LXLiang Xie

Liang Xie

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Liang Xie has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Constructing Radio Map via Spatio-Temporal Learning of Crowdsourced Trajectory Data

    by Zheng Xing, Guanghui Zhang, Liang Xie, Xianping Ma, Weibing Zhao, Yan Liu, Yannan Chen, Yapeng Zhao, Laizhong Cui

  • Long-Term Optimal Incentives for Differential-Privacy Federated Learning: A Multi-Stage Game Approach

    by Liang Xie, Yuntao Wang, Hengzhi Wang, Laizhong Cui

    Differential-privacy federated learning (DP-FL) has emerged as a promising paradigm capable of mitigating the inherent threat of traditional FL architectures that are vulnerable to inferential attacks due to the frequent exchange and updating of model parameters. However, existing DP-FL frameworks often assume that the client's perturbations remain constant throughout the FL process, while ignoring the varying influence of the client's perturbations in distinct communication rounds on the model performance. Besides, existing DP-FL frameworks posit the FL server as a fully rational actor, thereby neglecting the bounded rationality that the FL server may exhibit in the face of risk and uncertainty. In this paper, we propose a novel long-term (i.e., throughout the FL process) privacy-preserving FL framework to address the optimal incentive design, in the presence of the bounded rationality inherent in the FL server and the dynamic influence of perturbations on model performance. Specifically, we first investigate the impact of local perturbations of the client on the model's convergence performance in different communication rounds, elucidating the trade-off between learning performance and privacy loss. Then, to reconcile learning performance with privacy loss, we design a long-term privacy-preserving incentive scheme, where the interactions between clients and the FL server throughout the FL process are modeled as a multi-stage privacy-preserving game. Furthermore, by applying prospect theory (PT) to formulate the risk-aware behavior of the bounded rationality FL server, we employ contract theory to derive the equilibrium of the game, thereby ensuring optimality and fairness. Finally, extensive simulations illustrate that our scheme can motivate clients to provide high-quality models and improve the accuracy of the global model, compared with benchmarks.

  • A Privacy-Preserving Incentive Scheme for UAV-Aided Federated Learning: A Contract Method With Prospect Theory

    by Liang Xie, Zhou Su, Yuntao Wang, Nan Chen, Yiliang Liu, Rui Wang, Xin Liu, Donglan Liu, Hao Zhang

    The convergence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and federated learning (FL) has emerged as a promising paradigm to facilitate artificial intelligence (AI) services with enhanced privacy preservation. However, notwithstanding the inherent advantages of FL in terms of privacy protection, attackers can still exploit inference attacks to deduce raw data of UAVs. The existing studies predominantly assume FL servers to be fully rational and have access to all privacy preference information of UAVs (i.e., information symmetry scenario), in the design of privacy-preserving incentive schemes. To tackle these challenges, we propose a privacy-preserving incentive scheme for UAV-aided FL in the presence of information asymmetry while considering FL servers exhibit bounded rationality. Specifically, a practical UAV-aided FL framework is first introduced to enable AI model training between UAVs and the FL server with bounded rationality. In addition, based on differential privacy, we quantify the privacy level of UAVs and subsequently analyze its impact on the aggregation accuracy of the server. This scenario entails two conflicting objectives: the server aims for higher-quality local models to achieve better aggregation accuracy, while UAVs prioritize injecting more noise into their local models to enhance privacy protection. To reconcile the conflicting objectives, we develop an incentive mechanism based on contract theory to optimize the server's aggregation accuracy in the presence of information asymmetry. Furthermore, we employ prospect theory (PT) to the above contract to capture biases in the server's subjective decision-making process. Besides, we deduce closedform solutions for optimal contracts under PT and expected utility theory (EUT), where participants are assumed to be fully rational. Finally, simulation results validate the superiority of our proposed scheme in motivating UAVs to share high-quality local models and improving the aggregation accuracy of the server.


  • A Practical Federated Learning Framework With Truthful Incentive in UAV-Assisted Crowdsensing

    by Liang Xie, Zhou Su, Yuntao Wang, Zhendong Li

    The integration of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and artificial intelligence (AI) has garnered significant interest as a promising paradigm for facilitating intelligent and pervasive mobile crowdsensing (MCS) services. In traditional AI methodologies, the centralization of large volumes of privacy-sensitive sensory data shared by UAVs for model training entails substantial privacy risks. Federated learning (FL) emerges as an appealing privacy-preserving paradigm that enables participating UAVs to collaboratively train shared models while safeguarding the privacy of their data. However, given that the execution of FL tasks inherently requires the consumption of resources such as power and bandwidth, rational and self-interested UAVs may not actively engage in FL or launch free-riding attacks (i.e., sharing fake local models) to mitigate costs. To address the above challenges, we propose a truthful incentive scheme in FL-based UAV-assisted MCS. Specifically, we first present a learning framework tailored for realistic scenarios in UAV-assisted MCS that enhances privacy preservation and optimizes communication efficiency during AI model training for collaborative UAVs, where the sensing platform (i.e., the aggregation server) is the finite-rational decision maker. Then, based on prospect theory (PT), we design an incentive mechanism to motivate UAVs to participate in FL. In this mechanism, a PT-based game is exploited to model the interactions between the sensing platform and UAVs, where the equilibrium is derived. Moreover, we employ a zero-payment mechanism to curb the self-interested behavior of UAVs. Finally, simulation results show that the proposed scheme can facilitate high-quality model sharing while suppressing free-riding attacks.


  • A Two-Stage Secure Incentive Mechanism in App-and UAV-Assisted Crowdsensing

    by Liang Xie, Zhou Su, Yuntao Wang

    Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) combined with tagging applications (Apps) have recently attracted considerable attention to enable efficient mobile crowdsensing (MCS) applications in scenarios where an insufficient number of UAVs may be available to perform the sensing tasks. However, there remain potential security and incentive threats for App-and UAV-assisted crowdsensing owing to the presence of malicious UAVs and the selfishness of UAVs. To address these issues, we propose a two-stage secure incentive mechanism in the App-and UAV-assisted MCS. Specifically, we first develop an App-and UAV-assisted MCS framework, where the App tags the location of the sensing task as a point-of-interest (PoI) to attract registered UAVs, thus assisting the platform to complete the sensing task efficiently. To motivate the App to cooperate with the sensing platform, we design a double auction-based incentive mechanism for PoI-tagging tasks in the first stage, where the optimal price for PoI-tagging services is obtained by applying a double auction game. Furthermore, we evaluate each UAV through comprehensive consideration of the performance and security of UAVs for most task-suitable UAV recruitment and malicious UAVs prevention. Additionally, in the second stage, based on the Stackelberg game theory, an incentive mechanism for sensing tasks is proposed to encourage UAV participation. Finally, simulation results and security analysis validate the proposed mechanism can greatly increase the utility of UAVs and the App while ensuring the security of the sensing process.


  • A Secure and Efficient Data Sharing Scheme for UAV Networks: Integration of Blockchain and Prospect Theory

    by Liang Xie, Zhou Su, Nan Chen, Yiliang Liu, Qichao Xu

    Empowered by crowdsensing technology, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with rich sensors can perform sensing tasks in extreme scenarios. However, due to the selfishness and distrust of UAVs, some malicious UAVs with insufficient resources may provide false sensing data to the task publishers. In addition, the centralized sensing platform is vulnerable to various attacks (e.g., data tampering attacks and single point of failure) in traditional crowdsensing, resulting in degraded data quality and severe security issues. To cope with these problems, we propose a blockchain-based crowdsensing framework with reputation incentive (BCFR) for UAV-assisted mobile crowdsensing. Specifically, a reputation-based incentive scheme is first proposed to relate the behavior of each UAV with its reputation, and then to choose UAVs with high reputation to perform sensing tasks, thereby improving the security of sensing data sharing. Afterwards, we design a blockchain-based secure data transmission scheme to securely record data transactions of UAVs. Furthermore, UAVs may be reluctant to perform compute-intensive mining tasks due to their limited computing capabilities. Therefore, a two-stage Stackelberg game is introduced to motivate UAVs to participate in the block creation process. In a more realistic scenario, where participants are bounded rational, prospect theory (PT) is utilized to capture the potential subject perceptions of UAVs. Finally, simulation results and security analysis demonstrate that the proposed BCFR scheme can effectively improve the probability of successful mining and ensure the security of data sharing.


  • A Secure UAV Cooperative Communication Framework: Prospect Theory Based Approach

    by Liang Xie, Zhou Su, Qichao Xu, Nan Chen, Yixin Fan, Abderrahim Benslimane

    Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have attracted extensive attention from both industry and academia owing to their high mobility, line-of-sight (LoS) characteristics of air-to-ground (A2G) channels, and low cost. However, the broadcast nature of wireless transmission and the LoS characteristics of A2G channels are vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks, which leads to severe security issues. To enhance the security of UAV communication, we propose a framework that multiple UAVs cooperate to resist attacks (MURA). Specifically, we first introduce an efficient incentive scheme based on the coalition game to motivate UAVs to participate in a coalition. By forming a grand coalition, we demonstrate that each individual UAV can maximize its utility. Additionally, we propose a secure UAV communication scheme designed to counter eavesdropping attacks. Two distinct types of scenarios are considered in UAV communication. In a completely rational scenario, in which participants make decisions aiming to maximize their utility, we utilize the Stackelberg game to model the interactions between UAVs and attacker. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium solution are proved, and the equilibrium solution is obtained. In the context of an imperfectly rational scenario, we employ the prospect theory (PT) to effectively capture the underlying rationality exhibited by the players. The PT valuations of the players, i.e., UAV and attacker, are deduced in detail. Meanwhile, the convergence of the PT valuations of UAV and attacker is proved. Finally, extensive simulation results show that the proposed scheme can effectively improve the utility of legal UAVs and ensure the security of the UAV networks compared with benchmarks.


  • A Game-Theoretical Approach for Secure Crowdsourcing-Based Indoor Navigation System With Reputation Mechanism

    by Liang Xie, Tom H. Luan, Zhou Su, Qichao Xu, Nan Chen

    At present, the crowdsourcing-based indoor navigation system (CINS) has attracted extensive attention from both industry and academia owing to its low-cost and high-accuracy performance. Unfortunately, the system that relies on crowdsourced data is vulnerable to the collusion attack, which leads to severe security issues. To address the security issues in the CINS, we propose to utilize a fully trusted fog server platform to advocate secure transactions between service requesters and responders. First, we propose a novel reputation incentive mechanism based on the behaviors of responders. Then, we employ the offensive and defensive game to model the interactions between the fog server platform and the responders, whereby a social welfare optimization problem is formulated to maximize the social welfare of the system. Next, the game equilibriums are found by using the replicator dynamic equation while the game stability is discussed. Finally, the simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can effectively encourage responders to provide positive navigation services and obtain more social welfare of the system compared with the conventional mechanisms.