Monika Pompeo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Monika Pompeo has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Helena Fornwagner
Department of Economics, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4QJ, United Kingdom; and Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), 1030 Vienna, Austria
2 shared publications - Nina Serdarevic
University of Bergen - Department of Economics
2 shared publications Matthias Weber
University of St. Gallen - School of Finance; Swiss Finance Institute
1 shared publication- Nataliia Zaika
Institute for Behavioral Studies, American University Kyiv, Kiev, Ukraine
1 shared publication - Roman M. Sheremeta
Case Western Reserve University
1 shared publication Seung-Keun Martinez
University of Nottingham
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 March 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (3) , 1555-1574
Choosing Competition on Behalf of Someone Else
We extend the existing literature on gender differences in competitive behavior by investigating tournament entry choices when a principal decides for an agent. In a laboratory experiment, we randomly assign subjects the role of either principal or agent. The principal decides whether the agent performs a real-effort task under piece-rate or tournament incentives. When deciding, the principal is informed about the agent’s previous performance, age, and residency. Between treatments, we vary whether the principal knows the agent’s gender. In a baseline treatment, we replicate the standard setting in which subjects decide for themselves whether to compete. Our main findings are, first, that there is no gender gap in tournament entry when principals decide for agents as opposed to the baseline treatment. Second, the gender gap closes because more women are made to compete by principals. Third, whereas there is no gender gap in either of the principal treatments, revealing the agent’s gender is associated with higher overall tournament entry rates. Exploratory analyses of principals’ choice determinants reveal a positive effect of preferences to take risks, competitiveness, and confidence in agents’ performances on making agents compete. In addition, we find no difference in how principals evaluate male and female agents’ performances. Finally, we test the efficiency of principals’ competition choices and show that they lead to fewer payoff-maximizing outcomes than when subjects decide for themselves. Additionally, overall tournament performances and winners’ performances are lower when agents are made to compete, but this effect is not robust to controlling for agents’ previous performances. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by L. Meltzers Høyskolefond; Austrian Science Fund [Grant SFB F63 “Credence Goods, Incentives and Behavior”], and the Department of Economics at the University of Bergen. Also, we are grateful for funding from the Equal Opportunity Coordination Office of the University of Regensburg and its faculty of Business and Economics. Supplemental Material: The supplementary online material and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4413 .
- 1 March 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (3) , 1555-1574
Choosing Competition on Behalf of Someone Else
We extend the existing literature on gender differences in competitive behavior by investigating tournament entry choices when a principal decides for an agent. In a laboratory experiment, we randomly assign subjects the role of either principal or agent. The principal decides whether the agent performs a real-effort task under piece-rate or tournament incentives. When deciding, the principal is informed about the agent’s previous performance, age, and residency. Between treatments, we vary whether the principal knows the agent’s gender. In a baseline treatment, we replicate the standard setting in which subjects decide for themselves whether to compete. Our main findings are, first, that there is no gender gap in tournament entry when principals decide for agents as opposed to the baseline treatment. Second, the gender gap closes because more women are made to compete by principals. Third, whereas there is no gender gap in either of the principal treatments, revealing the agent’s gender is associated with higher overall tournament entry rates. Exploratory analyses of principals’ choice determinants reveal a positive effect of preferences to take risks, competitiveness, and confidence in agents’ performances on making agents compete. In addition, we find no difference in how principals evaluate male and female agents’ performances. Finally, we test the efficiency of principals’ competition choices and show that they lead to fewer payoff-maximizing outcomes than when subjects decide for themselves. Additionally, overall tournament performances and winners’ performances are lower when agents are made to compete, but this effect is not robust to controlling for agents’ previous performances. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by L. Meltzers Høyskolefond; Austrian Science Fund [Grant SFB F63 “Credence Goods, Incentives and Behavior”], and the Department of Economics at the University of Bergen. Also, we are grateful for funding from the Equal Opportunity Coordination Office of the University of Regensburg and its faculty of Business and Economics. Supplemental Material: The supplementary online material and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4413 .
- Open Access
- 30 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Nudging Civilian Evacuation During War: Evidence from Ukraine
In times of war, evacuating civilians from conflict zones is of critical importance for their survival and well-being. However, many people are hesitant to evacuate. Text-based nudges are a promising, yet unexplored, venue to increase the willingness to evacuate. We conduct a controlled survey experiment in Ukraine, manipulating the framing of automated alert messages. Our findings suggest that providing individuals with an evacuation plan by the authorities is crucial. The specific framing of the message itself does not seem to play a role in the perceived effectiveness of the messages. Heterogeneity analysis shows that women respond more strongly to information about a provided evacuation plan. Furthermore, having a pre-existing personal evacuation plan and being provided with one by the authorities act as substitutes.
- 30 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessNudging Civilian Evacuation During War: Evidence from Ukraine
In times of war, evacuating civilians from conflict zones is of critical importance for their survival and well-being. However, many people are hesitant to evacuate. Text-based nudges are a promising, yet unexplored, venue to increase the willingness to evacuate. We conduct a controlled survey experiment in Ukraine, manipulating the framing of automated alert messages. Our findings suggest that providing individuals with an evacuation plan by the authorities is crucial. The specific framing of the message itself does not seem to play a role in the perceived effectiveness of the messages. Heterogeneity analysis shows that women respond more strongly to information about a provided evacuation plan. Furthermore, having a pre-existing personal evacuation plan and being provided with one by the authorities act as substitutes.
- Open Access
- 4 June 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Him or Her? Choosing Competition on Behalf of Someone Else
We extend the literature on competitive behaviour by investigating environments in which the choice to compete is not made by an individual themselves, but by someone else. Choosing on behalf of others is an integral part of life and gender may be an important factor in shaping the perceived suitability of individuals for career promotions in competitive environments. We assign subjects either the role of an agent or a principal in an experiment. Agents perform a real effort task and a randomly assigned principal chooses whether the agent performs under a piece rate or tournament incentive scheme. Before making a decision for the agent, we vary whether the principal is informed about the agent's gender or not. Regardless of whether gender is revealed, we find no gender gap in competitiveness when principals are choosing for agents. In terms of determinants of the principals' choices, we observe that expectations about their agent's performance, as well as the principal's own preferences for risk and competitiveness matter for the decision to make others compete. In addition, we replicate existing results reporting that women are less willing to enter the tournament than men when choosing themselves. We compare both decision environments and show that efficiency (defined as average performance and earnings) does not suffer, whereas the winners' performance is lower when principals decide for agents. Taken together, our results suggest that allowing others to decide has the potential to increase the representation of women in competitive situations, many of which resemble the labour market.
- 4 June 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHim or Her? Choosing Competition on Behalf of Someone Else
We extend the literature on competitive behaviour by investigating environments in which the choice to compete is not made by an individual themselves, but by someone else. Choosing on behalf of others is an integral part of life and gender may be an important factor in shaping the perceived suitability of individuals for career promotions in competitive environments. We assign subjects either the role of an agent or a principal in an experiment. Agents perform a real effort task and a randomly assigned principal chooses whether the agent performs under a piece rate or tournament incentive scheme. Before making a decision for the agent, we vary whether the principal is informed about the agent's gender or not. Regardless of whether gender is revealed, we find no gender gap in competitiveness when principals are choosing for agents. In terms of determinants of the principals' choices, we observe that expectations about their agent's performance, as well as the principal's own preferences for risk and competitiveness matter for the decision to make others compete. In addition, we replicate existing results reporting that women are less willing to enter the tournament than men when choosing themselves. We compare both decision environments and show that efficiency (defined as average performance and earnings) does not suffer, whereas the winners' performance is lower when principals decide for agents. Taken together, our results suggest that allowing others to decide has the potential to increase the representation of women in competitive situations, many of which resemble the labour market.