Ngoc-Tuan Do
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Ngoc-Tuan Do has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Van-Phuc Hoang
Le Quy Don Technical University
6 shared publications - Van-Sang Doan
Faculty of Communication and Radar, Vietnam Naval Academy, Nha Trang, Khánh Hòa, Vietnam
4 shared publications - Cong-Kha Pham
Department of Computer and Network Engineering, The University of Electro-Communications (UEC), 1-5-1 Chofugaoka, Tokyo 182-8585, Japan
3 shared publications - Trong-Thuc Hoang
Department of Computer and Network Engineering, The University of Electro-Communications, Tokyo, Japan
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 18 December 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 9-14
Revealing Secret Key from Low Success Rate Deep Learning-Based Side Channel Attacks
Non-profiled deep learning-based side channel attacks utilize deep neural networks to extract highly accurate sensitive information. These attacks pose a significant threat to the security of cryptographic devices. Unlike profiled attacks, non-profiled attacks do not require prior knowledge of the target device, making them more versatile. Deep learning algorithms enable attackers to learn complex relationships between side channel signals and secret information, enabling the recovery of cryptographic keys, even the common SCA countermeasure deployed. However, non-profiled DLSCA can not reveal the secret key if the correct key’s metric is not clearly distinguished from the incorrect candidates. This paper discusses the mentioned issue of non-profiled DLSCA. Then, a new metric based on the inversion of exponential rank (IER) is proposed to enhance the performance of these attacks. The experimental results show that the proposed technique could reveal the secret subkey even if the partial success rate percentage is only 10% in the ASCAD dataset. Furthermore, when utilizing minimally tuned models and IER metric to execute attacks on the CHES-CTF 2018 data, there is a substantial increase in the percentage of correctly revealed bytes, rising from 62.5% to 93.75%.
- 18 December 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 9-14
Revealing Secret Key from Low Success Rate Deep Learning-Based Side Channel Attacks
Non-profiled deep learning-based side channel attacks utilize deep neural networks to extract highly accurate sensitive information. These attacks pose a significant threat to the security of cryptographic devices. Unlike profiled attacks, non-profiled attacks do not require prior knowledge of the target device, making them more versatile. Deep learning algorithms enable attackers to learn complex relationships between side channel signals and secret information, enabling the recovery of cryptographic keys, even the common SCA countermeasure deployed. However, non-profiled DLSCA can not reveal the secret key if the correct key’s metric is not clearly distinguished from the incorrect candidates. This paper discusses the mentioned issue of non-profiled DLSCA. Then, a new metric based on the inversion of exponential rank (IER) is proposed to enhance the performance of these attacks. The experimental results show that the proposed technique could reveal the secret subkey even if the partial success rate percentage is only 10% in the ASCAD dataset. Furthermore, when utilizing minimally tuned models and IER metric to execute attacks on the CHES-CTF 2018 data, there is a substantial increase in the percentage of correctly revealed bytes, rising from 62.5% to 93.75%.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Mobile Networks and Applications
- Vol. 28 (3) , 1187-1196
Performance Analysis of Deep Learning Based Non-profiled Side Channel Attacks Using Significant Hamming Weight Labeling
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Mobile Networks and Applications
- Vol. 28 (3) , 1187-1196
Performance Analysis of Deep Learning Based Non-profiled Side Channel Attacks Using Significant Hamming Weight Labeling
- 31 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 14 (3) , 427-439
A novel non-profiled side channel attack based on multi-output regression neural network
- 31 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 14 (3) , 427-439
A novel non-profiled side channel attack based on multi-output regression neural network
- Open Access
- 20 December 2022
- Published by Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) in IET Information Security
- Vol. 17 (3) , 377-393
On the performance of non‐profiled side channel attacks based on deep learning techniques
In modern embedded systems, security issues including side‐channel attacks (SCAs) are becoming of paramount importance since the embedded devices are ubiquitous in many categories of consumer electronics. Recently, deep learning (DL) has been introduced as a new promising approach for profiled and non‐profiled SCAs. This paper proposes and evaluates the applications of different DL techniques including the Convolutional Neural Network and the multilayer perceptron models for non‐profiled attacks on the AES‐128 encryption implementation. Especially, the proposed network is fine‐tuned with different number of hidden layers, labelling techniques and activation functions. Along with the designed models, a dataset reconstruction and labelling technique for the proposed model has also been performed for solving the high dimension data and imbalanced dataset problem. As a result, the DL based SCA with our reconstructed dataset for different targets of ASCAD, RISC‐V microcontroller, and ChipWhisperer boards has achieved a higher performance of non‐profiled attacks. Specifically, necessary investigations to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed techniques against different SCA countermeasures, such as masking and hiding, have been performed. In addition, the effect of the activation function on the proposed DL models was investigated. The experimental results have clarified that the exponential linear unit function is better than the rectified linear unit in fighting against noise generation‐based hiding countermeasure.
- 20 December 2022
- Published by Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) in IET Information Security
- Vol. 17 (3) , 377-393
Open AccessOn the performance of non‐profiled side channel attacks based on deep learning techniques
In modern embedded systems, security issues including side‐channel attacks (SCAs) are becoming of paramount importance since the embedded devices are ubiquitous in many categories of consumer electronics. Recently, deep learning (DL) has been introduced as a new promising approach for profiled and non‐profiled SCAs. This paper proposes and evaluates the applications of different DL techniques including the Convolutional Neural Network and the multilayer perceptron models for non‐profiled attacks on the AES‐128 encryption implementation. Especially, the proposed network is fine‐tuned with different number of hidden layers, labelling techniques and activation functions. Along with the designed models, a dataset reconstruction and labelling technique for the proposed model has also been performed for solving the high dimension data and imbalanced dataset problem. As a result, the DL based SCA with our reconstructed dataset for different targets of ASCAD, RISC‐V microcontroller, and ChipWhisperer boards has achieved a higher performance of non‐profiled attacks. Specifically, necessary investigations to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed techniques against different SCA countermeasures, such as masking and hiding, have been performed. In addition, the effect of the activation function on the proposed DL models was investigated. The experimental results have clarified that the exponential linear unit function is better than the rectified linear unit in fighting against noise generation‐based hiding countermeasure.
- 10 October 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Embedded Systems Letters
- Vol. 15 (3) , 145-148
Efficient Nonprofiled Side-Channel Attack Using Multi-Output Classification Neural Network
Differential deep learning analysis (DDLA) is the first deep-learning-based nonprofiled side-channel attack (SCA) on embedded systems. However, DDLA requires many training processes to distinguish the correct key. In this letter, we introduce a nonprofiled SCA technique using multi-output classification to mitigate the aforementioned issue. Specifically, a multi-output multilayer perceptron and a multi-output convolutional neural network are introduced against various SCA protected schemes, such as masking, noise generation, and trace de-synchronization countermeasures. The experimental results on different power side channel datasets have clarified that our model performs the attack up to 9–30 times faster than DDLA in the case of masking and de-synchronization countermeasures, respectively. In addition, regarding combined masking and noise generation countermeasure, our proposed model achieves a higher success rate of at least 20% in the cases of the standard deviation equal to 1.0 and 1.5.
- 10 October 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Embedded Systems Letters
- Vol. 15 (3) , 145-148
Efficient Nonprofiled Side-Channel Attack Using Multi-Output Classification Neural Network
Differential deep learning analysis (DDLA) is the first deep-learning-based nonprofiled side-channel attack (SCA) on embedded systems. However, DDLA requires many training processes to distinguish the correct key. In this letter, we introduce a nonprofiled SCA technique using multi-output classification to mitigate the aforementioned issue. Specifically, a multi-output multilayer perceptron and a multi-output convolutional neural network are introduced against various SCA protected schemes, such as masking, noise generation, and trace de-synchronization countermeasures. The experimental results on different power side channel datasets have clarified that our model performs the attack up to 9–30 times faster than DDLA in the case of masking and de-synchronization countermeasures, respectively. In addition, regarding combined masking and noise generation countermeasure, our proposed model achieves a higher success rate of at least 20% in the cases of the standard deviation equal to 1.0 and 1.5.
- Open Access
- 10 February 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 10, 17578-17589
Low Complexity Correlation Power Analysis by Combining Power Trace Biasing and Correlation Distribution Techniques
Side channel attack (SCA) is a class of crypt-analytic attacks for security evaluation of cryptographic and embedded microprocessor implementations. Among several SCA approaches, the correlation power analysis (CPA) is an efficient way to recover the secret key of the specific cryptographic algorithms running on the target devices such as embedded microprocessors. However, the evaluation process is time-consuming since a large number of traces are required to overcome the impact of noise. Hence, this paper proposes new methods to reduce the computation time by using Point of Interest (POI) extractor with the power trace biasing technique and the correlation distribution for the low complexity correlation power analysis (CPA). The theoretical explanations are provided and the experiments on different platforms such as ASCAD and RISC-V processor based databases are conducted to justify the proposed techniques. Especially, our experiments are performed with different protected schemes such as masking, hiding and combined hiding-masking techniques. The experimental results indicate that our proposed methods provide reliable results in comparison with the standard CPA. By using only a half of the power traces for taking the POIs, our first proposal not only decreases the execution time approximately by half but also enhances the success rate of the attack. Moreover, the second method based on power trace biasing technique is proposed in order to achieve better results and reduce the number of traces needed for selecting the POIs. With only 28.9% of given power traces needed, our second proposed technique reduces the execution time to only 2.6 times of the standard CPA.
- 10 February 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 10, 17578-17589
Open AccessLow Complexity Correlation Power Analysis by Combining Power Trace Biasing and Correlation Distribution Techniques
Side channel attack (SCA) is a class of crypt-analytic attacks for security evaluation of cryptographic and embedded microprocessor implementations. Among several SCA approaches, the correlation power analysis (CPA) is an efficient way to recover the secret key of the specific cryptographic algorithms running on the target devices such as embedded microprocessors. However, the evaluation process is time-consuming since a large number of traces are required to overcome the impact of noise. Hence, this paper proposes new methods to reduce the computation time by using Point of Interest (POI) extractor with the power trace biasing technique and the correlation distribution for the low complexity correlation power analysis (CPA). The theoretical explanations are provided and the experiments on different platforms such as ASCAD and RISC-V processor based databases are conducted to justify the proposed techniques. Especially, our experiments are performed with different protected schemes such as masking, hiding and combined hiding-masking techniques. The experimental results indicate that our proposed methods provide reliable results in comparison with the standard CPA. By using only a half of the power traces for taking the POIs, our first proposal not only decreases the execution time approximately by half but also enhances the success rate of the attack. Moreover, the second method based on power trace biasing technique is proposed in order to achieve better results and reduce the number of traces needed for selecting the POIs. With only 28.9% of given power traces needed, our second proposed technique reduces the execution time to only 2.6 times of the standard CPA.