ASAngelo Sotgiu

Angelo Sotgiu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Angelo Sotgiu has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    RAID: A benchmark dataset for testing the adversarial robustness of AI-generated image detectors

    by Hicham Eddoubi, Jonas Ricker, Federico Cocchi, Angelo Sotgiu, Maura Pintor, Marcella Cornia, Lorenzo Baraldi, Asja Fischer, Battista Biggio

  • Open Access

    Evaluating line-level localization ability of learning-based code vulnerability detection models

    by Marco Pintore, Giorgio Piras, Angelo Sotgiu, Maura Pintor, Battista Biggio

    To address the extremely concerning problem of software vulnerability, system security is often entrusted to Machine Learning (ML) algorithms. Despite their now established detection capabilities, such models are limited by design to flagging the entire input source code function as vulnerable, rather than precisely localizing the concerned code lines. However, the detection granularity is crucial to support human operators during software development, ensuring that such predictions reflect the true code semantics to help debug, evaluate, and fix the detected vulnerabilities. To address this issue, recent work made progress toward improving the detector’s localization ability, thus narrowing down the vulnerability detection “window” and providing more fine-grained predictions. Such approaches, however, implicitly disregard the presence of spurious correlations and biases in the data, which often predominantly influence the performance of ML algorithms. In this work, we investigate how detectors comply with this requirement by proposing an explainability-based evaluation procedure. Our approach, defined as Detection Alignment (DA), quantifies the agreement between the input source code lines that most influence the prediction and the actual localization of the vulnerability as per the ground truth. Through DA, which is model-agnostic and adaptable to different detection tasks, not limited to our use case, we analyze multiple learning-based vulnerability detectors and datasets. As a result, we show how the predictions of such models are consistently biased by non-vulnerable lines, ultimately highlighting the high impact of biases and spurious correlations.


  • Open Access

    Regression-Aware Continual Learning for Android Malware Detection

    by Daniele Ghiani, Daniele Angioni, Giorgio Piras, Angelo Sotgiu, Luca Minnei, Srishti Gupta, Maura Pintor, Fabio Roli, Battista Biggio


  • Open Access

    Evaluating Line-level Localization Ability of Learning-based Code Vulnerability Detection Models

    by Marco Pintore, Giorgio Piras, Angelo Sotgiu, Maura Pintor, Battista Biggio

    To address the extremely concerning problem of software vulnerability, system security is often entrusted to Machine Learning (ML) algorithms. Despite their now established detection capabilities, such models are limited by design to flagging the entire input source code function as vulnerable, rather than precisely localizing the concerned code lines. However, the detection granularity is crucial to support human operators during software development, ensuring that such predictions reflect the true code semantics to help debug, evaluate, and fix the detected vulnerabilities. To address this issue, recent work made progress toward improving the detector's localization ability, thus narrowing down the vulnerability detection "window" and providing more fine-grained predictions. Such approaches, however, implicitly disregard the presence of spurious correlations and biases in the data, which often predominantly influence the performance of ML algorithms. In this work, we investigate how detectors comply with this requirement by proposing an explainability-based evaluation procedure. Our approach, defined as Detection Alignment (DA), quantifies the agreement between the input source code lines that most influence the prediction and the actual localization of the vulnerability as per the ground truth. Through DA, which is model-agnostic and adaptable to different detection tasks, not limited to our use case, we analyze multiple learning-based vulnerability detectors and datasets. As a result, we show how the predictions of such models are consistently biased by non-vulnerable lines, ultimately highlighting the high impact of biases and spurious correlations. The code is available at https://github.com/pralab/vuln-localization-eval.

  • Open Access

    Indicators of Attack Failure: Debugging and Improving Optimization of Adversarial Examples

    by Maura Pintor, Luca Demetrio, Angelo Sotgiu, Ambra Demontis, Nicholas Carlini, Battista Biggio, Fabio Roli

    Evaluating robustness of machine-learning models to adversarial examples is a challenging problem. Many defenses have been shown to provide a false sense of robustness by causing gradient-based attacks to fail, and they have been broken under more rigorous evaluations. Although guidelines and best practices have been suggested to improve current adversarial robustness evaluations, the lack of automatic testing and debugging tools makes it difficult to apply these recommendations in a systematic manner. In this work, we overcome these limitations by: (i) categorizing attack failures based on how they affect the optimization of gradient-based attacks, while also unveiling two novel failures affecting many popular attack implementations and past evaluations; (ii) proposing six novel indicators of failure, to automatically detect the presence of such failures in the attack optimization process; and (iii) suggesting a systematic protocol to apply the corresponding fixes. Our extensive experimental analysis, involving more than 15 models in 3 distinct application domains, shows that our indicators of failure can be used to debug and improve current adversarial robustness evaluations, thereby providing a first concrete step towards automatizing and systematizing them. Our open-source code is available at: https://github.com/pralab/IndicatorsOfAttackFailure.

  • Open Access

    secml: Secure and explainable machine learning in Python

    by Maura Pintor, Luca Demetrio, Angelo Sotgiu, Marco Melis, Ambra Demontis, Battista Biggio


  • Open Access

    Domain Knowledge Alleviates Adversarial Attacks in Multi-Label Classifiers

    by Stefano Melacci, Gabriele Ciravegna, Angelo Sotgiu, Ambra Demontis, Battista Biggio, Marco Gori, Fabio Roli

    Adversarial attacks on machine learning-based classifiers, along with defense mechanisms, have been widely studied in the context of single-label classification problems. In this paper, we shift the attention to multi-label classification, where the availability of domain knowledge on the relationships among the considered classes may offer a natural way to spot incoherent predictions, i.e., predictions associated to adversarial examples lying outside of the training data distribution. We explore this intuition in a framework in which first-order logic knowledge is converted into constraints and injected into a semi-supervised learning problem. Within this setting, the constrained classifier learns to fulfill the domain knowledge over the marginal distribution, and can naturally reject samples with incoherent predictions. Even though our method does not exploit any knowledge of attacks during training, our experimental analysis surprisingly unveils that domain-knowledge constraints can help detect adversarial examples effectively, especially if such constraints are not known to the attacker. We show how to implement an adaptive attack exploiting knowledge of the constraints and, in a specifically-designed setting, we provide experimental comparisons with popular state-of-the-art attacks. We believe that our approach may provide a significant step towards designing more robust multi-label classifiers.


  • Open Access

    FADER: Fast Adversarial Example Rejection

    by Francesco Crecchi, Marco Melis, Angelo Sotgiu, Davide Bacciu, Battista Biggio

    Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, i.e., carefully-crafted inputs that mislead classification at test time. Recent defenses have been shown to improve adversarial robustness by detecting anomalous deviations from legitimate training samples at different layer representations - a behavior normally exhibited by adversarial attacks. Despite technical differences, all aforementioned methods share a common backbone structure that we formalize and highlight in this contribution, as it can help in identifying promising research directions and drawbacks of existing methods. The first main contribution of this work is the review of these detection methods in the form of a unifying framework designed to accommodate both existing defenses and newer ones to come. In terms of drawbacks, the overmentioned defenses require comparing input samples against an oversized number of reference prototypes, possibly at different representation layers, dramatically worsening the test-time efficiency. Besides, such defenses are typically based on ensembling classifiers with heuristic methods, rather than optimizing the whole architecture in an end-to-end manner to better perform detection. As a second main contribution of this work, we introduce FADER, a novel technique for speeding up detection-based methods. FADER overcome the issues above by employing RBF networks as detectors: by fixing the number of required prototypes, the runtime complexity of adversarial examples detectors can be controlled. Our experiments outline up to 73x prototypes reduction compared to analyzed detectors for MNIST dataset and up to 50x for CIFAR10 dataset respectively, without sacrificing classification accuracy on both clean and adversarial data.