Gleb Vasiliev
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Gleb Vasiliev has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dmitry Dagaev
2 shared publications- Igor Tylkin
European-University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
2 shared publications Alexey Savvateev
1 shared publicationArtur Assanskiy
New Economic School, 45 Skolkovskoe shosse, Moscow, Russian Federation
1 shared publicationDaniil Shaposhnikov
HSE University, Laboratory of Sports Studies, 11 Pokrovsky Boulevard, Moscow, Russian Federation
1 shared publication- Daniil Starikov1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Optimal Program Design in Elite Figure Skating
Choosing the technical content of a figure skating program requires making decisions about both elements and their order. I propose a framework that combines predictions from historical competition protocols with mixed-integer linear programming. For each skater and event, candidate elements are drawn from the preceding two years, and the main model selects a complete program satisfying the encoded International Skating Union composition rules. The analysis covers 13,876 complete programs from 2018 to 2024. In a holdout of 2,500 programs allowing changes in content and order, optimized layouts score 8.25 points higher on average when both layouts are evaluated with the main model. Positive estimated differences remain under a difficulty limit based on the skater's highest recent total base value, and element selection is stable under the tested changes in predicted scores. A dynamic extension allows for carryover after severe execution errors and accumulated load under supplied element load profiles. Calibration supports a small association between earlier errors and later execution, while the additional load penalty is zero in all eight examined profiles. This framework provides program alternatives for assessment by coaches and choreographers.
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOptimal Program Design in Elite Figure Skating
Choosing the technical content of a figure skating program requires making decisions about both elements and their order. I propose a framework that combines predictions from historical competition protocols with mixed-integer linear programming. For each skater and event, candidate elements are drawn from the preceding two years, and the main model selects a complete program satisfying the encoded International Skating Union composition rules. The analysis covers 13,876 complete programs from 2018 to 2024. In a holdout of 2,500 programs allowing changes in content and order, optimized layouts score 8.25 points higher on average when both layouts are evaluated with the main model. Positive estimated differences remain under a difficulty limit based on the skater's highest recent total base value, and element selection is stable under the tested changes in predicted scores. A dynamic extension allows for carryover after severe execution errors and accumulated load under supplied element load profiles. Calibration supports a small association between earlier errors and later execution, while the additional load penalty is zero in all eight examined profiles. This framework provides program alternatives for assessment by coaches and choreographers.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Implicit Centipedes
Sequential games are typically studied in environments where the game tree and payoffs are explicitly specified. In many real-world interactions, however, agents face implicitly formulated dynamic games: while the strategic structure and incentives are well defined, the underlying game form is not directly observed and must be inferred from experience. We study an implicitly formulated version of the centipede game and analyze a natural setting in which professional agents repeatedly engage in a sequential interaction with centipede-like incentives without observing the game tree. Using detailed intra-race data from Formula 1, we show that pit-stop timing decisions between closely competing drivers generate a centipede game once overtaking probabilities are taken into account. We estimate the payoff-relevant components of the game, compute the equilibrium of the resulting interaction, and compare theoretical predictions to observed behavior. We find that drivers respond strategically to each other: pit-stop timing shifts systematically when a nearby rival pits, even after controlling for tire degradation and race conditions. The observed responses broadly follow the equilibrium logic of the model. At the same time, we document substantial heterogeneity across teams: some teams consistently choose pit-stop timings close to the theoretical optimum, while others deviate substantially, and these patterns are associated with differences in success rates. By documenting equilibrium behavior in a complex sequential interaction outside the laboratory, the paper provides new evidence on how equilibrium predictions perform in natural dynamic environments.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessImplicit Centipedes
Sequential games are typically studied in environments where the game tree and payoffs are explicitly specified. In many real-world interactions, however, agents face implicitly formulated dynamic games: while the strategic structure and incentives are well defined, the underlying game form is not directly observed and must be inferred from experience. We study an implicitly formulated version of the centipede game and analyze a natural setting in which professional agents repeatedly engage in a sequential interaction with centipede-like incentives without observing the game tree. Using detailed intra-race data from Formula 1, we show that pit-stop timing decisions between closely competing drivers generate a centipede game once overtaking probabilities are taken into account. We estimate the payoff-relevant components of the game, compute the equilibrium of the resulting interaction, and compare theoretical predictions to observed behavior. We find that drivers respond strategically to each other: pit-stop timing shifts systematically when a nearby rival pits, even after controlling for tire degradation and race conditions. The observed responses broadly follow the equilibrium logic of the model. At the same time, we document substantial heterogeneity across teams: some teams consistently choose pit-stop timings close to the theoretical optimum, while others deviate substantially, and these patterns are associated with differences in success rates. By documenting equilibrium behavior in a complex sequential interaction outside the laboratory, the paper provides new evidence on how equilibrium predictions perform in natural dynamic environments.
- Open Access
- 2 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Not Yet: Humans Outperform LLMs in a Colonel Blotto Tournament
The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has spurred economists to study how humans and LLMs behave in strategic settings. We organized a series of round-robin tournaments in the Colonel Blotto game. This game attracts game theorists' attention due to high-dimensional action space and the absence of pure strategy Nash equilibria. In the first tournament, more than 200 human participants competed against one another. In the second tournament, several popular LLMs were invited to submit strategies. In the third tournament, we matched the number of LLM strategies to the number submitted by humans. We find that humans more often employ better-calibrated intermediate-level allocation heuristics and outperform the simpler, more stereotyped strategies submitted by LLMs. Strategic sophistication is key to success if and only if the necessary level of reasoning depth is reached, while lower and higher levels of reasoning offer no clear advantage over the primitive strategies. Among humans, field of study weakly predicts success: participants with STEM backgrounds perform better in the first tournament. Surprisingly, humans almost do not adjust their strategies across tournaments with different sets of opponents. This result suggests that humans base their choices primarily on the game's rules rather than on the identity of their opponents, treating LLMs much like human competitors.
- 2 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessNot Yet: Humans Outperform LLMs in a Colonel Blotto Tournament
The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has spurred economists to study how humans and LLMs behave in strategic settings. We organized a series of round-robin tournaments in the Colonel Blotto game. This game attracts game theorists' attention due to high-dimensional action space and the absence of pure strategy Nash equilibria. In the first tournament, more than 200 human participants competed against one another. In the second tournament, several popular LLMs were invited to submit strategies. In the third tournament, we matched the number of LLM strategies to the number submitted by humans. We find that humans more often employ better-calibrated intermediate-level allocation heuristics and outperform the simpler, more stereotyped strategies submitted by LLMs. Strategic sophistication is key to success if and only if the necessary level of reasoning depth is reached, while lower and higher levels of reasoning offer no clear advantage over the primitive strategies. Among humans, field of study weakly predicts success: participants with STEM backgrounds perform better in the first tournament. Surprisingly, humans almost do not adjust their strategies across tournaments with different sets of opponents. This result suggests that humans base their choices primarily on the game's rules rather than on the identity of their opponents, treating LLMs much like human competitors.
- 4 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 227
Choking under pressure in online and live esports competitions
- 4 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 227
Choking under pressure in online and live esports competitions
- 11 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 98, 101879
Prove them wrong: Do professional athletes perform better when facing their former clubs?
- 11 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 98, 101879
Prove them wrong: Do professional athletes perform better when facing their former clubs?