Richard Skowyra
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Richard Skowyra has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Samuel Jero
MIT Lincoln Laboratory, USA
3 shared publications - Hamed Okhravi
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA, USA
2 shared publications - Howard Shrobe
MIT CSAIL, USA
2 shared publications - Nathan Burow
MIT Lincoln Laboratory, USA
2 shared publications - Boyana Norris
University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA
1 shared publication Bryan Ward
MIT Lincoln Laboratory, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4569-4583
Manipulative Interference Attacks
A μ-kernel is an operating system (OS) paradigm that facilitates a strong cybersecurity posture for embedded systems. Unlike a monolithic OS such as Linux, a μ-kernel reduces overall system privilege by deploying most OS functionality within isolated, userspace protection domains. Moreover, a μ-kernel ensures confidentiality and integrity between protection domains (i.e., spatial isolation), and offers timing predictability for real-time tasks in mixed-criticality systems (i.e., temporal isolation). One popular μ-kernel is seL4 which offers extensive formal guarantees of implementation correctness and flexible temporal budgeting mechanisms. However, we show that an untrusted protection domain on a μ-kernel can abuse service requests to other protection domains in order to corrode system availability. We generalize this denial-of-service (DoS) attack strategy as Manipulative Interference Attacks (MIAs) and introduce techniques to efficiently identify instances of MIAs within a configured system. Specifically, we propose a novel hybrid approach that first leverages static analysis to identify software components with influenceable execution times, and second, uses an automatically generated model-based analysis to determine which compromised protection domains can manipulate the influenceable components and trigger MIAs. We investigate the risk of MIAs in several representative system examples including the seL4 Microkit, as well as a case study of seL4 software artifacts from the DARPA Cyber Assured Systems Engineering (CASE) program. In particular, we demonstrate that our analysis is efficient enough to discover practical instances of MIAs in real-world systems.
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4569-4583
Open AccessManipulative Interference Attacks
A μ-kernel is an operating system (OS) paradigm that facilitates a strong cybersecurity posture for embedded systems. Unlike a monolithic OS such as Linux, a μ-kernel reduces overall system privilege by deploying most OS functionality within isolated, userspace protection domains. Moreover, a μ-kernel ensures confidentiality and integrity between protection domains (i.e., spatial isolation), and offers timing predictability for real-time tasks in mixed-criticality systems (i.e., temporal isolation). One popular μ-kernel is seL4 which offers extensive formal guarantees of implementation correctness and flexible temporal budgeting mechanisms. However, we show that an untrusted protection domain on a μ-kernel can abuse service requests to other protection domains in order to corrode system availability. We generalize this denial-of-service (DoS) attack strategy as Manipulative Interference Attacks (MIAs) and introduce techniques to efficiently identify instances of MIAs within a configured system. Specifically, we propose a novel hybrid approach that first leverages static analysis to identify software components with influenceable execution times, and second, uses an automatically generated model-based analysis to determine which compromised protection domains can manipulate the influenceable components and trigger MIAs. We investigate the risk of MIAs in several representative system examples including the seL4 Microkit, as well as a case study of seL4 software artifacts from the DARPA Cyber Assured Systems Engineering (CASE) program. In particular, we demonstrate that our analysis is efficient enough to discover practical instances of MIAs in real-world systems.
- Open Access
- 7 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Computing Surveys
- Vol. 55 (6) , 1-34
TAG: Tagged Architecture Guide
Software security defenses are routinely broken by the persistence of both security researchers and attackers. Hardware solutions based on tagging are emerging as a promising technique that provides strong security guarantees (e.g., memory safety) while incurring minimal runtime overheads and maintaining compatibility with existing codebases. Such schemes extend every word in memory with a tag and enforce security policies across them. This paper provides a survey of existing work on tagged architectures and describe the types of attacks such architectures aim to prevent as well as the guarantees they provide. It highlights the main distinguishing factors among tagged architectures and presents the diversity of designs and implementations that have been proposed. The survey reveals several real-world challenges have been neglected relating to both security and practical deployment. The challenges relate to the provisioning and enforcement phases of tagged architectures, and various overheads they incur. This work identifies these challenges as open research problems and provides suggestions for improving their security and practicality.
- 7 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Computing Surveys
- Vol. 55 (6) , 1-34
Open AccessTAG: Tagged Architecture Guide
Software security defenses are routinely broken by the persistence of both security researchers and attackers. Hardware solutions based on tagging are emerging as a promising technique that provides strong security guarantees (e.g., memory safety) while incurring minimal runtime overheads and maintaining compatibility with existing codebases. Such schemes extend every word in memory with a tag and enforce security policies across them. This paper provides a survey of existing work on tagged architectures and describe the types of attacks such architectures aim to prevent as well as the guarantees they provide. It highlights the main distinguishing factors among tagged architectures and presents the diversity of designs and implementations that have been proposed. The survey reveals several real-world challenges have been neglected relating to both security and practical deployment. The challenges relate to the provisioning and enforcement phases of tagged architectures, and various overheads they incur. This work identifies these challenges as open research problems and provides suggestions for improving their security and practicality.
- Open Access
- 9 November 2020
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 51-57
Lessons Learned in Network and Memory-Based Moving Target Defenses
Moving-Target Defenses seek to introduce dynamism, randomness, and diversity into computer systems in an effort to make these systems harder to explore, predict, and exploit. Over the past decade a variety of work has explored applying these kinds of defenses to applications? runtime environments, to the operating systems and architectures running the applications, and to networks. In this paper, we report on lessons learned from seven years of building and evaluating moving-target defenses, primarily for process memory layouts and networks. We identify six major lessons learned from our experience that we believe to be broadly applicable to moving-target defenses, focusing around the importance and impact of threat models and characteristics of effective moving-target defenses. We then offer suggestions for the future direction of the field based on our experience.
- 9 November 2020
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 51-57
Open AccessLessons Learned in Network and Memory-Based Moving Target Defenses
Moving-Target Defenses seek to introduce dynamism, randomness, and diversity into computer systems in an effort to make these systems harder to explore, predict, and exploit. Over the past decade a variety of work has explored applying these kinds of defenses to applications? runtime environments, to the operating systems and architectures running the applications, and to networks. In this paper, we report on lessons learned from seven years of building and evaluating moving-target defenses, primarily for process memory layouts and networks. We identify six major lessons learned from our experience that we believe to be broadly applicable to moving-target defenses, focusing around the importance and impact of threat models and characteristics of effective moving-target defenses. We then offer suggestions for the future direction of the field based on our experience.
- 23 April 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 18 (4) , 8-19
One Giant Leap for Computer Security
- 23 April 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 18 (4) , 8-19
One Giant Leap for Computer Security
- Open Access
- 6 July 2018
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1648-1655
Adversarial co-evolution of attack and defense in a segmented computer network environment
- 6 July 2018
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1648-1655
Open AccessAdversarial co-evolution of attack and defense in a segmented computer network environment