Jianan Chen

Federated learning (FL) is a distributed learning framework that allows clients to jointly train a model by uploading parameter updates rather than sharing local data. FL deployed on a client-edge-cloud hierarchical architecture, named Hierarchical Federated Learning (HFL), can accelerate model training and accommodate more clients with reduced communication cost via edge aggregation. Unfortunately, HFL suffers from privacy risks since the submitted parameters from clients are vulnerable to privacy attacks. To address this issue, we propose a novel Differential Privacy (DP) definition tailored for HFL, i.e., Group Local Differential Privacy (GLDP). We design the Sampling-Randomizing-Shuffling (SRS) mechanism to implement GLDP in HFL, where the sampling process is employed to achieve a stronger level of privacy protection with less noise added. By combining the randomized response and the shuffling mechanism, our proposed SRS mechanism can achieve client-level personalization within $\rho _{k}$-GLDP for privacy preservation while balancing model performance and privacy protection in HFL. Privacy analysis and convergence analysis are conducted to provide theoretical performance guarantees. Experimental results based on real-world datasets verify the effectiveness of SRS.

We study Asynchronous Dynamic games and show that in games with a finite state space and finite action sets, one can obtain the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium by using a simple backward induction method when the time period for the game is finite. The equilibrium strategies for games with an infinite horizon are then obtained as the point-wise limit of the equilibrium strategies of a sequence of finite horizon games, where the finite horizon games are truncated versions of the original game with successively longer time periods. We also show that if the game has a fixed K-period cycle, then there is a stationary Markov equilibrium. Using these results, we derive an algorithm to compute the equilibrium strategies. We test the algorithm in three experiments. The first is a two-player asynchronous game with three states and three actions. In the second experiment, we compute the equilibrium of a cybersecurity game in which there are two players, an attacker and a defender. In the third experiment, we compute the stationary equilibrium of a duopoly game with two firms that choose an output in alternate periods.

As one of the typical settings of Federated Learning (FL), cross-silo FL allows organizations to jointly train an optimal Machine Learning (ML) model. In this case, some organizations may try to obtain the global model without contributing their local training power, lowering the social welfare. In this paper, we model the interactions among organizations in cross-silo FL as a public goods game and theoretically prove that there exists a social dilemma where the maximum social welfare is not achieved in Nash equilibrium. To overcome this dilemma, we employ the Multi-player Multi-action Zero-Determinant (MMZD) strategy to maximize the social welfare. With the help of the MMZD, an individual organization can unilaterally control the social welfare without extra cost. Since the MMZD strategy can be adopted by all organizations, we further study the case of multiple organizations jointly adopting the MMZD strategy to form an MMZD Alliance (MMZDA). We prove that the MMZDA strategy can strengthen the control of the maximum social welfare. Experimental results validate that the MMZD strategy is effective in obtaining the maximum social welfare and the MMZDA can achieve a larger maximum value.

As one of the typical settings of Federated Learning (FL), cross-silo FL allows organizations to jointly train an optimal Machine Learning (ML) model. In this case, some organizations may try to obtain the global model without contributing their local training power, lowering the social welfare. In this paper, we model the interactions among organizations in cross-silo FL as a public goods game and theoretically prove that there exists a social dilemma where the maximum social welfare is not achieved in Nash equilibrium. To overcome this dilemma, we employ the Multi-player Multi-action Zero-Determinant (MMZD) strategy to maximize the social welfare. With the help of the MMZD, an individual organization can unilaterally control the social welfare without extra cost. Since the MMZD strategy can be adopted by all organizations, we further study the case of multiple organizations jointly adopting the MMZD strategy to form an MMZD Alliance (MMZDA). We prove that the MMZDA strategy can strengthen the control of the maximum social welfare. Experimental results validate that the MMZD strategy is effective in obtaining the maximum social welfare and the MMZDA can achieve a larger maximum value.

Due to the increasing demand from mobile devices for the real-time response of cloud computing services, federated edge learning (FEL) emerges as a new computing paradigm, which utilizes edge devices to achieve efficient machine learning while protecting their data privacy. Implementing efficient FEL suffers from the challenges of devices’ limited computing and communication resources, as well as unevenly distributed datasets, which inspires several existing research focusing on device selection to optimize time consumption and data diversity. However, these studies fail to consider the energy consumption of edge devices given their limited power supply, which can seriously affect the cost-efficiency of FEL with unexpected device dropouts. To fill this gap, we propose a device selection model capturing both energy consumption and data diversity optimization, under the constraints of time consumption and training data amount. Then we solve the optimization problem by reformulating the original model and designing a novel algorithm, named E ² DS, to reduce the time complexity greatly. By comparing with two classical FEL schemes, we validate the superiority of our proposed device selection mechanism for FEL with extensive experimental results.