Massimiliano Castellani
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Interests
Massimiliano Castellani has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Pierpaolo Pattitoni
University of Bologna
10 shared publications - Francesco Angelini
University of Bologna
9 shared publications Guido Candela
Department of Economics University of Bologna Bologna Italy
5 shared publications- Laura Vici
University of Bologna
4 shared publications - Maurizio Mussoni
University of Bologna
3 shared publications - Corrado Benassi
Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Forgery in the art market: a model of strategic fraud under uncertain authenticity
In the world of art, deception looms large, with some sources suggesting that over 50% of artworks may be forged or misattributed. While this revelation may not directly affect the aesthetic appeal of art, it has major economic consequences by increasing the risk faced by buyers. Art fraud, where sellers may strategically offer fabricated or misattributed artworks to inflate their economic value, is thus a critical concern. This paper develops a game-theoretic model of art forgery to understand the incentives driving the creation and sale of forged artworks. We show how market characteristics, such as the frequency of authentic works, the gains from trade, and the cost of forgery, jointly shape incentives to forge and to verify. In particular, a lower fraction of original artworks may reduce forgery by increasing buyers’ incentives to inspect, whereas higher gains from trade and lower forgery costs increase the likelihood that forgery arises in equilibrium. These factors affect not only the composition of traded artworks, but also the equilibrium regimes that emerge. On the policy side, stronger public detection has a surprisingly ambiguous effect: in intermediate cases, it crowds out private verification, leaving the share of undetected fakes unchanged.
- 19 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessForgery in the art market: a model of strategic fraud under uncertain authenticity
In the world of art, deception looms large, with some sources suggesting that over 50% of artworks may be forged or misattributed. While this revelation may not directly affect the aesthetic appeal of art, it has major economic consequences by increasing the risk faced by buyers. Art fraud, where sellers may strategically offer fabricated or misattributed artworks to inflate their economic value, is thus a critical concern. This paper develops a game-theoretic model of art forgery to understand the incentives driving the creation and sale of forged artworks. We show how market characteristics, such as the frequency of authentic works, the gains from trade, and the cost of forgery, jointly shape incentives to forge and to verify. In particular, a lower fraction of original artworks may reduce forgery by increasing buyers’ incentives to inspect, whereas higher gains from trade and lower forgery costs increase the likelihood that forgery arises in equilibrium. These factors affect not only the composition of traded artworks, but also the equilibrium regimes that emerge. On the policy side, stronger public detection has a surprisingly ambiguous effect: in intermediate cases, it crowds out private verification, leaving the share of undetected fakes unchanged.
- 22 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industrial and Business Economics
- Vol. 53 (2) , 633-659
Price competition, willingness to pay, and demand externalities under vertical differentiation
- 22 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industrial and Business Economics
- Vol. 53 (2) , 633-659
Price competition, willingness to pay, and demand externalities under vertical differentiation
- 5 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Foodservice Business Research
- p. 1-28
Efficiency and quality: an empirical analysis of Italian fine dining restaurants
- 5 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Foodservice Business Research
- p. 1-28
Efficiency and quality: an empirical analysis of Italian fine dining restaurants
- Open Access
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 59 (1) , 77-100
Before the hammer falls: an empirical analysis of the market reaction to art thefts
This study investigates the effects of art theft on art auction sales. In particular, it focuses on the impact on the auction sales when an artist’s artwork has been stolen and reported in a public list of stolen art. By using criminal data from Interpol’s International Stolen Works of Art Database (SWoA) from 2002 to 2016 all over the world, and auction data concerning all lots put at auction by Christie’s, Sotheby’s, and Phillips in New York and London between 2012 and 2016, we build a hand-collected data on top-tier international auction sales of modern and contemporary artists whose artwork have previously been stolen. The empirical analysis is based on an economic framework of the art auction and on hedonic regression models to test the effect of theft on auction prices. The results hint at a negative effect of theft on the prices of the artworks at market level, which gets stronger as the number of reported stolen artworks from the same artist increases. Overall, the paper provides a nuanced understanding of the complex incentives and disincentives surrounding the reporting of stolen artworks, emphasising the need to balance private interests with broader goals of art theft prevention and recovery. It invites further exploration of potential solutions and their practicality in addressing these conflicts of interest in the art world.
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 59 (1) , 77-100
Open AccessBefore the hammer falls: an empirical analysis of the market reaction to art thefts
This study investigates the effects of art theft on art auction sales. In particular, it focuses on the impact on the auction sales when an artist’s artwork has been stolen and reported in a public list of stolen art. By using criminal data from Interpol’s International Stolen Works of Art Database (SWoA) from 2002 to 2016 all over the world, and auction data concerning all lots put at auction by Christie’s, Sotheby’s, and Phillips in New York and London between 2012 and 2016, we build a hand-collected data on top-tier international auction sales of modern and contemporary artists whose artwork have previously been stolen. The empirical analysis is based on an economic framework of the art auction and on hedonic regression models to test the effect of theft on auction prices. The results hint at a negative effect of theft on the prices of the artworks at market level, which gets stronger as the number of reported stolen artworks from the same artist increases. Overall, the paper provides a nuanced understanding of the complex incentives and disincentives surrounding the reporting of stolen artworks, emphasising the need to balance private interests with broader goals of art theft prevention and recovery. It invites further exploration of potential solutions and their practicality in addressing these conflicts of interest in the art world.
- Open Access
- 6 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 144 (1) , 1-29
Platform investment and seller competition in two-sided markets
Platforms can create value within their ecosystems through their investments. In this paper, we model a monopolistic platform choosing the level of a demand-enhancing investment and the membership fees that sellers and buyers pay to access the platform. We find that platform size and quality are large when the degree of product differentiation among sellers and investment productivity are high. Platform profit and users’ surplus are aligned. If the platform sells a product under its brand, incentives to invest are higher, compared to a pure marketplace, and sellers’ surplus can be larger if the degree of product differentiation is low.
- 6 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 144 (1) , 1-29
Open AccessPlatform investment and seller competition in two-sided markets
Platforms can create value within their ecosystems through their investments. In this paper, we model a monopolistic platform choosing the level of a demand-enhancing investment and the membership fees that sellers and buyers pay to access the platform. We find that platform size and quality are large when the degree of product differentiation among sellers and investment productivity are high. Platform profit and users’ surplus are aligned. If the platform sells a product under its brand, incentives to invest are higher, compared to a pure marketplace, and sellers’ surplus can be larger if the degree of product differentiation is low.
- 10 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 56 (3) , 533-557
You can’t export that! Export ban for modern and contemporary Italian art
- 10 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 56 (3) , 533-557
You can’t export that! Export ban for modern and contemporary Italian art
- Open Access
Digital leisure and the gig economy: a two-sector model of growth
The process of market digitization at the world level and the increasing and extended usage of digital devices reshaped the way consumers employ their leisure time, with the emergence of what can be called digital leisure. This new type of leisure produces data that firms can use, with no explicit cost paid by consumers. At the same time, the global digitalization process has allowed workers to allocate part of (or their whole) working time to the Gig Economy sector, which strongly relies on data as a production factor. In this paper, we develop a two-sector growth model to study how the above mechanism can shape the dynamics of growth, also assessing how shocks in either the traditional or the Gig Economy sector can modify the equilibrium of the overall economy. We find that shocks in the TFP can crowd out working time from a sector to the other, while shocks on the elasticity of production to data determines a change in the time allocated to digital leisure.
Open AccessDigital leisure and the gig economy: a two-sector model of growth
The process of market digitization at the world level and the increasing and extended usage of digital devices reshaped the way consumers employ their leisure time, with the emergence of what can be called digital leisure. This new type of leisure produces data that firms can use, with no explicit cost paid by consumers. At the same time, the global digitalization process has allowed workers to allocate part of (or their whole) working time to the Gig Economy sector, which strongly relies on data as a production factor. In this paper, we develop a two-sector growth model to study how the above mechanism can shape the dynamics of growth, also assessing how shocks in either the traditional or the Gig Economy sector can modify the equilibrium of the overall economy. We find that shocks in the TFP can crowd out working time from a sector to the other, while shocks on the elasticity of production to data determines a change in the time allocated to digital leisure.
- Open Access
- 17 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Economia Politica
- Vol. 39 (3) , 961-988
Overconfidence in the art market: a bargaining pricing model with asymmetric disinformation
This paper develops a Nash bargaining model of price formation in the art market. Agents can be naïve, if they are overconfident and either overestimate artistic quality or underestimate their uncertainty of artistic quality, or sophisticated, if they correctly use all the available information. Overconfidence turns out to have a positive impact on both the price and the average quality of the artworks traded in the market. The impact of overconfidence on expected quality is weaker than the corresponding price increase, so sellers overcharge buyers. In addition, the buyer’s (seller’s) overconfidence has a positive (negative) impact on the likelihood of trade. If many pairs of agents may bargain simultaneously, we find that seller’s market power is negatively affected by the number of sellers and positively affected by the number of buyers. If sophisticated and naïve buyers coexist, naïve buyers exert a negative externality on the sophisticated ones, increasing the price the latter pay.
- 17 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Economia Politica
- Vol. 39 (3) , 961-988
Open AccessOverconfidence in the art market: a bargaining pricing model with asymmetric disinformation
This paper develops a Nash bargaining model of price formation in the art market. Agents can be naïve, if they are overconfident and either overestimate artistic quality or underestimate their uncertainty of artistic quality, or sophisticated, if they correctly use all the available information. Overconfidence turns out to have a positive impact on both the price and the average quality of the artworks traded in the market. The impact of overconfidence on expected quality is weaker than the corresponding price increase, so sellers overcharge buyers. In addition, the buyer’s (seller’s) overconfidence has a positive (negative) impact on the likelihood of trade. If many pairs of agents may bargain simultaneously, we find that seller’s market power is negatively affected by the number of sellers and positively affected by the number of buyers. If sophisticated and naïve buyers coexist, naïve buyers exert a negative externality on the sophisticated ones, increasing the price the latter pay.
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Foodservice Business Research
- Vol. 27 (2) , 138-156
Restaurant sector efficiency frontiers: a meta-analysis
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in assessing the level of performance and efficiency of the foodservice industry. As a result, an increasing number of studies applied efficiency frontiers methods to quantify firm (in)efficiency. Starting from the benchmarking studies on restaurant efficiency, this paper aims to develop a meta-analysis based on 77 observations from 25 studies published in scientific journals from 1998 to 2020. The estimated effect size in our meta-analysis is equal to 0.842 and is statistically different from zero, while the Cochran’s Q test for the heterogeneity in our sample hints at the absence of heterogeneity in the previous studies on restaurant efficiency. A meta-regression analysis partially supports this result but also highlights the importance of assuming an appropriate return to scale, given the peculiarity of the sector.
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Foodservice Business Research
- Vol. 27 (2) , 138-156
Restaurant sector efficiency frontiers: a meta-analysis
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in assessing the level of performance and efficiency of the foodservice industry. As a result, an increasing number of studies applied efficiency frontiers methods to quantify firm (in)efficiency. Starting from the benchmarking studies on restaurant efficiency, this paper aims to develop a meta-analysis based on 77 observations from 25 studies published in scientific journals from 1998 to 2020. The estimated effect size in our meta-analysis is equal to 0.842 and is statistically different from zero, while the Cochran’s Q test for the heterogeneity in our sample hints at the absence of heterogeneity in the previous studies on restaurant efficiency. A meta-regression analysis partially supports this result but also highlights the importance of assuming an appropriate return to scale, given the peculiarity of the sector.
- 29 April 2019
- Published by Wiley in Metroeconomica
- Vol. 70 (3) , 488-524
In search of leisure time: An endogenous growth model with leisure services
- 29 April 2019
- Published by Wiley in Metroeconomica
- Vol. 70 (3) , 488-524
In search of leisure time: An endogenous growth model with leisure services