Vangelis Souitaris

This article explores the important but understudied topic of authenticity in investment evaluations. Building on research in authenticity and signaling theory, we theorize how visual first impressions, such as clothing, can generate perceptions of authenticity that lead investors to overlook later quality signals, including a lack of prior experience. We found support for our theory in two field studies and a randomized experiment: investors tend to perceive entrepreneurs who are casually dressed as more authentic than those formally dressed, which is associated with higher investor evaluations. Moreover, perceptions of authenticity generated by casual clothes crowd out later signals: Casually dressed entrepreneurs are evaluated highly regardless of their entrepreneurial experience, but formally dressed entrepreneurs are penalized for perceived inexperience. We discuss the implications of our findings for authenticity research, the temporal order of signals, and early-stage investments.

Destructive entrepreneurship is an important research topic because it challenges the frequent implicit assumption that all entrepreneurship is “good.” Recent scholarly interest has been directed toward destructive entrepreneurship from various perspectives, including economics, psychology, and business ethics. This article offers a comprehensive review of the literature on destructive entrepreneurship. We begin with a definition of destructive entrepreneurship, distinguishing it from seemingly similar constructs, such as unproductive entrepreneurship. We organize the fragmented studies into a multilevel model highlighting what we know about destructive entrepreneurship. This study also reveals potential holes in this framework that future research can fill.

Different streams of research have led to contradictory conclusions about the venture performance implications of founders’ breadth of experience. Although extant empirical studies have explored the performance implications of founders’ breadth of experience at the start-up stage, we focus on the later stage of the initial public offering (IPO). We theorize that investors categorize venture founders based on two salient dimensions—their industry and functional background—and we relate this categorization to resource acquisition at IPO. To test our model, we use a hand-collected data set of 175 entrepreneurial IPOs in the Alternative Investment Market in London (2002–2013) and two randomized experiments. We theorize and find that compared with entrepreneurial ventures with a lead founder specializing in one industry or one function, investors generally devalue those with a category-spanning lead founder (a generalist). However, devaluation is less severe when a lead founder is a generalist in one dimension (e.g., industry) but a specialist in the other dimension (e.g., function). We also theorize and empirically test trust as a mechanism for the generalist penalty. Specifically, audience members (investors) have low trust in a generalist producer (founder) in contexts where the two parties consider entering into a partnership (equity investment at IPO), and so that generalist producer is devalued. Finally, we show that an external expert endorsement—in our case, from intensive venture capital affiliations—offsets the generalist penalty, especially when category spanning occurs in multiple category dimensions.Funding: This work was supported by the University of St. Gallen and the Natural Science of China [Grant 71832012].Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1581 .

The rise of digital technologies provides an opportunity to study smart cities as new organizational forms. We ask whether and how digital platforms and ecosystems affect the bureaucratic governance of municipal governments. To this end, we offer a multiple case analysis based on rich empirical, longitudinal data of seven European smart cities. We find that the contradicting logic of platform governance creates organizational tensions within the bureaucratic municipal government and at the interface between the municipal government and its external partners. We distil a process that describes how these tensions are resolved through a temporary shift to a non-bureaucratic work mode, and the subsequent formalization and institutionalization of those practices as new bureaucratic rules. We make three contributions. First, we contribute to the smart-city literature by outlining an overarching process of how data-driven technologies affect bureaucratic municipal governments. Second, we contribute to the ongoing conversation about the changing nature of Weberian bureaucracy showing how bureaucracy preserves its core while simultaneously adapting to and shaping its environment. Third, we highlight the role of lower-echelon bureaucrats as change agents who devise rules at the intersection of technological and societal development.

Entrepreneurial action can be directed toward identifying, generating, and exploiting potential business opportunities that can cause harm to others. Over and above the “rules of the game” of the economic system, we theorize on destructive entrepreneurial actions that result from entrepreneurs’ impaired regulation of their decision making. Specifically, we build on the entrepreneurial action literature and draw on regulation theories of goal attainment and moral disengagement to develop an impaired-regulation model of destructive entrepreneurial actions. This model contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by providing new insights into (a) why some entrepreneurs are more susceptible to engaging their ventures in destructive entrepreneurial actions, (b) everyday entrepreneurs (the “who”) engaging in destructive entrepreneurial actions (i.e., the “how” and “why”), and (c) when and why some entrepreneurs respond to their destructive entrepreneurial actions by becoming repentant do-gooders while others grow into serial offenders.

Research Summary: We examine the influence of two conflicting emotions—group fear and group hope—in entrepreneurial team decision‐making. We are interested in which emotion will be more strongly related to whether entrepreneurial teams escalate their commitment to a currently failing venture versus terminating that venture. Using a longitudinal start‐up simulation and based on data from 66 teams across 569 decision‐making rounds, we find that group “hope trumps fear.” That is, the relationship between group hope and escalating commitment to a failing venture is stronger than the relationship between group fear and terminating that venture. We predict and find that team engagement mediates these relationships. We find partial support for a predicted moderation effect of group friendship strength. Theoretical implications are discussed. Managerial Summary: Emotions are a critical but often unacknowledged part of entrepreneurial decision‐making. We tested whether group fear or group hope will most strongly influence teams' decisions to escalate their commitment, versus terminating a currently failing venture. Using a longitudinal entrepreneurial simulation, based on data from 66 teams across 569 decision‐making rounds, we find that “hope trumps fear.” That is, the relationship between group hope and escalating commitment to a failing venture is stronger than the relationship between group fear and terminating that venture. Group engagement versus disengagement helps to explain this finding. Our results indicate the importance of entrepreneurs understanding and managing their team emotions for the best decision‐making. It also helps explain the continued engagement of entrepreneurial teams who even, when fearful, have hope.

How do corporate venture capitalists ( CVCs ) do deals? Conversations with CVCs suggest that the putative view of venture capital investing is incomplete. We draw on 13 cases of CVC programs to document eight ‘corporate investment practices’ that are unique to CVCs . These practices reflect pressure on the CVC units for strategic fit and engagement with the corporation and also an opportunity to utilize parental resources. We then show that CVCs vary their emphasis on corporate investment practices, diverging into two distinct investment logics, ‘integrated’ versus ‘arm's‐length.’ Focus of isomorphism on internal versus external stakeholders explains the emergence of the two logics. Copyright © 2014 Strategic Management Society.

This study focuses on polychronicity as a cultural dimension of top management teams (TMTs). TMT polychronicity is the extent to which team members mutually prefer and tend to engage in multiple tasks simultaneously or intermittently instead of one at a time and believe that this is the best way of doing things. We explore the impact of TMT polychronicity on strategic decision speed and comprehensiveness and, subsequently, its effect on new venture financial performance. Contrary to popular time‐management principles advocating task prioritization and focused sequential execution, we found that TMT polychronicity has a positive effect on firm performance in the context of dynamic unanalyzable environments. This effect is partially mediated by strategic decision speed and comprehensiveness. Our study contributes to research on strategic leadership by focusing on a novel value‐based characteristic of the TMT (polychronicity) and by untangling the decision‐making processes that relate TMT characteristics and firm performance. It also contributes to the attention‐based view of the firm by positioning polychronicity as a new type of attention structure. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.