Fabia M.
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Fabia M. has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Judith Maria Burkart
Department of Evolutionary Anthropology, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
4 shared publications Erik P. Willems
Department of Evolutionary Anthropology University of Zurich Zurich Switzerland
2 shared publicationsJudith M. Burkart
2 shared publicationsLuxshiha Santharuban
Department of Evolutionary Anthropology University of Zurich Zurich Switzerland
2 shared publicationsBaptiste Sadoughi
Centre de Primatologie de l’Université de Strasbourg, Niederhausbergen, France
1 shared publicationC. P. van Schaik
Department of Anthropology 1
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 April 2026
- Published by Wiley in Developmental Science
- Vol. 29 (3) , e70199
To Merge or not: The Early Onto‐ and Phylogenetic Origin of Co‐Representation
The origin of co‐representation during joint action poses a puzzle: It apparently only emerges around the age of four in humans, suggesting it is cognitively demanding, but has also been demonstrated in several nonhuman primate species whose cognitive skills do not match human four‐year‐olds. We therefore reassessed co‐representation in 2–4‐year‐old human children ( n = 38, 11 females) with a directly comparable, nonverbal task previously applied to nonhuman primates. Co‐representation was already present and strongest in the youngest children, not constrained by Theory of Mind and inhibitory control skills, and weaker in children than in nonhuman primates. Together, this suggests co‐representation may be an early default mode of processing joint action. However, species differed in the flexibility to adjust when to merge perspectives by co‐representing, and when not. Children and the cooperatively breeding marmosets were most flexible and relied on coordination smoothers to achieve this (marmosets: mutual gaze; children: mutual gaze and communication). Summary: Co‐representation, that is the merging of perspectives, is present in the joint Simon task in 2‐year‐olds and decreases with age Co‐representation is weaker in children than in nonhuman primates Cooperation success requires flexibly switching between merging or not Children and highly cooperative nonhuman primate species rely on mutual gaze as coordination smoothers for switching Co‐representation is likely an early default mode of processing joint actions
- 26 April 2026
- Published by Wiley in Developmental Science
- Vol. 29 (3) , e70199
Open AccessTo Merge or not: The Early Onto‐ and Phylogenetic Origin of Co‐Representation
The origin of co‐representation during joint action poses a puzzle: It apparently only emerges around the age of four in humans, suggesting it is cognitively demanding, but has also been demonstrated in several nonhuman primate species whose cognitive skills do not match human four‐year‐olds. We therefore reassessed co‐representation in 2–4‐year‐old human children ( n = 38, 11 females) with a directly comparable, nonverbal task previously applied to nonhuman primates. Co‐representation was already present and strongest in the youngest children, not constrained by Theory of Mind and inhibitory control skills, and weaker in children than in nonhuman primates. Together, this suggests co‐representation may be an early default mode of processing joint action. However, species differed in the flexibility to adjust when to merge perspectives by co‐representing, and when not. Children and the cooperatively breeding marmosets were most flexible and relied on coordination smoothers to achieve this (marmosets: mutual gaze; children: mutual gaze and communication). Summary: Co‐representation, that is the merging of perspectives, is present in the joint Simon task in 2‐year‐olds and decreases with age Co‐representation is weaker in children than in nonhuman primates Cooperation success requires flexibly switching between merging or not Children and highly cooperative nonhuman primate species rely on mutual gaze as coordination smoothers for switching Co‐representation is likely an early default mode of processing joint actions
- Open Access
- 28 September 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
To merge or not: The onto- and phylogenetic origin of co-representation
Co-representation during joint action is a hallmark of human cooperation, but its origin poses a puzzle: It apparently emerges late in ontogeny (around the age of four) suggesting it is cognitively demanding, but it has also been demonstrated in several nonhuman primate species. We reassessed the ontogeny of co-representation in 2-4 years old human children with a language-free task developed for nonhuman primates. Co-representation was already present and strongest in the youngest age class, and not constrained by Theory of Mind and inhibitory control. Together with the primate results, this suggests co-representation emerges spontaneously and automatically, and that not co-representation per se, but the flexibility to adjust when to merge and when not is the fundamental challenge for cooperation success. We show that human children and the most cooperative primates, the cooperatively breeding marmosets, rely on coordination smoothers (marmosets: mutual gaze; children: mutual gaze and communication) to achieve that.
- 28 September 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessTo merge or not: The onto- and phylogenetic origin of co-representation
Co-representation during joint action is a hallmark of human cooperation, but its origin poses a puzzle: It apparently emerges late in ontogeny (around the age of four) suggesting it is cognitively demanding, but it has also been demonstrated in several nonhuman primate species. We reassessed the ontogeny of co-representation in 2-4 years old human children with a language-free task developed for nonhuman primates. Co-representation was already present and strongest in the youngest age class, and not constrained by Theory of Mind and inhibitory control. Together with the primate results, this suggests co-representation emerges spontaneously and automatically, and that not co-representation per se, but the flexibility to adjust when to merge and when not is the fundamental challenge for cooperation success. We show that human children and the most cooperative primates, the cooperatively breeding marmosets, rely on coordination smoothers (marmosets: mutual gaze; children: mutual gaze and communication) to achieve that.
- Open Access
- 22 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
- Vol. 143, 104924
Towards integrating joint action research: Developmental and evolutionary perspectives on co-representation
- 22 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
- Vol. 143, 104924
Open AccessTowards integrating joint action research: Developmental and evolutionary perspectives on co-representation
- 1 August 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Comparative Psychology
- Vol. 136 (3) , 199-212
Primate origins of corepresentation and cooperative flexibility: A comparative study with common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), brown capuchins (Sapajus apella), and Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana).
Human joint action is generally facilitated by the tendency to represent not only one's own task and behavior but also the partner's. Yet, under some conditions, such as in the joint Simon task, corepresentation can cause interference and hampers, rather than facilitates, joint performance. A competent cooperator should thus also be able to flexibly inhibit corepresentation if that is conducive to cooperation success. To investigate the evolutionary origin of corepresentation, as well as the cooperative flexibility to inhibit it when necessary, we tested brown capuchins and Tonkean macaques in the joint Simon task and compared them with the previously tested marmosets. Corepresentation was present in all 3 species, but its strength and the cooperation success varied substantially. The cooperatively breeding marmosets showed the weakest corepresentation effect and, therefore, highest cooperation success, and they were the only ones to use mutual gaze when coordination with the partner was necessary. Cooperative flexibility was therefore not correlated with brain size but with the prevalence of cooperation in nature. This conclusion was corroborated by species differences in gazing patterns and suggests that the drivers of cooperative flexibility in humans were not solely cognitive. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 August 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Comparative Psychology
- Vol. 136 (3) , 199-212
Primate origins of corepresentation and cooperative flexibility: A comparative study with common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), brown capuchins (Sapajus apella), and Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana).
Human joint action is generally facilitated by the tendency to represent not only one's own task and behavior but also the partner's. Yet, under some conditions, such as in the joint Simon task, corepresentation can cause interference and hampers, rather than facilitates, joint performance. A competent cooperator should thus also be able to flexibly inhibit corepresentation if that is conducive to cooperation success. To investigate the evolutionary origin of corepresentation, as well as the cooperative flexibility to inhibit it when necessary, we tested brown capuchins and Tonkean macaques in the joint Simon task and compared them with the previously tested marmosets. Corepresentation was present in all 3 species, but its strength and the cooperation success varied substantially. The cooperatively breeding marmosets showed the weakest corepresentation effect and, therefore, highest cooperation success, and they were the only ones to use mutual gaze when coordination with the partner was necessary. Cooperative flexibility was therefore not correlated with brain size but with the prevalence of cooperation in nature. This conclusion was corroborated by species differences in gazing patterns and suggests that the drivers of cooperative flexibility in humans were not solely cognitive. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 25 July 2022
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 377 (1859) , 20210098
A convergent interaction engine: vocal communication among marmoset monkeys
To understand the primate origins of the human interaction engine, it is worthwhile to focus not only on great apes but also on callitrichid monkeys (marmosets and tamarins). Like humans, but unlike great apes, callitrichids are cooperative breeders, and thus habitually engage in coordinated joint actions, for instance when an infant is handed over from one group member to another. We first explore the hypothesis that these habitual cooperative interactions, the marmoset interactional ethology, are supported by the same key elements as found in the human interaction engine: mutual gaze (during joint action), turn-taking, volubility, as well as group-wide prosociality and trust. Marmosets show clear evidence of these features. We next examine the prediction that, if such an interaction engine can indeed give rise to more flexible communication, callitrichids may also possess elaborate communicative skills. A review of marmoset vocal communication confirms unusual abilities in these small primates: high volubility and large vocal repertoires, vocal learning and babbling in immatures, and voluntary usage and control. We end by discussing how the adoption of cooperative breeding during human evolution may have catalysed language evolution by adding these convergent consequences to the great ape-like cognitive system of our hominin ancestors. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Revisiting the human ‘interaction engine’: comparative approaches to social action coordination’.
- 25 July 2022
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 377 (1859) , 20210098
Open AccessA convergent interaction engine: vocal communication among marmoset monkeys
To understand the primate origins of the human interaction engine, it is worthwhile to focus not only on great apes but also on callitrichid monkeys (marmosets and tamarins). Like humans, but unlike great apes, callitrichids are cooperative breeders, and thus habitually engage in coordinated joint actions, for instance when an infant is handed over from one group member to another. We first explore the hypothesis that these habitual cooperative interactions, the marmoset interactional ethology, are supported by the same key elements as found in the human interaction engine: mutual gaze (during joint action), turn-taking, volubility, as well as group-wide prosociality and trust. Marmosets show clear evidence of these features. We next examine the prediction that, if such an interaction engine can indeed give rise to more flexible communication, callitrichids may also possess elaborate communicative skills. A review of marmoset vocal communication confirms unusual abilities in these small primates: high volubility and large vocal repertoires, vocal learning and babbling in immatures, and voluntary usage and control. We end by discussing how the adoption of cooperative breeding during human evolution may have catalysed language evolution by adding these convergent consequences to the great ape-like cognitive system of our hominin ancestors. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Revisiting the human ‘interaction engine’: comparative approaches to social action coordination’.
- Open Access
- 5 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Animal Cognition
- Vol. 25 (6) , 1399-1415
Individual differences in co-representation in three monkey species (Callithrix jacchus, Sapajus apella and Macaca tonkeana) in the joint Simon task: the role of social factors and inhibitory control
Behavioral coordination is involved in many forms of primate interactions. Co-representation is the simultaneous mental representation of one’s own and the partner’s task and actions. It often underlies behavioral coordination and cooperation success. In humans, the dyadic social context can modulate co-representation. Here, we first investigated whether individual differences in co-representation in the joint Simon task in capuchin monkeys and Tonkean macaques can be explained by social factors, namely dyadic grooming and sociality index, rank difference and eigenvector centrality. These factors did not predict variation in co-representation. However, in this specific task, co-representation reduces rather than facilitates joint performance. Automatic co-representation therefore needs to be inhibited or suppressed to maximize cooperation success. We therefore also investigated whether general inhibitory control (detour-reaching) would predict co-representation in the joint Simon task in Tonkean macaques, brown capuchin and marmoset monkeys. Inhibitory control did neither explain individual differences nor species differences, since marmosets were most successful in their joint performance despite scoring lowest on inhibitory control. These results suggest that the animals’ ability to resolve conflicts between self and other representation to increase cooperation success in this task is gradually learned due to frequent exposure during shared infant care, rather than determined by strong general inhibitory control. Further, we conclude that the joint Simon task, while useful to detect co-representation non-invasively, is less suitable for identifying the factors explaining individual differences and thus a more fruitful approach to identify these factors is to design tasks in which co-representation favors, rather than hinders cooperation success.
- 5 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Animal Cognition
- Vol. 25 (6) , 1399-1415
Open AccessIndividual differences in co-representation in three monkey species (Callithrix jacchus, Sapajus apella and Macaca tonkeana) in the joint Simon task: the role of social factors and inhibitory control
Behavioral coordination is involved in many forms of primate interactions. Co-representation is the simultaneous mental representation of one’s own and the partner’s task and actions. It often underlies behavioral coordination and cooperation success. In humans, the dyadic social context can modulate co-representation. Here, we first investigated whether individual differences in co-representation in the joint Simon task in capuchin monkeys and Tonkean macaques can be explained by social factors, namely dyadic grooming and sociality index, rank difference and eigenvector centrality. These factors did not predict variation in co-representation. However, in this specific task, co-representation reduces rather than facilitates joint performance. Automatic co-representation therefore needs to be inhibited or suppressed to maximize cooperation success. We therefore also investigated whether general inhibitory control (detour-reaching) would predict co-representation in the joint Simon task in Tonkean macaques, brown capuchin and marmoset monkeys. Inhibitory control did neither explain individual differences nor species differences, since marmosets were most successful in their joint performance despite scoring lowest on inhibitory control. These results suggest that the animals’ ability to resolve conflicts between self and other representation to increase cooperation success in this task is gradually learned due to frequent exposure during shared infant care, rather than determined by strong general inhibitory control. Further, we conclude that the joint Simon task, while useful to detect co-representation non-invasively, is less suitable for identifying the factors explaining individual differences and thus a more fruitful approach to identify these factors is to design tasks in which co-representation favors, rather than hinders cooperation success.