Ketian Zhang
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The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
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Latest Publications
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 2 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Politics
- Vol. 63 (3) , 1-36
Alliances with Chinese characteristics? The contents and rationale of China’s strategic partnerships
Alliances are an important component of international relations. However, China rarely forms formal alliances; instead, it relies on various forms of partnerships. In light of China’s growing presence worldwide and the development of its relations with Russia, how does China view alliances and their utility? Why does China prefer partnerships over alliances? This article utilizes primary Chinese-language sources, interviews, as well as qualitative methods and creates a new dataset of China’s strategic partnerships from 1990 to 2025. It argues that Chinese strategic partnerships are not alliances. China establishes these partnerships because forming alliances is neither feasible nor necessary under U.S. hegemony and because partnerships offer greater flexibility without entrapping China in military obligations. The article contributes to the alliance literature by examining China’s views and thoughts on alliances and partnerships. It also has policy relevance for whether these strategic partnerships pose a real threat to the United States.
- 2 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Politics
- Vol. 63 (3) , 1-36
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessAlliances with Chinese characteristics? The contents and rationale of China’s strategic partnerships
Alliances are an important component of international relations. However, China rarely forms formal alliances; instead, it relies on various forms of partnerships. In light of China’s growing presence worldwide and the development of its relations with Russia, how does China view alliances and their utility? Why does China prefer partnerships over alliances? This article utilizes primary Chinese-language sources, interviews, as well as qualitative methods and creates a new dataset of China’s strategic partnerships from 1990 to 2025. It argues that Chinese strategic partnerships are not alliances. China establishes these partnerships because forming alliances is neither feasible nor necessary under U.S. hegemony and because partnerships offer greater flexibility without entrapping China in military obligations. The article contributes to the alliance literature by examining China’s views and thoughts on alliances and partnerships. It also has policy relevance for whether these strategic partnerships pose a real threat to the United States.
- Open Access
- 31 December 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1331
Response to Dylan M.H. Loh’s Review of China’s Gambit: The Calculus of Coercion
Response to Dylan M.H. Loh’s Review of China’s Gambit: The Calculus of Coercion - Volume 22 Issue 4
- 31 December 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1331
Open AccessResponse to Dylan M.H. Loh’s Review of China’s Gambit: The Calculus of Coercion
Response to Dylan M.H. Loh’s Review of China’s Gambit: The Calculus of Coercion - Volume 22 Issue 4
- Open Access
- 31 December 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1327-1328
China’s Rising Foreign Ministry: Practices and Representations of Assertive Diplomacy. By Dylan M.H. Loh. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2024. $75.00 cloth.
China’s Rising Foreign Ministry: Practices and Representations of Assertive Diplomacy. By Dylan M.H. Loh. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2024. $75.00 cloth. - Volume 22 Issue 4
- 31 December 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1327-1328
Open AccessChina’s Rising Foreign Ministry: Practices and Representations of Assertive Diplomacy. By Dylan M.H. Loh. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2024. $75.00 cloth.
China’s Rising Foreign Ministry: Practices and Representations of Assertive Diplomacy. By Dylan M.H. Loh. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2024. $75.00 cloth. - Volume 22 Issue 4
- 16 June 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary China
- Vol. 32 (141) , 399-416
Explaining Chinese Military Coercion in Sino-Indian Border Disputes
This article examines Sino-Indian border disputes in the post-Cold War period. There has been an increased frequency of Chinese military coercion in the Sino-Indian border disputes since 2006. This trend contrasts with Chinese coercion in the South China Sea in the post-2007 period, which tends to be non-militarized. Why does China prefer to use military coercion regarding Sino-Indian border disputes? This article argues that the geopolitical backlash cost for China to use military coercion against India has been low since the 1990s, and China, therefore, has consistently used militarized coercive tools. In contrast, the high geopolitical backlash cost pertaining to South China Sea disputes led China to utilize non-military coercion post-2007. This article implications for theorizing China’s choices of coercive tools and its India policy.
- 16 June 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary China
- Vol. 32 (141) , 399-416
Explaining Chinese Military Coercion in Sino-Indian Border Disputes
This article examines Sino-Indian border disputes in the post-Cold War period. There has been an increased frequency of Chinese military coercion in the Sino-Indian border disputes since 2006. This trend contrasts with Chinese coercion in the South China Sea in the post-2007 period, which tends to be non-militarized. Why does China prefer to use military coercion regarding Sino-Indian border disputes? This article argues that the geopolitical backlash cost for China to use military coercion against India has been low since the 1990s, and China, therefore, has consistently used militarized coercive tools. In contrast, the high geopolitical backlash cost pertaining to South China Sea disputes led China to utilize non-military coercion post-2007. This article implications for theorizing China’s choices of coercive tools and its India policy.
- 28 February 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Strategic Studies
- Vol. 46 (6-7) , 1185-1214
Explaining China’s large-scale land reclamation in the South China Sea: Timing and rationale
Since 2013, China has undertaken extensive reclamation and construction on several reefs in the Spratly Island chain in the South China Sea. China has since been adding new construction and fortifications to the land features that had undergone reclamation between late 2013 and 2015, but none of the new projects rivalled the large-scale reclamation from 2014–15, and nor has China reclaimed any new land features. Land reclamation has theoretical and empirical implications. The literature regarding maritime disputes in the South China Sea is rich and plenty. Many studies, however, focus on China’s bilateral assertive or coercive behaviour as well as China’s general strategy in the South China Sea, not land reclamation per se. What explains the timing of China’s large-scale land reclamation in the South China Sea? Why did China decide to initiate large-scale land reclamation in the first place? This paper, therefore, conducts a comprehensive case study analysing China’s land reclamation decisions. I argue that China’s land reclamation is a result of capability, rationale, and opportunities which include a calculation of U.S. resolve. This study has implications for understanding Chinese foreign policy decision-making and contributes to the credibility debate in the coercion literature.
- 28 February 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Strategic Studies
- Vol. 46 (6-7) , 1185-1214
Explaining China’s large-scale land reclamation in the South China Sea: Timing and rationale
Since 2013, China has undertaken extensive reclamation and construction on several reefs in the Spratly Island chain in the South China Sea. China has since been adding new construction and fortifications to the land features that had undergone reclamation between late 2013 and 2015, but none of the new projects rivalled the large-scale reclamation from 2014–15, and nor has China reclaimed any new land features. Land reclamation has theoretical and empirical implications. The literature regarding maritime disputes in the South China Sea is rich and plenty. Many studies, however, focus on China’s bilateral assertive or coercive behaviour as well as China’s general strategy in the South China Sea, not land reclamation per se. What explains the timing of China’s large-scale land reclamation in the South China Sea? Why did China decide to initiate large-scale land reclamation in the first place? This paper, therefore, conducts a comprehensive case study analysing China’s land reclamation decisions. I argue that China’s land reclamation is a result of capability, rationale, and opportunities which include a calculation of U.S. resolve. This study has implications for understanding Chinese foreign policy decision-making and contributes to the credibility debate in the coercion literature.