Ramon Marimon
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ramon Marimon has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
George W. Evans
University of Oregon - Department of Economics; University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance
3 shared publicationsSeppo Honkapohja
Aalto University School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
3 shared publicationsAdrien Wicht
2 shared publicationsJoão Brogueira de Sousa
Univ Nova Lisboa, Nova Sch Business & Econ, Lisbon, Portugal
2 shared publicationsFabrizio Zilibotti
University of Zurich; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
1 shared publicationGian-Italo Bischi
Istituto di Scienze Economiche, University of Urbino
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 145
Making sovereign debt safe with a financial stability fund
- 2 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 145
Open AccessMaking sovereign debt safe with a financial stability fund
- Open Access
- 5 August 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Review of Economic Dynamics
- Vol. 50, 106-130
On a lender of last resort with a central bank and a stability Fund
- 5 August 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Review of Economic Dynamics
- Vol. 50, 106-130
Open AccessOn a lender of last resort with a central bank and a stability Fund
- Open Access
- 17 May 2023
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 156
On the design of a European Unemployment Insurance System
- 17 May 2023
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 156
Open AccessOn the design of a European Unemployment Insurance System
- 3 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 21 (5) , 1944-1993
A Worker’s Backpack as an Alternative to PAYG Pension Systems
Facing an ageing population and historical trends of low employment rates, pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems, currently in place in several European countries, imply very large economic and welfare costs in the coming decades. In an overlapping generations economy with incomplete insurance markets and frictional labour markets, an employment fund, which can be used while unemployed or retired, can enhance production efficiency and social welfare. With an appropriate design, the sustainable Backpack employment fund (BP) can greatly outperform (measured by average social welfare in the economy) existing PAYG systems and also Pareto dominate a full privatization of the pension system, as well as a standard fully funded defined contribution pension system. We show this in a calibrated model of the Spanish economy, by comparing the effect of its ageing transition under these different pension systems and by showing how a front-loaded transition from the PAYG to the BP system can be Pareto improving, while minimizing the cost of the reform.
- 3 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 21 (5) , 1944-1993
A Worker’s Backpack as an Alternative to PAYG Pension Systems
Facing an ageing population and historical trends of low employment rates, pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems, currently in place in several European countries, imply very large economic and welfare costs in the coming decades. In an overlapping generations economy with incomplete insurance markets and frictional labour markets, an employment fund, which can be used while unemployed or retired, can enhance production efficiency and social welfare. With an appropriate design, the sustainable Backpack employment fund (BP) can greatly outperform (measured by average social welfare in the economy) existing PAYG systems and also Pareto dominate a full privatization of the pension system, as well as a standard fully funded defined contribution pension system. We show this in a calibrated model of the Spanish economy, by comparing the effect of its ageing transition under these different pension systems and by showing how a front-loaded transition from the PAYG to the BP system can be Pareto improving, while minimizing the cost of the reform.
- Open Access
- 18 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 13 (3) , 513-556
Introducing an Austrian backpack in Spain
In an overlapping generations economy with incomplete insurance markets, the introduction of an employment fund—akin to the one introduced in Austria in 2003, also known as ‘Austrian backpack’—can enhance production efficiency and social welfare. It complements the two classical systems of public insurance: pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions and unemployment insurance (UI). We show this in a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents of the Spanish economy in 2018. A ‘backpack’ (BP) employment fund is an individual (across jobs) transferable fund, which earns a market interest rate as a return and is financed with a payroll tax (a BP tax). The worker can use the fund while unemployed or retired. Upon retirement, backpack savings can be converted into an (actuarially fair) retirement pension. To complement the existing PAYG pension and UI systems with a welfare maximizing 6% BP tax would raise welfare by 0.96% of average consumption at the new steady state, if we model Spain as an open economy. As a closed economy, there are important general equilibrium effects, and as a result, the social value of introducing the backpack is substantially greater: 16.14%, with a BP tax of 18%. In both economies, the annuity retirement option is an important component of the welfare gains.
- 18 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 13 (3) , 513-556
Open AccessIntroducing an Austrian backpack in Spain
In an overlapping generations economy with incomplete insurance markets, the introduction of an employment fund—akin to the one introduced in Austria in 2003, also known as ‘Austrian backpack’—can enhance production efficiency and social welfare. It complements the two classical systems of public insurance: pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions and unemployment insurance (UI). We show this in a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents of the Spanish economy in 2018. A ‘backpack’ (BP) employment fund is an individual (across jobs) transferable fund, which earns a market interest rate as a return and is financed with a payroll tax (a BP tax). The worker can use the fund while unemployed or retired. Upon retirement, backpack savings can be converted into an (actuarially fair) retirement pension. To complement the existing PAYG pension and UI systems with a welfare maximizing 6% BP tax would raise welfare by 0.96% of average consumption at the new steady state, if we model Spain as an open economy. As a closed economy, there are important general equilibrium effects, and as a result, the social value of introducing the backpack is substantially greater: 16.14%, with a BP tax of 18%. In both economies, the annuity retirement option is an important component of the welfare gains.
- Open Access
- 12 December 2008
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 278-315
Learning from learning in economics
- 12 December 2008
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 278-315
Open AccessLearning from learning in economics
- Open Access
- 1 April 2004
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Strategic Delegations in Monetary Unions
In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.
- 1 April 2004
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessStrategic Delegations in Monetary Unions
In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.
- Open Access
- 1 February 2004
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Stable Sunspot Equilibria in a Cash-in-Advance Economy
We analyze a monetary model with flexible labor supply, cash-inadvance constraints and seigniorage-financed government deficits. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor is greater than one, there are two steady states, one determinate and the other indeterminate. If the elasticity is less than one, there is a unique steady state, which can be indeterminate. Only in the latter case do there exist sunspot equilibria that are stable under adaptive learning. A sufficient reduction in government purchases can in many cases eliminate the sunspot equilibria while raising consumption/labor taxes even enough to balance the budget may fail to achieve determinacy.
- 1 February 2004
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessStable Sunspot Equilibria in a Cash-in-Advance Economy
We analyze a monetary model with flexible labor supply, cash-inadvance constraints and seigniorage-financed government deficits. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor is greater than one, there are two steady states, one determinate and the other indeterminate. If the elasticity is less than one, there is a unique steady state, which can be indeterminate. Only in the latter case do there exist sunspot equilibria that are stable under adaptive learning. A sufficient reduction in government purchases can in many cases eliminate the sunspot equilibria while raising consumption/labor taxes even enough to balance the budget may fail to achieve determinacy.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2003
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Inside-Outside Money Competition
We study how competition from privately supplied currency substitutes affects monetary equilibria. Whenever currency is inefficiently provided, inside money competition plays a disciplinary role by providing an upper bound on equilibrium inflation rates. Furthermore, if "inside monies" can be produced at a sufficiently low cost, outside money is driven out of circulation. Whenever a "benevolent" government can commit to its fiscal policy, sequential monetary policy is efficient and inside money competition plays no role.
- 1 July 2003
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInside-Outside Money Competition
We study how competition from privately supplied currency substitutes affects monetary equilibria. Whenever currency is inefficiently provided, inside money competition plays a disciplinary role by providing an upper bound on equilibrium inflation rates. Furthermore, if "inside monies" can be produced at a sufficiently low cost, outside money is driven out of circulation. Whenever a "benevolent" government can commit to its fiscal policy, sequential monetary policy is efficient and inside money competition plays no role.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2003
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
- Vol. 7 (1)
Stable Sunspot Equilibria in a Cash-in-Advance Economy
We develop a monetary model with flexible supply of labor, cash in advance constraints and government spending financed by seignorage. This model has two regime
- 1 January 2003
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
- Vol. 7 (1)
Open AccessStable Sunspot Equilibria in a Cash-in-Advance Economy
We develop a monetary model with flexible supply of labor, cash in advance constraints and government spending financed by seignorage. This model has two regime