Kene Boun My
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Kene Boun My has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Anne Stenger
2 shared publicationsAnthony Ziegelmeyer
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics
2 shared publicationsCamille Cornand
2 shared publicationsRomain Baeriswyl
2 shared publications- Thi Kim Cuong Pham
EconomiX Paris Nanterre University Nanterre France
2 shared publications - Tuyen Tiet
Ho Chi Minh University of Banking, Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Central Bank Digital Currency and Gresham’s Law: An Experimental Analysis
In a monetary system in which risk-free and risky money coexist, Gresham’s law predicts that people will hoard risk-free money as a store of value and spend risky money as a medium of exchange. Establishing a payment system on the basis of risk-free money, such as a retail CBDC, while maintaining the fractional reserve banking system in place poses numerous challenges. In a laboratory experiment, we demonstrate that when the holding of risk-free money is unrestricted, people hold and pay with it extensively. However, when the ability to hold risk-free money is limited by a ceiling or an unattractive interest rate, people tend to hoard risk-free money and use risky money for payments.
- 9 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCentral Bank Digital Currency and Gresham’s Law: An Experimental Analysis
In a monetary system in which risk-free and risky money coexist, Gresham’s law predicts that people will hoard risk-free money as a store of value and spend risky money as a medium of exchange. Establishing a payment system on the basis of risk-free money, such as a retail CBDC, while maintaining the fractional reserve banking system in place poses numerous challenges. In a laboratory experiment, we demonstrate that when the holding of risk-free money is unrestricted, people hold and pay with it extensively. However, when the ability to hold risk-free money is limited by a ceiling or an unattractive interest rate, people tend to hoard risk-free money and use risky money for payments.
- Open Access
- 8 February 2025
- Published by Elsevier in World Development Sustainability
- Vol. 6
Farmers’ preferences toward organic certification scheme: Evidence from a discrete choice experiment in Northern Vietnam
- 8 February 2025
- Published by Elsevier in World Development Sustainability
- Vol. 6
Open AccessFarmers’ preferences toward organic certification scheme: Evidence from a discrete choice experiment in Northern Vietnam
- Open Access
- 28 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Making Information Stick: Goal Setting and Attention
Information campaigns often fail to induce behavior change as individuals attribute low instrumental value to the information provided. However, pursuing a goal may increase the perceived value of information and enhance attention. We test this idea in a field experiment on mobile data consumption and carbon awareness. While information provision alone does not produce any significant change in consumption behavior, the addition of goal setting increases attention in the short run and recall in the long run. These effects together reduce mobile data consumption even after intervention removal. Evidence from a follow-up survey indicates that this change is not due to alternative mechanisms, such as automated data management technologies, thereby lending support to theories of rational attention.
- 28 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMaking Information Stick: Goal Setting and Attention
Information campaigns often fail to induce behavior change as individuals attribute low instrumental value to the information provided. However, pursuing a goal may increase the perceived value of information and enhance attention. We test this idea in a field experiment on mobile data consumption and carbon awareness. While information provision alone does not produce any significant change in consumption behavior, the addition of goal setting increases attention in the short run and recall in the long run. These effects together reduce mobile data consumption even after intervention removal. Evidence from a follow-up survey indicates that this change is not due to alternative mechanisms, such as automated data management technologies, thereby lending support to theories of rational attention.
- Open Access
- 21 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Double Overreaction in Beauty-Contests With Information Acquisition: Theory and Experiment
Central banks' disclosures, such as forward guidance, have a weaker effect on the economy in reality than in theoretical models. The present paper contributes to understanding how people pay attention and react to various sources of information. In a beauty-contest with information acquisition, we show that strategic complementarities give rise to a double overreaction to public disclosures by increasing agents equilibrium attention, which, in turn, increases the weight assigned to them in equilibrium action. A laboratory experiment provides evidence that the effect of strategic complementarities on the realized attention and the realized action is qualitatively consistent with theoretical predictions, though quantitatively weaker. Both the lack of attention to public disclosures and a limited level of reasoning by economic agents account for the weaker realized reaction. This suggests that it is just as important for a central bank to control reaction to public disclosures by swaying information acquisition by recipients as it is by shaping information disclosures themselves.
- 21 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDouble Overreaction in Beauty-Contests With Information Acquisition: Theory and Experiment
Central banks' disclosures, such as forward guidance, have a weaker effect on the economy in reality than in theoretical models. The present paper contributes to understanding how people pay attention and react to various sources of information. In a beauty-contest with information acquisition, we show that strategic complementarities give rise to a double overreaction to public disclosures by increasing agents equilibrium attention, which, in turn, increases the weight assigned to them in equilibrium action. A laboratory experiment provides evidence that the effect of strategic complementarities on the realized attention and the realized action is qualitatively consistent with theoretical predictions, though quantitatively weaker. Both the lack of attention to public disclosures and a limited level of reasoning by economic agents account for the weaker realized reaction. This suggests that it is just as important for a central bank to control reaction to public disclosures by swaying information acquisition by recipients as it is by shaping information disclosures themselves.
- Open Access
- 29 November 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Effects of Gain-Loss Frames on Social Preferences
This paper compares individuals' inequality aversion in the gain and loss domain. While introducing loss aversion in the Fehr and Schmidt's model, we predict that individuals' desire to mitigate losses affects their equality-seeking behavior. A modified dictator game is designed in both domains to assess the theoretical prediction. Our findings suggest that individuals choose on average less equitable payoffs when the game is framed with losses than with gains. The results also manifest that women are more inequality averse than men both in gains and losses.
- 29 November 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEffects of Gain-Loss Frames on Social Preferences
This paper compares individuals' inequality aversion in the gain and loss domain. While introducing loss aversion in the Fehr and Schmidt's model, we predict that individuals' desire to mitigate losses affects their equality-seeking behavior. A modified dictator game is designed in both domains to assess the theoretical prediction. Our findings suggest that individuals choose on average less equitable payoffs when the game is framed with losses than with gains. The results also manifest that women are more inequality averse than men both in gains and losses.
- Open Access
- 1 March 2009
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
On the Acceptability of the Ambient Tax Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation
There is a common belief among nonpoint source pollution managers that ambient taxes are likely to raise acceptability problems. In this paper, we empirically assess the acceptability of ambient taxes. Concretely, we ask participants in an experiment to play the role of polluters who choose between (A) an ambient tax scheme and (B) an individual tax system (polluters are heterogeneous, with small, medium and large capacity polluters). In case (A), polluters' payoff depends on total emissions and on natural variability whereas in case (B) polluters earn a sure payoff. The sure payoff level reflects polluters' maximal profit under the individual tax system and ranges from 40% to 95% of polluters' expected payoff under the ambient tax scheme if the social optimum is achieved. For a given sure payoff level, we take the percentage of polluters preferring the ambient tax to the surepayoff as an indicator of the acceptability of the ambient tax scheme. We find that, though the rate of acceptance decreases with the level of the sure payoff, the acceptance rate remains high even when the sure payoff is almost as high as the social optimum payoff and large polluters are less likely to accept the ambient tax mechanism than small and medium polluters. Our experimental results mitigate the common belief that ambient taxes are unacceptable. Still, the acceptability of the instrument could be low in groups of highly heterogeneous polluters.
- 1 March 2009
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOn the Acceptability of the Ambient Tax Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation
There is a common belief among nonpoint source pollution managers that ambient taxes are likely to raise acceptability problems. In this paper, we empirically assess the acceptability of ambient taxes. Concretely, we ask participants in an experiment to play the role of polluters who choose between (A) an ambient tax scheme and (B) an individual tax system (polluters are heterogeneous, with small, medium and large capacity polluters). In case (A), polluters' payoff depends on total emissions and on natural variability whereas in case (B) polluters earn a sure payoff. The sure payoff level reflects polluters' maximal profit under the individual tax system and ranges from 40% to 95% of polluters' expected payoff under the ambient tax scheme if the social optimum is achieved. For a given sure payoff level, we take the percentage of polluters preferring the ambient tax to the surepayoff as an indicator of the acceptability of the ambient tax scheme. We find that, though the rate of acceptance decreases with the level of the sure payoff, the acceptance rate remains high even when the sure payoff is almost as high as the social optimum payoff and large polluters are less likely to accept the ambient tax mechanism than small and medium polluters. Our experimental results mitigate the common belief that ambient taxes are unacceptable. Still, the acceptability of the instrument could be low in groups of highly heterogeneous polluters.
- Open Access
- 12 November 2007
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
On the Acceptability of the Ambient Tax Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation
Our objective in this paper is to assess the acceptability of the ambient tax. Concretely, we ask subjects to choose between (A) an ambient tax and (B) an individual tax system. In case (A), they actually participate in a game in which their payoff depends on all participants' decisions and on natural variability as would be the case in the real world if an ambient tax was implemented. In case (B) they simply earn a sure payoff, which is supposed to reflect their maximal profit under the individual tax system. We take the percentage of agents preferring the ambient tax to a given sure payoff level as an indicator of the acceptability of the ambient tax given this sure payoff level. Our experimental results mitigate the common belief that ambient taxes are totally unacceptable. If the sure alternative to the ambient tax policy is very costly for the polluters, for example because it involves high inspection costs, polluters might eventually prefer being liable to an ambient tax.
- 12 November 2007
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOn the Acceptability of the Ambient Tax Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation
Our objective in this paper is to assess the acceptability of the ambient tax. Concretely, we ask subjects to choose between (A) an ambient tax and (B) an individual tax system. In case (A), they actually participate in a game in which their payoff depends on all participants' decisions and on natural variability as would be the case in the real world if an ambient tax was implemented. In case (B) they simply earn a sure payoff, which is supposed to reflect their maximal profit under the individual tax system. We take the percentage of agents preferring the ambient tax to a given sure payoff level as an indicator of the acceptability of the ambient tax given this sure payoff level. Our experimental results mitigate the common belief that ambient taxes are totally unacceptable. If the sure alternative to the ambient tax policy is very costly for the polluters, for example because it involves high inspection costs, polluters might eventually prefer being liable to an ambient tax.