LCLan Chen
Lan Chen
*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Lan Chen has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Fengxia Han
Faculty of Environmental Science and Engineering, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming, China
1 shared publication - Hanjie Xiao
School of Economics and Management, Huzhou University, China
1 shared publication - Jianwei Shi
Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650504, China
1 shared publication - Tengfei Shi
Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650504, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 May 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
- Vol. 19 (9) , 5778
A Regulatory Game Analysis of Smart Aging Platforms Considering Privacy Protection
Privacy and information protection are important issues in the era of big data. At present, China’s elderly care industry is gradually adopting the supply model of smart elderly care to alleviate the contradiction between supply and demand. However, the low level of regulation of smart aging platforms may lead to a low level of privacy protection on the platforms. Therefore, in this paper, based on the evolutionary game and Lyapunov theory, we discuss the willingness of elderly people to participate in regulation, the privacy protection status of platform service providers, and the degree of government regulation, as well as the key factors affecting the equilibrium of the three-party game system, and conduct simulation analysis and game system optimization using MATLAB. The simulation results show that and can be transformed to by adjusting the parameters, i.e., the optimal ESS is participation, high-quality protection, and low investment supervision; the service income of the elderly, the loss of privacy leakage, the investment cost of service providers, and the amount of government rewards and punishments are the key factors affecting the tripartite game system. By analyzing the impact of factors, such as benefits and costs, on privacy protection and the regulation of smart senior care platforms, the level of privacy protection of smart senior care platforms can be improved and the process of the comprehensive regulation of domestic senior care services can be promoted.- 9 May 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
- Vol. 19 (9) , 5778
Open AccessA Regulatory Game Analysis of Smart Aging Platforms Considering Privacy Protection
Privacy and information protection are important issues in the era of big data. At present, China’s elderly care industry is gradually adopting the supply model of smart elderly care to alleviate the contradiction between supply and demand. However, the low level of regulation of smart aging platforms may lead to a low level of privacy protection on the platforms. Therefore, in this paper, based on the evolutionary game and Lyapunov theory, we discuss the willingness of elderly people to participate in regulation, the privacy protection status of platform service providers, and the degree of government regulation, as well as the key factors affecting the equilibrium of the three-party game system, and conduct simulation analysis and game system optimization using MATLAB. The simulation results show that and can be transformed to by adjusting the parameters, i.e., the optimal ESS is participation, high-quality protection, and low investment supervision; the service income of the elderly, the loss of privacy leakage, the investment cost of service providers, and the amount of government rewards and punishments are the key factors affecting the tripartite game system. By analyzing the impact of factors, such as benefits and costs, on privacy protection and the regulation of smart senior care platforms, the level of privacy protection of smart senior care platforms can be improved and the process of the comprehensive regulation of domestic senior care services can be promoted.