Boyan Ding
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Boyan Ding has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Songwu Lu
Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, USA
3 shared publications - Zhaowei Tan
University of California, Riverside, Riverside, California, USA
3 shared publications - Jinghao Zhao
Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, USA
2 shared publications - Jun Liu
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
2 shared publications - Tao Wang
Computer Science and Engineering, University of North Texas
2 shared publications - Xiaoguang Li
State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks, School of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University, Xian, China
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-15
Sign-to-911: Emergency Call Service for Sign Language Users with Assistive AR Glasses
- 2 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-15
Open AccessSign-to-911: Emergency Call Service for Sign Language Users with Assistive AR Glasses
- Open Access
- 29 November 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks
- Vol. 18 (4) , 1-26
Breaking Cellular IoT with Forged Data-plane Signaling: Attacks and Countermeasure
We devise new attacks exploiting the unprotected data-plane signaling in cellular IoT networks (a.k.a. both NB-IoT and Cat-M). We show that, despite the deployed security mechanisms on both control-plane signaling and data-plane packet forwarding, novel data-plane signaling attacks are still feasible. The attacker can forge both uplink and downlink data-plane signaling messages that pass the current security checks used by the receiver. With the capability of forging messages, the attacker can launch attacks that exhibit a variety of attack forms beyond simplistic packet-blasting, denial-of-service (DoS) threats, including location privacy breach, packet delivery loop, prolonged data delivery, throughput limiting, radio resource draining, connection reset, and multicast disabling. Our testbed evaluation and operational network validation have confirmed the attack viability. To combat the threat, we further propose a new defense solution within the 3GPP C-IoT standard framework. It leverages the synchronized timer clock information to protect the data-plane signaling messages with low overhead.
- 29 November 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks
- Vol. 18 (4) , 1-26
Open AccessBreaking Cellular IoT with Forged Data-plane Signaling: Attacks and Countermeasure
We devise new attacks exploiting the unprotected data-plane signaling in cellular IoT networks (a.k.a. both NB-IoT and Cat-M). We show that, despite the deployed security mechanisms on both control-plane signaling and data-plane packet forwarding, novel data-plane signaling attacks are still feasible. The attacker can forge both uplink and downlink data-plane signaling messages that pass the current security checks used by the receiver. With the capability of forging messages, the attacker can launch attacks that exhibit a variety of attack forms beyond simplistic packet-blasting, denial-of-service (DoS) threats, including location privacy breach, packet delivery loop, prolonged data delivery, throughput limiting, radio resource draining, connection reset, and multicast disabling. Our testbed evaluation and operational network validation have confirmed the attack viability. To combat the threat, we further propose a new defense solution within the 3GPP C-IoT standard framework. It leverages the synchronized timer clock information to protect the data-plane signaling messages with low overhead.
- 23 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in World Wide Web
- Vol. 23 (2) , 1011-1034
A SDR-based verification platform for 802.11 PHY layer security authentication
- 23 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in World Wide Web
- Vol. 23 (2) , 1011-1034
A SDR-based verification platform for 802.11 PHY layer security authentication
- Open Access
- 4 October 2017
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 101-113
The Tick Programmable Low-Latency SDR System
- 4 October 2017
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 101-113
Open AccessThe Tick Programmable Low-Latency SDR System