Pinghai Yuan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Pinghai Yuan has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Fulong Chen
Anhui Normal University
2 shared publications - Hao Jiang
Anhui Normal University
2 shared publications - Jie Sun
Anhui Normal University
1 shared publication - Jinhua Cui
Hunan University, Changsha, China
1 shared publication - Prateek Saxena
Department of Computer Science, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
1 shared publication Qingkai Zeng
Nanjing University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 536-553
Security Weaknesses and Privacy Leakage in Mini-Apps: An Analysis Based on Structural, Behavioral, and Indicators
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 536-553
Security Weaknesses and Privacy Leakage in Mini-Apps: An Analysis Based on Structural, Behavioral, and Indicators
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 517-535
HostCFI: Host-Side Control-Flow Integrity for Unmodified Guest Kernels in Cloud Environments
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 517-535
HostCFI: Host-Side Control-Flow Integrity for Unmodified Guest Kernels in Cloud Environments
- Open Access
- 9 July 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1-40
Dynamic Binary Translation for SGX Enclaves
Enclaves, such as those enabled by Intel SGX, offer a hardware primitive for shielding user-level applications from the OS. While enclaves are a useful starting point, code running in the enclave requires additional checks whenever control or data is transferred to/from the untrusted OS. The enclave-OS interface on SGX, however, can be extremely large if we wish to run existing unmodified binaries inside enclaves. This article presents Ratel , a dynamic binary translation engine running inside SGX enclaves on Linux. Ratel offers complete interposition , the ability to interpose on all executed instructions in the enclave and monitor all interactions with the OS. Instruction-level interposition offers a general foundation for implementing a large variety of inline security monitors in thefuture. We take a principled approach in explaining why complete interposition on SGX is challenging. We draw attention to five design decisions in SGX that create fundamental trade-offs between performance and ensuring complete interposition, and we explain how to resolve them in the favor of complete interposition. To illustrate the utility of the Ratel framework, we present the first attempt to offer binary compatibility with existing software on SGX. We report that Ratel offers binary compatibility with over 200 programs we tested, including micro-benchmarks and real applications, such as Linux shell utilities. Runtimes for two programming languages, namely, Python and R, tested with standard benchmarks work out-of-the-box on Ratel without any specialized handling.
- 9 July 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1-40
Open AccessDynamic Binary Translation for SGX Enclaves
Enclaves, such as those enabled by Intel SGX, offer a hardware primitive for shielding user-level applications from the OS. While enclaves are a useful starting point, code running in the enclave requires additional checks whenever control or data is transferred to/from the untrusted OS. The enclave-OS interface on SGX, however, can be extremely large if we wish to run existing unmodified binaries inside enclaves. This article presents Ratel , a dynamic binary translation engine running inside SGX enclaves on Linux. Ratel offers complete interposition , the ability to interpose on all executed instructions in the enclave and monitor all interactions with the OS. Instruction-level interposition offers a general foundation for implementing a large variety of inline security monitors in thefuture. We take a principled approach in explaining why complete interposition on SGX is challenging. We draw attention to five design decisions in SGX that create fundamental trade-offs between performance and ensuring complete interposition, and we explain how to resolve them in the favor of complete interposition. To illustrate the utility of the Ratel framework, we present the first attempt to offer binary compatibility with existing software on SGX. We report that Ratel offers binary compatibility with over 200 programs we tested, including micro-benchmarks and real applications, such as Linux shell utilities. Runtimes for two programming languages, namely, Python and R, tested with standard benchmarks work out-of-the-box on Ratel without any specialized handling.
- 12 December 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 66-85
Hardware-Assisted Fine-Grained Code-Reuse Attack Detection
- 12 December 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 66-85
Hardware-Assisted Fine-Grained Code-Reuse Attack Detection