MGMichael Gruber

Michael Gruber

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Michael Gruber has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    A Comprehensive Analysis of DOMREP-II with Respect to SCA-NFA

    by Matthias Probst, János Sack, Manuel Brosch, Michael Gruber, Georg Sigl

    Protection against hardware attacks is a fundamental requirement for cryptographic implementations deployed on devices that may be physically accessible to adversaries. The primary threats in such scenarios are SCA and FIA, which are increasingly being combined into potent joint attacks. A prominent example is the technique, which has been shown to circumvent DOMREP, a countermeasure designed to provide individual protections against both SCA and FIA. In this work, we present DOMREP-II, which extends the original scheme to withstand powerful adversaries with SCA-NFA capabilities. We adapt non-linear DOM gates to ensure strong non-interference under the presence of faults and develop a protected error-correction gate that eliminates secret-dependent leakage during the redundancy-checking phase. The proposed countermeasure is validated using first-order TVLA and a detailed empirical SCA-NFA analysis on a microcontroller platform. Our results demonstrate that while the original Domain Oriented Masking with REPetiton codes (DOMREP) implementation leaks the secret key within 100,000 traces, DOMREP-II successfully mitigates this leakage. When applied to the Gimli permutation, the enhanced protection introduces a moderate performance overhead of 18.8% in cycle count and only 4.4% in code size. Furthermore, we show that the authenticated structure of our countermeasure enables secure randomness reuse, reducing the entropy demand to 696 bytes per permutation. These findings confirm that DOMREP-II provides a practical and scalable security-performance tradeoff for high-assurance cryptographic implementations.

  • Algebraic Fault Analysis of Subterranean 2.0

    by Michael Gruber, Patrick Karl, Georg Sigl

    Algebraic Fault Analysis (AFA) is based on the principles of algebraic cryptanalysis in conjunction with fault analysis. One of the main benefits of AFA is the ability to use off the shelf solving tools like SAT solvers to conduct fault analysis in an automated fashion. In this work we show how the principles of AFA can be applied to the authenticated encryption scheme Subterranean 2.0, a second round candidate of the ongoing NIST-LWC competition. In order to find the optimal parameters for a fault injection we investigated the fault model’s influence on the solving time. The optimal fault parameters turned out as a single bitflip fault in conjunction with a known but randomly chosen fault location, where the fault is applied just one cycle before the tag generation. We verify the efficiency of our attack by means of simulation. Conducting our proposed attack with optimal fault parameters requires only five fault injections to recover the secret key of Subterranean 2.0 in less than four seconds.


  • DOMREP–An Orthogonal Countermeasure for Arbitrary Order Side-Channel and Fault Attack Protection

    by Michael Gruber, Matthias Probst, Patrick Karl, Thomas Schamberger, Lars Tebelmann, Michael Tempelmeier, Georg Sigl

    Protection against physical attacks is a major requirement for cryptographic implementations on devices which can be accessed by attackers. Side-channel and fault injection attacks are the most common types of physical attacks. In this work we present a novel generic solution for simultaneous protection against side-channel and fault attacks with arbitrary order. We combine domain oriented masking and repetition codes in an orthogonal way and call this approach DOMREP. The resistance against side-channel attacks and fault attacks can be scaled independently of each other, for the protection against higher-order side-channel analysis and the injection of multiple faults including SIFA. We develop the generic concept of orthogonal protection, and implement the DOMREP concept on GIMLI, a round two NIST LWC competition candidate, on a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA. Our implementation of GIMLI is verified to be resistant against univariate first-order side-channel attacks by TVLA. The resistance against SIFA is verified by means of fault emulation of single as well as multiple bit faults. Our implementation of GIMLI achieves the expected security level according to these measurements. We also provide numbers for the area overhead for our protected implementation of GIMLI.