RSRichard Skowyra

Richard Skowyra

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Richard Skowyra has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Manipulative Interference Attacks

    by Samuel Mergendahl, Stephen Fickas, Boyana Norris, Richard Skowyra

    A μ-kernel is an operating system (OS) paradigm that facilitates a strong cybersecurity posture for embedded systems. Unlike a monolithic OS such as Linux, a μ-kernel reduces overall system privilege by deploying most OS functionality within isolated, userspace protection domains. Moreover, a μ-kernel ensures confidentiality and integrity between protection domains (i.e., spatial isolation), and offers timing predictability for real-time tasks in mixed-criticality systems (i.e., temporal isolation). One popular μ-kernel is seL4 which offers extensive formal guarantees of implementation correctness and flexible temporal budgeting mechanisms. However, we show that an untrusted protection domain on a μ-kernel can abuse service requests to other protection domains in order to corrode system availability. We generalize this denial-of-service (DoS) attack strategy as Manipulative Interference Attacks (MIAs) and introduce techniques to efficiently identify instances of MIAs within a configured system. Specifically, we propose a novel hybrid approach that first leverages static analysis to identify software components with influenceable execution times, and second, uses an automatically generated model-based analysis to determine which compromised protection domains can manipulate the influenceable components and trigger MIAs. We investigate the risk of MIAs in several representative system examples including the seL4 Microkit, as well as a case study of seL4 software artifacts from the DARPA Cyber Assured Systems Engineering (CASE) program. In particular, we demonstrate that our analysis is efficient enough to discover practical instances of MIAs in real-world systems.


  • Open Access

    TAG: Tagged Architecture Guide

    by Samuel Jero, Nathan Burow, Bryan Ward, Richard Skowyra, Roger Khazan, Howard Shrobe, Hamed Okhravi

    Software security defenses are routinely broken by the persistence of both security researchers and attackers. Hardware solutions based on tagging are emerging as a promising technique that provides strong security guarantees (e.g., memory safety) while incurring minimal runtime overheads and maintaining compatibility with existing codebases. Such schemes extend every word in memory with a tag and enforce security policies across them. This paper provides a survey of existing work on tagged architectures and describe the types of attacks such architectures aim to prevent as well as the guarantees they provide. It highlights the main distinguishing factors among tagged architectures and presents the diversity of designs and implementations that have been proposed. The survey reveals several real-world challenges have been neglected relating to both security and practical deployment. The challenges relate to the provisioning and enforcement phases of tagged architectures, and various overheads they incur. This work identifies these challenges as open research problems and provides suggestions for improving their security and practicality.


  • Open Access

    Lessons Learned in Network and Memory-Based Moving Target Defenses

    by Richard Skowyra, Samuel Jero

    Moving-Target Defenses seek to introduce dynamism, randomness, and diversity into computer systems in an effort to make these systems harder to explore, predict, and exploit. Over the past decade a variety of work has explored applying these kinds of defenses to applications? runtime environments, to the operating systems and architectures running the applications, and to networks. In this paper, we report on lessons learned from seven years of building and evaluating moving-target defenses, primarily for process memory layouts and networks. We identify six major lessons learned from our experience that we believe to be broadly applicable to moving-target defenses, focusing around the importance and impact of threat models and characteristics of effective moving-target defenses. We then offer suggestions for the future direction of the field based on our experience.


  • One Giant Leap for Computer Security

    by Hamed Okhravi, Nathan Burow, Richard Skowyra, Bryan C. Ward, Samuel Jero, Roger Kazan, Howard Shrobe


  • Open Access

    Adversarial co-evolution of attack and defense in a segmented computer network environment

    by Erik Hemberg, Joseph R. Zipkin, Richard W. Skowyra, Neal Wagner, Una-May O'Reilly