Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Andrew Bailey
1 shared publication- Christopher Dann1 shared publication
Edward Yager
Western Kentucky University
1 shared publicationGiulio Lisi
1 shared publication- Jacob Chapman1 shared publication
James Sanders
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 74
The accountability gap: Deliberation on monetary policy in Britain and America during the financial crisis
- 21 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 74
Open AccessThe accountability gap: Deliberation on monetary policy in Britain and America during the financial crisis
- 20 December 2017
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Statistics, Politics and Policy
- Vol. 8 (2) , 153-194
Themes and Topics in Parliamentary Oversight Hearings: A New Direction in Textual Data Analysis
This paper contributes to the growing empirical work on deliberation in legislatures by proposing a novel approach to analysing parliamentary hearings using both thematic and topic modelling textual analysis software. We explore variations in deliberative quality across economic policy type (fiscal policy, monetary policy and financial stability) and across parliamentary chambers (Commons and Lords) in UK select committee oversight hearings during the 2010–2015 Parliament. Our overall focus is not only to suggest a multi-method approach to the textual analysis of parliamentary data, but also to explore more substantive aspects of parliamentary oversight, such as: (1) the extent to which oversight varies between unelected and elected policy makers; and (2) whether parliamentarians conduct oversight more forcefully or more along partisan lines when they are challenging fellow politicians as opposed to central bank officials. Our findings suggest consistent differences in deliberative styles between types of hearings (fiscal, monetary, financial stability) and between chambers (Commons, Lords).
- 20 December 2017
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Statistics, Politics and Policy
- Vol. 8 (2) , 153-194
Themes and Topics in Parliamentary Oversight Hearings: A New Direction in Textual Data Analysis
This paper contributes to the growing empirical work on deliberation in legislatures by proposing a novel approach to analysing parliamentary hearings using both thematic and topic modelling textual analysis software. We explore variations in deliberative quality across economic policy type (fiscal policy, monetary policy and financial stability) and across parliamentary chambers (Commons and Lords) in UK select committee oversight hearings during the 2010–2015 Parliament. Our overall focus is not only to suggest a multi-method approach to the textual analysis of parliamentary data, but also to explore more substantive aspects of parliamentary oversight, such as: (1) the extent to which oversight varies between unelected and elected policy makers; and (2) whether parliamentarians conduct oversight more forcefully or more along partisan lines when they are challenging fellow politicians as opposed to central bank officials. Our findings suggest consistent differences in deliberative styles between types of hearings (fiscal, monetary, financial stability) and between chambers (Commons, Lords).
- 17 July 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics and the Life Sciences
- Vol. 36 (1) , 27-46
Nonverbal contention and contempt in U.K. parliamentary oversight hearings on fiscal and monetary policy
In parliamentary committee oversight hearings on fiscal policy, monetary policy, and financial stability, where verbal deliberation is the focus, nonverbal communication may be crucial in the acceptance or rejection of arguments proffered by policymakers. Systematic qualitative coding of these hearings in the 2010–15 U.K. Parliament finds the following: (1) facial expressions, particularly in the form of anger and contempt, are more prevalent in fiscal policy hearings, where backbench parliamentarians hold frontbench parliamentarians to account, than in monetary policy or financial stability hearings, where the witnesses being held to account are unelected policy experts; (2) comparing committees across chambers, hearings in the House of Lords committee yield more reassuring facial expressions relative to hearings in the House of Commons committee, suggesting a more relaxed and less adversarial context in the former; and (3) central bank witnesses appearing before both the Lords and Commons committees tend toward expressions of appeasement, suggesting a willingness to defer to Parliament.
- 17 July 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics and the Life Sciences
- Vol. 36 (1) , 27-46
Nonverbal contention and contempt in U.K. parliamentary oversight hearings on fiscal and monetary policy
In parliamentary committee oversight hearings on fiscal policy, monetary policy, and financial stability, where verbal deliberation is the focus, nonverbal communication may be crucial in the acceptance or rejection of arguments proffered by policymakers. Systematic qualitative coding of these hearings in the 2010–15 U.K. Parliament finds the following: (1) facial expressions, particularly in the form of anger and contempt, are more prevalent in fiscal policy hearings, where backbench parliamentarians hold frontbench parliamentarians to account, than in monetary policy or financial stability hearings, where the witnesses being held to account are unelected policy experts; (2) comparing committees across chambers, hearings in the House of Lords committee yield more reassuring facial expressions relative to hearings in the House of Commons committee, suggesting a more relaxed and less adversarial context in the former; and (3) central bank witnesses appearing before both the Lords and Commons committees tend toward expressions of appeasement, suggesting a willingness to defer to Parliament.
- 19 July 2012
- Published by Wiley in Presidential Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 42 (3) , 482-513
Yes, Ronald Reagan's Rhetoric Was Unique—But Statistically,HowUnique?
We use automated textual analysis to compare Ronald Reagan's rhetoric with that of presidents Woodrow Wilson through Barack Obama, using their State of the Union speeches. We are able to assign statistical significance to the thematic content, and to depict spatially the shifting dimensionality in themes used by presidents. We find strong evidence for Reagan's usage of the civil religion rhetoric: over half (59%) of the discourse in his seminal and 48% in his State of the Union speeches focus on civil religion. We also find an apparent shift in modern presidential rhetoric, from themes concerned with (1) institutions, to ones focused more on (2) individuals, families, and children.
- 19 July 2012
- Published by Wiley in Presidential Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 42 (3) , 482-513
Yes, Ronald Reagan's Rhetoric Was Unique—But Statistically,HowUnique?
We use automated textual analysis to compare Ronald Reagan's rhetoric with that of presidents Woodrow Wilson through Barack Obama, using their State of the Union speeches. We are able to assign statistical significance to the thematic content, and to depict spatially the shifting dimensionality in themes used by presidents. We find strong evidence for Reagan's usage of the civil religion rhetoric: over half (59%) of the discourse in his seminal and 48% in his State of the Union speeches focus on civil religion. We also find an apparent shift in modern presidential rhetoric, from themes concerned with (1) institutions, to ones focused more on (2) individuals, families, and children.
- 1 January 2008
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 16 (4) , 404-427
Does Deliberation Matter in FOMC Monetary Policymaking? The Volcker Revolution of 1979
In monetary policy, decision makers seek to influence the expectations of agents in ways that can avoid making abrupt, dramatic, and unexpected decisions. Yet in October 1979, Chairman Paul Volcker led the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) unanimously to shift its course in managing U.S. monetary policy, which in turn eventually brought the era of high inflation to an end. Although some analysts argue that “the presence and influence of one individual”—namely, Volcker—is sufficient to explain the policy shift, this overlooks an important feature of monetary policymaking. FOMC chairmen—however, omnipotent they may appear—do not act alone. They require the agreement of other committee members, and in the 1979 revolution, the decision was unanimous. How, then, did Chairman Volcker manage to bring a previously divided committee to a consensus in October 1979, and moreover, how did he retain the support of the committee throughout the following year in the face of mounting political and economic pressure against the Fed? We use automated content analysis to examine the discourse of the FOMC (with this discourse recorded in the verbatim transcripts of meetings). In applying this methodology, we assess the force of the arguments used by Chairman Volcker and find that deliberation in the FOMC did indeed “matter” both in 1979 and 1980. Specifically, Volcker led his colleagues in coming to understand and apply the idea of credible commitment in U.S. monetary policymaking.
- 1 January 2008
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 16 (4) , 404-427
Does Deliberation Matter in FOMC Monetary Policymaking? The Volcker Revolution of 1979
In monetary policy, decision makers seek to influence the expectations of agents in ways that can avoid making abrupt, dramatic, and unexpected decisions. Yet in October 1979, Chairman Paul Volcker led the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) unanimously to shift its course in managing U.S. monetary policy, which in turn eventually brought the era of high inflation to an end. Although some analysts argue that “the presence and influence of one individual”—namely, Volcker—is sufficient to explain the policy shift, this overlooks an important feature of monetary policymaking. FOMC chairmen—however, omnipotent they may appear—do not act alone. They require the agreement of other committee members, and in the 1979 revolution, the decision was unanimous. How, then, did Chairman Volcker manage to bring a previously divided committee to a consensus in October 1979, and moreover, how did he retain the support of the committee throughout the following year in the face of mounting political and economic pressure against the Fed? We use automated content analysis to examine the discourse of the FOMC (with this discourse recorded in the verbatim transcripts of meetings). In applying this methodology, we assess the force of the arguments used by Chairman Volcker and find that deliberation in the FOMC did indeed “matter” both in 1979 and 1980. Specifically, Volcker led his colleagues in coming to understand and apply the idea of credible commitment in U.S. monetary policymaking.