EKEngin Kirda

Engin Kirda

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Engin Kirda has a total of 63 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • “Only as Strong as the Weakest Link”: On the Security of Brokered Single Sign-On on the Web

    by Tommaso Innocenti, Louis Jannett, Christian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov, Engin Kirda

    Single Sign-On (SSO) is an authentication process that allows users to access multiple services with a single set of login credentials. Although SSO improves the user experience, it poses challenges to developers to implement complex authentication protocols securely. External services, called brokers, simplify the integration of SSO. In this paper, we shed light on the emerging brokered SSO ecosystem, focusing on the security of the newly introduced actor, the broker. We systematically evaluate the landscape of brokered SSO, uncovering significant blind spots in previous research. Our study reveals that 25% of the websites with SSO integrate brokers for authentication, an area that has not been covered by any previous research. Through our comprehensive security evaluation, we identify three categories of threats associated with brokered SSO: (1) insufficient validation of redirect chains enabling injection attacks, (2) unauthorized data access enabling account takeovers, and (3) violations of security best current practices. We expose vulnerabilities in over 50 brokers, compromising the security of more than 2k websites. These findings represent only a lower bound of a critical situation, underscoring the urgent need for improved security measures and protocols to safeguard the integrity of brokered SSO systems.


  • Open Access

    ENOLA: Efficient Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems

    by Armanuzzaman, Engin Kirda, Ziming Zhao

    Microcontroller-based embedded systems are vital in daily life, but are especially vulnerable to control-flow hijacking attacks due to hardware and software constraints. Control-Flow Attestation (CFA) aims to precisely attest the execution path of a program to a remote verifier. However, existing CFA solutions face challenges with large measurement and/or trace data, limiting these solutions to small programs. In addition, slow software-based measurement calculations limit their feasibility for microcontroller systems. In this paper, we present ENOLA, an efficient control-flow attestation solution for low-end embedded systems. ENOLA introduces a novel authenticator that achieves linear space complexity. Moreover, ENOLA capitalizes on the latest hardware-assisted message authentication code computation capabilities found in commercially-available devices for measurement computation. ENOLA employs a trusted execution environment, and allocates general-purpose registers to thwart memory corruption attacks. We have developed the ENOLA compiler through LLVM passes and attestation engine on the ARMv8.1-M architecture. Our evaluations demonstrate ENOLA's effectiveness in minimizing data transmission, while achieving lower or comparable performance to the existing works.

  • Open Access

    PriveShield: Enhancing User Privacy Using Automatic Isolated Profiles in Browsers

    by Seyed Ali Akhavani, Engin Kirda, Amin Kharraz

    Online tracking is a widespread practice on the web with questionable ethics, security, and privacy concerns. While web tracking can offer personalized and curated content to Internet users, it operates as a sophisticated surveillance mechanism to gather extensive user information. This paper introduces PriveShield, a light-weight privacy mechanism that disrupts the information gathering cycle while offering more control to Internet users to maintain their privacy. PriveShield is implemented as a browser extension that offers an adjustable privacy feature to surf the web with multiple identities or accounts simultaneously without any changes to underlying browser code or services. When necessary, multiple factors are automatically analyzed on the client side to isolate cookies and other information that are the basis of online tracking. PriveShield creates isolated profiles for clients based on their browsing history, interactions with websites, and the amount of time they spend on specific websites. This allows the users to easily prevent unwanted browsing information from being shared with third parties and ad exchanges without the need for manual configuration. Our evaluation results from 54 real-world scenarios show that our extension is effective in preventing retargeted ads in 91% of those scenarios.

  • Open Access

    Gudifu: Guided Differential Fuzzing for HTTP Request Parsing Discrepancies

    by Bahruz Jabiyev, Anthony Gavazzi, Kaan Onarlioglu, Engin Kirda

    Modern web applications involve multiple HTTP processors on the traffic path, each acting as a reverse proxy and processing client requests. Even when such proxies are secure in isolation, when combined into complex systems, minor HTTP parsing discrepancies between them can lead to various severe attacks such as cache poisoning and HTTP request smuggling attacks. We propose Gudifu, a new approach that improves the state-of-the-art HTTP differential fuzzing approaches in two main ways: 1) taking a graybox fuzzing approach to probe the parsing behavior of HTTP proxies and 2) using a new algorithm which is capable of searching for discrepancies in the entire HTTP request. These improvements lead to the discovery of significantly more parsing discrepancies and discrepancy-based attack vectors which were previously unknown.


  • Open Access

    Assessing the Feasibility of the Virtual Smartphone Paradigm in Countering Zero-Click Attacks

    by Narmeen Shafqat, Cem Topcuoglu, Engin Kirda, Aanjhan Ranganathan

    Zero-click attacks exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in chat apps, such as WhatsApp and iMessage, enabling root access to the user's device without their interaction, thereby posing a significant privacy risk. While Apple's Lockdown mode and Samsung's Message Guard implement virtual sandboxes, it is crucial to recognize that sophisticated zero-click exploits can potentially bypass the sandbox and compromise the device. This paper explores the feasibility of countering such attacks by shifting the attack surface to a virtual smartphone ecosystem, developed using readily available off-the-shelf components. Considering that zero-click attacks are inevitable, our cross-platform security system is strategically designed to substantially reduce the impact and duration of any potential successful attack. Our evaluation highlighted several trade-offs between security and usability. Moreover, we share insights to inspire further research on mitigating zero-click attacks on smartphones.

  • Open Access

    Assessing the Feasibility of the Virtual Smartphone Paradigm in Countering Zero-Click Attacks

    by Narmeen Shafqat, Cem Topcuoglu, Engin Kirda, Aanjhan Ranganathan

    Zero-click attacks exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in chat apps, such as WhatsApp and iMessage, enabling root access to the user's device without their interaction, thereby posing a significant privacy risk. While Apple's Lockdown mode and Samsung's Message Guard implement virtual sandboxes, it is crucial to recognize that sophisticated zero-click exploits can potentially bypass the sandbox and compromise the device. This paper explores the feasibility of countering such attacks by shifting the attack surface to a virtual smartphone ecosystem, developed using readily available off-the-shelf components. Considering that zero-click attacks are inevitable, our cross-platform security system is strategically designed to substantially reduce the impact and duration of any potential successful attack. Our evaluation highlighted several trade-offs between security and usability. Moreover, we share insights to inspire further research on mitigating zero-click attacks on smartphones.


  • Open Access

    OAuth 2.0 Redirect URI Validation Falls Short, Literally

    by Tommaso Innocenti, Matteo Golinelli, Kaan Onarlioglu, Ali Mirheidari, Bruno Crispo, Engin Kirda

    OAuth 2.0 requires a complex redirection trail between websites and Identity Providers (IdPs). In particular, the "redirect URI" parameter included in the popular Authorization Grant Code flow governs the callback endpoint that users are routed to, together with their security tokens. The protocol specification, therefore, includes guidelines on protecting the integrity of the redirect URI. In this work, we analyze the OAuth 2.0 specification in light of modern systems-centric attacks and reveal that the prescribed redirect URI validation guidance exposes IdPs to path confusion and parameter pollution attacks. Based on this observation, we propose novel attack techniques and experiment with 16 popular IdPs, empirically verifying that the OAuth 2.0 security guidance is under-specified. We finally present end-to-end attack scenarios that combine our attack techniques with common web application vulnerabilities, ultimately resulting in a complete compromise of the secure delegated access that OAuth 2.0 promises.


  • PellucidAttachment: Protecting Users From Attacks via E-Mail Attachments

    by Sevtap Duman, Matthias Bu¨chler, Manuel Egele, Engin Kirda

    Malicious email attachments are a common and successful attack vector on today's Internet. Sophisticated at- tackers can craft highly-targeted attachments, using publicly available information about potential victims to create convincing documents that contain hidden malicious payloads. Users who open these attachments using vulnerable applications are at a high risk of infection. Unfortunately, current mitigations are unreliable, relying either on fallible malware detection techniques or user education. In this work, we propose adopting a default policy of isolated attachment rendering. Emails bearing attachments are transpar- ently rewritten (in a sandboxed virtual machine environment) to contain static renderings of the attachments. Users who wish to obtain the original attachment are explicitly warned of the dan- gers of doing so – akin to TLS warnings as used in web browsers before being allowed to access the requested documents. We implement this technique in a system we call PellucidAttachment. We further report on an extensive user study that measures the usability and effectiveness of PellucidAttachment in shielding users from attacks. Our evaluation shows that adopting email attachment security indicators and an isolation-by-default policy results in a significant increase in user security, while maintaining the usability of email attachments.


  • Open Access

    A Recent Year On the Internet: Measuring and Understanding the Threats to Everyday Internet Devices

    by Afsah Anwar, Yi Hui Chen, Roy Hodgman, Tom Sellers, Engin Kirda, Alina Oprea

    An effective way to improve resilience to cyber attacks is to measure and understand the adversary’s capabilities. Gaining insights into the threats we are exposed to helps us build better defenses, share findings with practitioners, and identify the perpetrators to limit their impact. Honeypot interactions have been widely studied in the past to measure cyber attacks, but the focus of more recent honeypot studies has been on IoT-based threats. Hence, classic threats studied by honeypots in depth a decade ago, such as desktop malware and web threats, have lately received much less attention. In this paper, we perform a measurement study on a large-scale honeypot data collected between July 2020 and June 2021 by a large cybersecurity company. We measure a set of 7 billion connections to extract 806 million alerts raised by 662 endpoints (honeypots) distributed globally. For this study, we create a framework that leverages Open Source Cyber Threat Intelligence (OSCTI) to generate high-level attack classification and malware campaign inferences. One of the main findings of our work is that some networks involved in rogue activities that were reported in literature more than a decade ago [59] are still involved in malicious activity. Also, we find that 17 vulnerabilities disclosed more than a decade ago, even as early as 1999, are still used to launch cyber attacks. At the same time, the threat landscape has evolved. We discover that a large fraction of recent campaigns (63.4%) are Stealers or Keyloggers, new attack vectors such as the SMB EternalBlue vulnerability enable rapid self-propagation of malware across the globe, and infection strategies are shared among multiple campaigns (e.g., 10K alerts for Gafgyt, Trickbot, Freakout, and Hajime utilize the infection strategy of Mirai or muBot).


  • Open Access

    Who’s Controlling My Device? Multi-User Multi-Device-Aware Access Control System for Shared Smart Home Environment

    by Amit Kumar Sikder, Leonardo Babun, Z. Berkay Celik, Hidayet Aksu, Patrick McDaniel, Engin Kirda, A. Selcuk Uluagac

    Multiple users have access to multiple devices in a smart home system – typically through a dedicated app installed on a mobile device. Traditional access control mechanisms consider one unique, trusted user that controls access to the devices. However, multi-user multi-device smart home settings pose fundamentally different challenges to traditional single-user systems. For instance, in a multi-user environment, users have conflicting, complex, and dynamically-changing demands on multiple devices that cannot be handled by traditional access control techniques. Moreover, smart devices from different platforms/vendors can share the same home environment, making existing access control obsolete for smart home systems. To address these challenges, in this paper, we introduce Kratos+ , a novel multi-user and multi-device-aware access control mechanism that allows smart home users to flexibly specify their access control demands. Kratos+ has four main components: user interaction module, backend server, policy manager, and policy execution module. Users can easily specify their desired access control settings using the interaction module that are translated into access control policies in the back-end server. The policy manager analyzes these policies, initiates automated negotiation between users to resolve conflicting demands, and generates final policies to enforce in smart home systems. We implemented Kratos+ as a platform-independent solution and evaluated its performance on real smart home deployments featuring multi-user scenarios with a rich set of configurations (337 different policies including 231 demand conflicts and 69 restriction policies). These configurations also included five different threats associated with access control mechanisms. Our extensive evaluations show that Kratos+ is very effective in resolving conflicting access control demands with minimal overhead. We also performed an extensive user study with 72 smart home users to better understand the user’s needs before designing the system and a usability study to evaluate the efficacy of Kratos+ in a real-life smart home environment.