CBC. Daniel Batson

C. Daniel Batson

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


C. Daniel Batson has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Moral Hypocrisy

    by Elizabeth C. Collins, C. Daniel Batson

  • What’s Wrong with Morality?

    by C. Daniel Batson

    Why do moral people so often fail to act morally? Standard scientific answers point to poor moral judgment (based on deficient character development, reason, or intuition) or to situational pressure. I consider a third possibility: a relative lack of truly moral motivation and emotion. What has been taken for moral motivation is often instead a subtle form of egoism. Recent research provides considerable evidence for moral hypocrisy—motivation to appear moral while, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral—but very little evidence for moral integrity—motivation to actually be moral. The lack of truly moral motivation may, in turn, be linked to a lack of truly moral emotion, at least in response to violation of certain moral standards.


  • Using Empathy to Improve Intergroup Attitudes and Relations

    by C. Daniel Batson, Nadia Y. Ahmad

    Recently, social psychologists have given considerable attention to the possibility that empathy can be used to improve intergroup attitudes and relations. For this possibility to bear practical fruit, it is important to know what is meant by empathy because different researchers use the term to refer to different psychological states. It is also important to understand how each of these empathy states might affect intergroup relations by reviewing theory and research on the psychological processes involved, and it is important to consider the limitations of each form of empathy as a source of improved intergroup relations. Finally, it is important to consider the role of different empathy states in existing programs designed to improve intergroup relations, whether in protracted political conflicts, in educational settings, or via media. In this article, we pursue each of these goals.


  • Quest Religion, Anti‐Fundamentalism, and Limited Versus Universal Compassion

    by C. Daniel Batson, Drew M Denton, Jason T Vollmecke

    Goldfried and Miner (2002) claimed to provide evidence that those high in quest religion are less likely to help a religiously closed‐minded person even when the help does not promote closed‐mindedness. As a result, they concluded that quest religion is associated with limited, not universal, compassion. An experiment modeled on theirs but avoiding several methodological problems suggested a very different conclusion. Although participants high in quest religion helped a religiously closed‐minded person less when doing so promoted closed‐mindedness, they were no less likely to help such a person when it did not promote closed‐mindedness. These results suggest that quest religion is associated with antipathy toward promoting closed‐mindedness, not with antipathy toward religiously closed‐minded persons. The scope of compassion associated with quest religion does not appear to be limited in the way Goldfried and Miner claimed.


  • An additional antecedent of empathic concern: Valuing the welfare of the person in need.

    by C. Daniel Batson, Jakob Håkansson Eklund, Valerie L. Chermok, Jennifer L. Hoyt, Biaggio G. Ortiz

    Two experiments examined the role of valuing the welfare of a person in need as an antecedent of empathic concern. Specifically, these experiments explored the relation of such valuing to a well-known antecedent--perspective taking. In Experiment 1, both perspective taking and valuing were manipulated, and each independently increased empathic concern, which, in turn, increased helping behavior. In Experiment 2, only valuing was manipulated. Manipulated valuing increased measured perspective taking and, in part as a result, increased empathic concern, which, in turn, increased helping. Valuing appears to be an important, largely overlooked, situational antecedent of feeling empathy for a person in need.


  • Open Access

    Anger at unfairness: is it moral outrage?

    by C. Daniel Batson, Christopher L. Kennedy, Lesley‐Anne Nord, E. L. Stocks, D'YAni A. Fleming, Christian M. Marzette, David A. Lishner, Robin E. Hayes, Leah M. Kolchinsky, Tricia Zerger

    Anger at unfair treatment has been called moral outrage. However, moral outrage—anger at the violation of a moral standard—should be distinguished from personal anger at being harmed and empathic anger at seeing another for whom one cares harmed. Across a preliminary experiment and a main experiment, both designed to manipulate the appraisal conditions for these three forms of anger, we found evidence of personal anger and empathic anger, but little evidence of moral outrage. Participants perceived unfair treatment of another, even another for whom they had not been induced to feel empathy, to be as unfair as participants perceived unfair treatment of themselves. But the appraisal conditions that evoked anger were unfair treatment of self and unfair treatment of a cared‐for other, not unfairness per se. In the absence of empathic concern, unfair treatment of another evoked little anger. Possible implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are suggested. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


  • ‘Doing Business After the Fall: The Virtue of Moral Hypocrisy’

    by C. Daniel Batson, Elizabeth Collins, Adam A. Powell


  • Top Cited Papers

    “... As you Would have Them Do Unto You”: Does Imagining Yourself in the Other's Place Stimulate Moral Action?

    by C. Daniel Batson, David A. Lishner, Amy Carpenter, Luis Dulin, Sanna Harjusola-Webb, E. L. Stocks, Shawna Gale, Omar Hassan, Brenda Sampat

    Philosophers, psychologists, and religious teachers have suggested that imagining yourself in another's place will stimulate moral action. The authors tested this idea in two different situations. In Experiment 1, participants had the opportunity to assign themselves and another research participant to tasks, with one task clearly more desirable than the other. Imagining oneself in the other's place did little to increase the morality (fair-ness) of the decision. A different form of perspective taking, imagining the other's feelings, increased direct assignment of the other to the desirable task, apparently due to increased empathy. In Experiment 2, participants confronted a different decision: either accept an initial task assignment that would give them highly positive consequences and the other participant nothing or change the assignment so they and the other would each receive moderately positive consequences. In this situation, imagining oneself in the other's place did significantly increase moral action.


  • Moral hypocrisy: Addressing some alternatives.

    by C. Daniel Batson, Elizabeth R. Thompson, Hubert Chen

    Two studies addressed alternative explanations for 3 pieces of evidence supporting the existence of moral hypocrisy. In Study 1, no support was found for the idea that low salience of social standards accounts for falsifying the result of a coin flip to assign oneself a more desirable task. In Study 2, no support was found for the idea that responses of those who honestly win the flip account for the higher ratings of morality of their action by participants who assign themselves the more desirable task after flipping the coin. Also, no support was found for the idea that responses of those who honestly win the flip account for the inability of personal moral responsibility measures to predict moral action. Instead, results of both studies provided additional evidence of moral hypocrisy.