Yunke Mai
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yunke Mai has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bin Hu
Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080
4 shared publications Bin Hu
Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas, 75080, USA
1 shared publication- Ruize Ma
School of Economics and Management, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China
1 shared publication Saša Pekeč
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, 27708, USA
1 shared publication- Saša Pekeč
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 July 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 35 (2) , 704-723
From Growth to Monetization: Managing Freemium Services
Motivated by the recent rapid growths of freemium services, we study freemium service providers’ dynamic operating policies to maximize their lifetime profits. We adopt a hybrid of the Bass diffusion model and the replicator equation from evolutionary game theory to capture the user base growth, and model the provider’s dynamic decisions as an optimal control problem. We analyze two variants of the freemium business model inspired by two prominent examples, Dropbox and Spotify, which, respectively, adopt the monetization strategies of limiting features and advertising (and its removal). We establish the optimal dynamic operating policies for the Dropbox-inspired ad-free freemium model and the Spotify-inspired ad-supported freemium model and identify their distinctive operational characteristics: the optimal policies as well as the sustainability of the Dropbox model critically depend on the network effect among users, whereas the optimal policies of the Spotify model show that advertising could be a more effective monetization strategy than limiting features. The latter observation is confirmed in a general model allowing both monetization strategies where the optimal policies consistently adopt advertising without limiting features. We then show that the freemium model significantly outperforms the ad-supported free model in weak advertising markets and that offering multiple tiers of premium subscription is unnecessary and confirm our core insights’ robustness under a generalized network effect, customized advertisements, and liquidity constraints. Our study establishes the versatility and value of the freemium model to suit distinct needs of a service in different stages from growth to monetization, and provides guidelines for service providers adopting this business model.
- 9 July 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 35 (2) , 704-723
Open AccessFrom Growth to Monetization: Managing Freemium Services
Motivated by the recent rapid growths of freemium services, we study freemium service providers’ dynamic operating policies to maximize their lifetime profits. We adopt a hybrid of the Bass diffusion model and the replicator equation from evolutionary game theory to capture the user base growth, and model the provider’s dynamic decisions as an optimal control problem. We analyze two variants of the freemium business model inspired by two prominent examples, Dropbox and Spotify, which, respectively, adopt the monetization strategies of limiting features and advertising (and its removal). We establish the optimal dynamic operating policies for the Dropbox-inspired ad-free freemium model and the Spotify-inspired ad-supported freemium model and identify their distinctive operational characteristics: the optimal policies as well as the sustainability of the Dropbox model critically depend on the network effect among users, whereas the optimal policies of the Spotify model show that advertising could be a more effective monetization strategy than limiting features. The latter observation is confirmed in a general model allowing both monetization strategies where the optimal policies consistently adopt advertising without limiting features. We then show that the freemium model significantly outperforms the ad-supported free model in weak advertising markets and that offering multiple tiers of premium subscription is unnecessary and confirm our core insights’ robustness under a generalized network effect, customized advertisements, and liquidity constraints. Our study establishes the versatility and value of the freemium model to suit distinct needs of a service in different stages from growth to monetization, and provides guidelines for service providers adopting this business model.
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 27 (4) , 1258-1274
User-Generated Content Platforms: Managing the Relationship Triangle
Problem definition: In the user-generated content (UGC) business model, the platform provides income for the creators, the creators provide content for the viewers, and the viewers provide advertising revenue for the platform, forming a relationship triangle. We set out to study a UGC platform’s optimal dynamic operational policies in its different stages and the impact of various constraints and innovations. Methodology/results: We adopt a hybrid of the Bass diffusion model and the replicator equation in evolutionary game theory to capture the creator and viewer base growths and analyze the dynamic operational decisions of a UGC platform, including promotion, advertising, and revenue sharing in an optimal control framework. We find an interesting mirroring structure between the platform’s early- and mature-stage optimal advertising and creator wage policies. An analysis of the optimal policies reveals a coherent rationale behind the dynamic management of the UGC platform around the relationship triangle. We also show that the platform should generously share advertising revenue with creators and may adopt loss leading shortly after as opposed to right at launch. We further explore the impacts of celebrity creators, liquidity constraints, paid advertisement removal, sponsored content, and viewer tipping. Managerial implications: Our findings are instructive for the dynamic management of UGC platforms and highlight the unique characteristics of this business model. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0917 .
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 27 (4) , 1258-1274
User-Generated Content Platforms: Managing the Relationship Triangle
Problem definition: In the user-generated content (UGC) business model, the platform provides income for the creators, the creators provide content for the viewers, and the viewers provide advertising revenue for the platform, forming a relationship triangle. We set out to study a UGC platform’s optimal dynamic operational policies in its different stages and the impact of various constraints and innovations. Methodology/results: We adopt a hybrid of the Bass diffusion model and the replicator equation in evolutionary game theory to capture the creator and viewer base growths and analyze the dynamic operational decisions of a UGC platform, including promotion, advertising, and revenue sharing in an optimal control framework. We find an interesting mirroring structure between the platform’s early- and mature-stage optimal advertising and creator wage policies. An analysis of the optimal policies reveals a coherent rationale behind the dynamic management of the UGC platform around the relationship triangle. We also show that the platform should generously share advertising revenue with creators and may adopt loss leading shortly after as opposed to right at launch. We further explore the impacts of celebrity creators, liquidity constraints, paid advertisement removal, sponsored content, and viewer tipping. Managerial implications: Our findings are instructive for the dynamic management of UGC platforms and highlight the unique characteristics of this business model. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0917 .
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (6) , 3437-3456
Optimizing Free-to-Play Multiplayer Games with Premium Subscription
We consider the optimal operating policies of a free-to-play multiplayer game with a premium subscription to maximize its lifetime operating profit. Accounting for social comparisons between free and premium players, we model the game attracting or losing players with a hybrid of the Bass diffusion model and the replicator equation in evolutionary game theory. Leveraging optimal control theory, we characterize optimal dynamic pricing and advertising policies and show that the developer should prioritize initial growth through aggressive advertising, while postponing the introduction of a premium subscription. Surprisingly, the optimal subscription price may start high and gradually decrease. We further show that the developer should strengthen social-comparison effects, that payment-based matchmaking can be an effective monetization driver, and that our main findings remain robust when allowing individual in-game item purchases/partial premium subscription. These findings are potentially instructive for game developers adopting the premium subscription model.This paper was accepted by Víctor Martínez-de-Albéniz, operations management.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (6) , 3437-3456
Optimizing Free-to-Play Multiplayer Games with Premium Subscription
We consider the optimal operating policies of a free-to-play multiplayer game with a premium subscription to maximize its lifetime operating profit. Accounting for social comparisons between free and premium players, we model the game attracting or losing players with a hybrid of the Bass diffusion model and the replicator equation in evolutionary game theory. Leveraging optimal control theory, we characterize optimal dynamic pricing and advertising policies and show that the developer should prioritize initial growth through aggressive advertising, while postponing the introduction of a premium subscription. Surprisingly, the optimal subscription price may start high and gradually decrease. We further show that the developer should strengthen social-comparison effects, that payment-based matchmaking can be an effective monetization driver, and that our main findings remain robust when allowing individual in-game item purchases/partial premium subscription. These findings are potentially instructive for game developers adopting the premium subscription model.This paper was accepted by Víctor Martínez-de-Albéniz, operations management.
- 1 February 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (2) , 996-1016
Courteous or Crude? Managing User Conduct to Improve On-Demand Service Platform Performance
In this paper, we study how an on-demand service platform could improve its performance through managing user conduct. In such a platform, service providers may reject certain platform-proposed service requests, and their responses, in turn, incentivize users to adjust their conduct. We develop an evolutionary game theory model of user conduct and provider responses that shows that the platform could improve user conduct through either setting a low wage for service providers or implementing priority matching. Building upon these results, we further model providers and users joining and leaving the platform by once again utilizing the evolutionary game theory approach. We find that wage setting alone is a blunt instrument to improve platform performance via managing user conduct, whereas supplementing the wage decision with priority matching could overcome its limitations and serve as an effective strategy to further improve platform performance in terms of growth and profitability. This finding suggests that matching prioritization could be an important strategy for managing platforms with user and provider heterogeneities. In addition, our analysis and results also demonstrate the potential of the evolutionary game theory approach for analyzing the impact of pricing and matching decisions on the performance of large markets. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4391 .
- 1 February 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (2) , 996-1016
Courteous or Crude? Managing User Conduct to Improve On-Demand Service Platform Performance
In this paper, we study how an on-demand service platform could improve its performance through managing user conduct. In such a platform, service providers may reject certain platform-proposed service requests, and their responses, in turn, incentivize users to adjust their conduct. We develop an evolutionary game theory model of user conduct and provider responses that shows that the platform could improve user conduct through either setting a low wage for service providers or implementing priority matching. Building upon these results, we further model providers and users joining and leaving the platform by once again utilizing the evolutionary game theory approach. We find that wage setting alone is a blunt instrument to improve platform performance via managing user conduct, whereas supplementing the wage decision with priority matching could overcome its limitations and serve as an effective strategy to further improve platform performance in terms of growth and profitability. This finding suggests that matching prioritization could be an important strategy for managing platforms with user and provider heterogeneities. In addition, our analysis and results also demonstrate the potential of the evolutionary game theory approach for analyzing the impact of pricing and matching decisions on the performance of large markets. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4391 .
- 24 May 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 29 (10) , 2252-2267
Managing Innovation Spillover in Outsourcing
When an innovator outsources the manufacturing of an innovative product to a contract manufacturer (CM) which is also a competitor in the end market, the potential innovation spillover may be a serious concern. We study an innovator’s outsourcing decision under spillover risks with an emphasis on the ex ante uncertain values of innovations, and distinguish between technical innovations which can only spill over through outsourcing and non‐technical innovations which can also spill over in the market. We find that in both cases an innovator may strategically outsource to a competitor‐CM, albeit for distinct motivations: for technical innovations, it is done so that the competitor‐CM would yield market leadership to the innovator; and for non‐technical innovations, it is done so that the competitor‐CM would face innovation uncertainties alongside the innovator.
- 24 May 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 29 (10) , 2252-2267
Managing Innovation Spillover in Outsourcing
When an innovator outsources the manufacturing of an innovative product to a contract manufacturer (CM) which is also a competitor in the end market, the potential innovation spillover may be a serious concern. We study an innovator’s outsourcing decision under spillover risks with an emphasis on the ex ante uncertain values of innovations, and distinguish between technical innovations which can only spill over through outsourcing and non‐technical innovations which can also spill over in the market. We find that in both cases an innovator may strategically outsource to a competitor‐CM, albeit for distinct motivations: for technical innovations, it is done so that the competitor‐CM would yield market leadership to the innovator; and for non‐technical innovations, it is done so that the competitor‐CM would face innovation uncertainties alongside the innovator.