Peng Xing

Facing the strengthening of consumer environmental awareness, we investigate the green investment and green subsidy problem of an incumbent supply chain (ISC) taking into account whether the external manufacturer (EM) encroach. Green investment strategies are explored under three scenarios: no-green investment, ex-ante and ex-post green subsidies by the incumbent manufacturer (IM), and green investment by the supplier. The results show that market size does not influence supplier channel selection and investment decisions. The green investment strategy is significantly affected by investment cost efficiency. Meanwhile, contrary to expectation, the more the investment is, the more willing the incumbent supply chain is to invest. Moreover, under a single-channel format, the incumbent supply chain can’t always achieve Pareto equilibrium. However, in the presence of the supplier green investment, although each green investment scenario can improve the profit, it cannot realize Pareto equilibrium. In addition, when the dual-channel format is adopted, the local areas can achieve Pareto equilibrium under different scenarios. The supplier plays an important role as it holds a monopoly upstream in the supply chain. As a result, the supplier’s green investment generates excellent profit and consumer surplus; however, there will be fluctuations in the optimal strategy of the incumbent manufacturer.

In the closed-loop supply chain, many suppliers opt for self-recycling or entrust retailers to recycle. Under both recycling channels, the member responsible for recycling can undertake or outsource logistics services. This paper investigates how consumers’ environmental awareness and recycling cost-saving affect the optimal combination of recycling channel and logistics-service strategy. To this end, we mathematically formulate the supplier-led Stackelberg game theoretical-framework, and apply the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions for constrained optimization. We examine the optimal combination under the impact of consumers’ environmental awareness and recycling cost-saving on profits, environmental impact and social welfare, using numerical analysis. Results demonstrate that as consumers’ environmental awareness and recycling cost-saving remain at a higher level, the supplier and retailer will both achieve maximum profits when the supplier entrusts the retailer to recycle and the retailer undertakes the logistics services. Meanwhile, the third party will choose to be entrusted with services by the supplier, rather than the retailer. To improve supply-chain performance, the retailer should assume social responsibility to recycle and build the logistics-service system.

As a medium for matching supply and demand, platforms are changing industrial structures and consumption patterns to achieve sustainable operations. The platform establishes a self-operated channel on the basis of the present agent channel, which generates new conflicts and pollution problems. Considering the competition and quality investment, we investigate the platform’s optimal strategies, i.e., pricing, quality investment, channel format and slotting fee contract. The result shows that the platform adopting a dual channel structure contributes to sustainable operations because it can increase selling prices, sales volumes and consumers’ willingness when the channel introduction cost is lower. Meanwhile, the supplier always prefers the dual-channel structure because it can increase sales volume, profits and consumer surplus. Meanwhile, contrary to the commission rate, the emergence of competition promotes quality investment and guarantees consumer satisfaction. Under the intense channel conflicts, a variable slotting fee contract (VFC) is more profitable than a unit fixed slotting fee contract (UFC) owing to alleviating the competition; otherwise, the UFC has a larger improvement effect on profits. Meanwhile, with the increase in consumer quality sensitivity, UFC gradually cannibalizes VFC and occupies the core position in the operation.

With the increasing popularity of new energy vehicles (NEVs), a large number of automotive batteries are intensively reaching their end-of-life, which brings enormous challenges to environmental protection and sustainable development. This paper establishes a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model composed of a power battery manufacturer and a NEV retailer. The benchmark scenario of CLSC members without blockchain technology is analyzed, and the optimal recycling strategy of the manufacturer and retailer using traceability information based on blockchain technology is discussed. We generate our findings from three aspects, as follows: the manufacturer or retailer is more willing to take the responsibility of recycling when the proportion of retired batteries that can be used in echelons is relatively high. Meanwhile, when the recycling cost is large, both manufacturers and retailers should adopt blockchain technology to obtain greater profits. Furthermore, with the improvement of traceability information transmission efficiency, a higher profit growth rate will be achieved.

Purpose: The paper aims to investigate the optimal service quality and pricing for a mobile application (App) service supply chain (SSC) and analyze the impact of network externality on App SSC members' utilities. After that, the corresponding management inspirations and suggestions are put forward.Design/methodology/approach: The paper developed a SSC consisted of an App service supplier and an App service operator. Our models aim to maximize the SSC members' utilities. By utilizing the game theory, equilibrium solutions are obtained. Numerical examples are used to manifest the impact of parameters on decisions by Matlab. Some management enlightenment could be obtained by comparison analysis.Findings: Cooperating with an App service operator that asks for a lower revenue sharing ratio will enable the App service supplier to have sufficient funds to provide high-quality update service. With the increase of network externality, adopting a high-quality service strategy can bring higher utility to the App service operator and users. Pouring attention into consumer welfare moderately will improve the App service supplier's utility. Scenario CRS can achieve a win–win goal for App SSC members and consumers.Originality/value: The innovations of this paper are as follows: Firstly, the authors investigate the optimal service quality and pricing for the App SSC, which has been discussed little in previous literature. Secondly, the authors discuss how network externality and enterprises' attention to consumer welfare affect the optimal decisions and utilities of App service supply chain members. Thirdly, this paper considers four different circumstances and determines the optimal operation scenario for App SSC through comparative analysis.

This paper investigates channel selection and quality effort in O2O takeout service supply chain consisting of a takeout platform, a catering business, and a distribution rider. By analyzing the three operation modes of platform distribution, business self‐distribution, and business self‐built platform + distribution, the profit functions of O2O takeout service supply chain members are constructed, respectively. On the basis of game theory, the optimal quality effort and profits are obtained. Combined with numerical simulation, the effects of revenue sharing rate and market size on the optimal quality effort and profits under different scenarios are discussed. The results reveal that O2O takeout platform should cooperate with more catering businesses, and adopt appropriate strategies considering different market sizes of catering businesses. Additionally, the catering business should properly consider the market size and adopt different online and offline prices. Meanwhile, the rider should choose a reasonable quality effort according to the revenue sharing rate.

We investigate the optimal strategy of service supply chain (SSC) including one integrator and two suppliers under a two-layer game structure. Service integrator decides social responsibility and service price, while the two service suppliers with quality preference determine their quality efforts, respectively. By analyzing the two-layer game structure and eight different scenarios of decision models (i.e., CD, DD, ICD, IDD, ISD, SCD, SDD, and SSD), we establish members’ utility functions under different decision models. Meanwhile, based on game theory, the optimal strategies of SSC are obtained. Mathematical reasoning and numerical simulations show that, firstly, quality preference has impact on optimal strategy and members’ utilities under different constraints. Secondly, utility of supply chain with integrator as a leader is greater than the case with suppliers as the leader.