Jong Hwa Lee
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Jong Hwa Lee has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kyung Hwan Baik
Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, USA
1 shared publication - Seok-Ho Lee
Department of Radiation Oncology, Yonsei Cancer Center, Heavy Ion Therapy Research Institute, Yonsei University College of Medicine, Seoul, Republic of Korea
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 59 (3) , 495-523
Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests
We study a three-player Tullock contest in an endogenous-timing framework, focusing on the players’ decisions on timing of effort exertion. In this model, there are two points in time at which the players may choose their effort levels. The players decide independently and announce simultaneously when they each will expend their effort, and then each player chooses her effort level at the point in time which she announced. We find that, given moderate asymmetries among the players, each of the players announces the first point in time, and thus they all choose their effort levels simultaneously at the first point in time. This finding is in sharp contrast to a well-known result obtained from two-player asymmetric contests with endogenous timing.
- 28 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 59 (3) , 495-523
Open AccessEndogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests
We study a three-player Tullock contest in an endogenous-timing framework, focusing on the players’ decisions on timing of effort exertion. In this model, there are two points in time at which the players may choose their effort levels. The players decide independently and announce simultaneously when they each will expend their effort, and then each player chooses her effort level at the point in time which she announced. We find that, given moderate asymmetries among the players, each of the players announces the first point in time, and thus they all choose their effort levels simultaneously at the first point in time. This finding is in sharp contrast to a well-known result obtained from two-player asymmetric contests with endogenous timing.