IAImran Hafeez Abbassi

Imran Hafeez Abbassi

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Imran Hafeez Abbassi has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • ForASec: Formal Analysis of Hardware Trojan-Based Security Vulnerabilities in Sequential Circuits

    by Faiq Khalid, Imran Hafeez Abbassi, Semeen Rehman, Awais Mehmood Kamboh, Osman Hasan, Muhammad Shafique

    In this article, we propose a novel model checking-based methodology that analyzes the hardware trojan (HT)-based security vulnerabilities in sequential circuits with 100% coverage while addressing the state-space explosion issue and completeness issue. In this work, the state-space explosion issue is addressed by efficiently partitioning the larger state space into corresponding smaller state spaces to enable the distributed HT-based security analysis of complex sequential circuits. We analyze multiple ISCAS89 and trust-hub benchmarks for different ASIC technologies, i.e., 65, 45, and 22 nm, to demonstrate the efficacy of our framework in identifying HT-based security vulnerabilities. The experimental results show that ForASec successfully performs the complete analysis of the given complex and large sequential circuits, and provides approximately $6\times $ – $10\times $ speedup in analysis time compared to the state-of-the-art model checking-based techniques.


  • Open Access

    McSeVIC: A Model Checking Based Framework for Security Vulnerability Analysis of Integrated Circuits

    by Imran Hafeez Abbassi, Faiq Khalid, Osman Hasan, Awais Mehmood Kamboh, Muhammad Shafique

    The rising trend of globalization in the integrated circuits' design process has increased their vulnerabilities against malicious intrusions. The security vulnerability analysis using conventional design time simulations is computationally intensive and incomplete by nature. Formal verification has the potential to overcome these limitations of simulation techniques; however, the existing state-of-the-art formal verification techniques cannot be used as such to analyze the effects of hardware Trojans (HTs) that may impact the performance of the circuit without altering its functionality. In this paper, we propose a novel model checking-based formal framework for a priori assessment of circuit vulnerabilities against both the functional and parametric HTs at the early stages of the design. This framework is characterized by the gate-level side channel parameters, i.e., dynamic power, leakage power, and propagation delay, to examine the impacts of malicious circuitry insertion. An algorithm based on the temporal logic properties is proposed, which computes the bounds for the side channel parameters to define the expected secure regions of circuit operation. Moreover, we propose a second algorithm for formally analyzing the security vulnerabilities in the circuit by introducing partitions, which significantly reduces the size of state space. We evaluate the masking effects on the intrusions while considering 3-sigma variation in the process. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach by analyzing the security vulnerabilities on a set of ISCAS85 and 74× benchmarks.


  • Formal Verification of Gate-Level Multiple Side Channel Parameters to Detect Hardware Trojans

    by Imran Hafeez Abbasi, Faiq Khalid Lodhi, Awais Mehmood Kamboh, Osman Hasan