassent leurs employés. L’article documente un effet positif des investisseurs de long-terme sur la satisfaction des employés et établit la causalité de différentes façons. Ce résultat indique que la structure de l’actionnariat est un déterminant important de mise en place de politiques RSE créatrices de valeur à long-terme. Le troisième article étudie l’impact de l’horizon d’investissement des actionnaires sur la performance des banques pendant la crise. Les résultats de l’analyse empirique montrent qu’une plus grande présence d’actionnaires de court-terme est associée à une plus forte chute du cours de bourse pendant la crise. Cette association s’explique partiellement par une prise de risques plus grande, avant crise, des banques dans lesquelles les actionnaires de court-terme étaient plus présents. Elle s’explique également par le comportement des actionnaires de court-terme pendant la crise. Ces derniers ont vendu massivement leurs actions, générant une pression à la vente plus forte des actions des banques par l’ensemble des investisseurs institutionnels. Ces résultats ont une implication pour la réglementation des fonds propres bancaires, ils suggèrent que l’effet protecteur des fonds propres pour les banques varie en fonction de l’horizon d’investissement des détenteurs de ces fonds. Le dernier article se concentre sur l’effet disciplinaire des investisseurs de long-terme. Il montre que l’effet disciplinaire des investisseurs de long-terme sur le surinvestissement d’une entreprise dépend de la durée pendant laquelle ces investisseurs ont effectivement détenu les actions de l’entreprise. Les résultats de l’analyse empirique soutiennent l’idée que, pour constituer une base actionnariale qui génère plus de valeur, attirer des investisseurs de long-terme n’est pas suffisant, les entreprises devraient également inciter leurs actionnaires à détenir leurs actions plus longtemps.

  • Top Cited Papers

    Climate Change and Mutual Fund Voting on Climate Proposals

    by Alberta Di Giuli, Alexandre Garel, Roni Michaely, Arthur Romec

    This paper explores whether investors’ personal experience with climate change affects their voting behavior on climate change–related proposals. We find that fund managers exposed to abnormally hot temperatures are significantly more likely to support climate proposals. We further show that the effect is persistent. We observe significant heterogeneity in the effect of hot temperatures, depending on firm-level climate risk, the quality of the proposals, fund investment strategy, and prior awareness of climate change. Fund managers’ personal experience with climate change matters for the outcome of climate proposals as it affects the aggregate support they receive. Fund managers exposed to abnormally hot temperatures are also more likely to divest from stocks with greater exposure to climate change. This paper was accepted by Camelia Kuhnen, finance. Funding: R. Michaely acknowledges financial support from the National Nature Science Foundation of China [Project 72332002]. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03733 .


  • Open Access

    Climate Risk Engagements

    by François Derrien, Alexandre Garel, Arthur Romec, Feng Zhou

    We study climate risk engagements by one of the world’s largest institutional investors. These engagements account for a substantial share of ESG engagements and predominantly target firms with large carbon footprints and high exposure to transition risk. The recent ESG backlash has led to a reduction in climate risk engagements, particularly in industries where climate issues are less financially material. Climate risk engagements are associated with greater voting support for management. Following engagement, targeted firms are more likely to adopt science-based climate targets and to disclose climate-related information. They also experience a modest reduction in emissions intensity. Placebo tests using social engagements suggest that these outcomes are specifically due to climate risk engagements. Finally, when targeted firms fail to subsequently take climate actions, engagement is repeated and complemented by votes against directors.

  • Shareholder engagements in banks

    by Alexandre Garel, Arthur Romec, Feng Zhou


  • Open Access

    Climate Risk Engagements

    by François Derrien, Alexandre Garel, Arthur Romec, Feng Zhou

    We study climate risk engagements by one of the world’s largest institutional investors. These engagements account for a substantial share of ESG engagements and predominantly target firms with large carbon footprints and high exposure to transition risk. The recent ESG backlash has led to a reduction in climate risk engagements, particularly in industries where climate issues are less financially material. Climate risk engagements are associated with greater voting support for management. Following engagement, targeted firms are more likely to adopt science-based climate targets and to disclose climate-related information. They also experience a modest reduction in emissions intensity. Placebo tests using social engagements suggest that these outcomes are specifically due to climate risk engagements. Finally, when targeted firms fail to subsequently take climate actions, engagement is repeated and complemented by votes against directors.

  • Open Access

    Climate Disclosure and Director Elections

    by Alexandre Garel, Roni Michaely, Arthur Romec

    This study investigates the links between climate-related disclosure and investor sup port for directors in board elections. Firms not disclosing carbon emissions receive significantly more votes against their directors, a trend robust to various controls, including governance proxies, ESG incidents, environmental activism, climate commit ments, and proxy advisors’ recommendations. Firms initiating climate disclosure face fewer negative votes. Sustainable funds and universal investors are key drivers of this trend. Moreover, investors supporting shareholder-sponsored climate disclosure pro posals are more likely to vote against directors in firms lacking carbon disclosure. In the years following a significant fraction of votes against directors, companies are more likely to respond to the CDP questionnaire. Our results suggest that investors vote against directors as a mean to change boards’ approach towards climate change issues and climate disclosure in particular.