Qin Zhong

Against the background of the pandemic, the mask supply chain faces the risk of pollution caused by discarded masks, the risk of insufficient funds of retailers, and the risk of mask overstock. To better guard against the above risks, this study constructed a two-party game model and a cusp catastrophe model from the perspective of the mask green supply chain, and studied the strategic choices of retailers and suppliers in the supply chain affected by the risk of capital constraints and overstock. The result shows that the risk shocks will lead to the disruption of the mask green supply chain, and the main factors affecting the strategy choice of mask suppliers and retailers are mask recycling rate, deposit ratio, risk occurrence time, etc. In further research, this study involved a mechanism for financial institutions, mask retailers, and the government to jointly deal with the risk of mask overstock, the risk of retailers’ insufficient funds, and the risk of environmental pollution from discarded masks. The research path and conclusion of this study reveal the risks in the circulation area of mask supplies during the pandemic, and provide recommendations for planning for future crises and risk prevention.

Purpose: Previous studies have mostly discussed the impact of environmental policy on enterprise innovation, but the discussion on how turbulence in environmental policy may affect firms' green innovation has been insufficient. This paper explores the effect of environmental policy uncertainty on corporate green innovation in the turnover of environmental protection officials (EPOT) context.Design/methodology/approach: The authors manually collected the data on the EPOT of 280 Chinese prefecture-level cities, and used the Poisson regression model to conduct empirical analyses based on the panel data of 1472 Chinese listed manufacturing firms from 2008 to 2017.Findings: The results show that environmental policy uncertainty leads firms to reduce their green patent applications only for green invention patent applications. Such an effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). In addition, when the new directors of the Ecology and Environmental Bureau take office through promotions or are no more than 55 years old, the negative effect is more obvious, but there is no significant difference regardless of whether new directors have worked in environmental protection departments.Originality/value: First, this paper supplements the research on the antecedents of corporate green innovation from the perspective of environmental policy uncertainty and extends the applications of real options theory. Second, this paper expands the research on the government–business relationship from the EPOT perspective.

Improving the reliability of electricity supply is closely related to the national industrial economy and people’s livelihood. When procuring electricity, the large consumer faces the risk of insufficient electricity supply. Such insufficiency may be caused by the supply disruption of the upstream electricity generator and the fluctuation of electricity prices in the electricity pool. We establish an expected cost model for the large consumer and a revenue model for the electricity generator by introducing robustness and opportunity functions to analyse the impact of supply disruption and price fluctuation on both members. Then, we obtain the optimal reliability level and subsidy rate. Our analytical results reveal the following points: (1) During an electricity price fluctuation, the sufficient and necessary condition for the large consumer to expect high robustness of his own decision‐making is to pay a high cost. (2) The high uncertainty of electricity price leads to less revenue for the electricity generator; thus, the electricity generator should perform well in price forecasting. (3) Without disruption risk, the electricity generator is reliable. Furthermore, the electricity pool is unreliable from the perspective of price. However, the electricity supply of the electricity generator is no longer reliable when considering disruption risk, whereas the electricity pool is reliable because the large consumer is tolerant of price fluctuation under this circumstance. Moreover, the impacts of market uncertainty and players’ attributes on the optimal strategies are explored.

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel () on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variable changes in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease when increases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase when increases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected by . The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel () on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variable changes in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease when increases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase when increases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected by .