AKAnum Khurshid

Anum Khurshid

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Anum Khurshid has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Methods for Requirements Engineering, Verification, Security, Safety, and Robustness in AIoT Systems

    by Marcelo Pasin, Jämes Ménétrey, Pascal Felber, Valerio Schiavoni, Hans-Martin Heyn, Eric Knauss, Anum Khurshid, Shahid Raza

    This chapter presents methods for requirements engineering, verification, security, safety, and robustness with a special focus on AIoT systems. It covers an architectural framework dealing with requirements engineering aspects of distributed AIoT systems, covering several clusters of concern dealing with the context description of the system, learning environment of the deep-learning components, communication concerns, and a set of quality concerns, such as ethical aspects, safety, power, security, and privacy aspects. Each cluster contains a set of architectural views sorted into different levels of abstraction. In addition, it introduces WebAssembly as an interoperable environment that would run seamlessly across hardware devices and software stacks while achieving good performance and a high level of security as a critical requirement when processing data off-premises. To address security aspects in AIoT systems, remote attestation and certification mechanisms are 198introduced to provide a TOCTOU (time-of-check to time-of-use) secure way of ensuring the system's integrity.

  • Open Access

    EU Cybersecurity Act and IoT Certification: Landscape, Perspective and a Proposed Template Scheme

    by Anum Khurshid, Reem Alsaaidi, Mudassar Aslam, Shahid Raza

    The vulnerabilities in deployed IoT devices are a threat to critical infrastructure and user privacy. There is ample ongoing research and efforts to produce devices that are secure-by-design. However, these efforts are still far from translation into actual deployments. To address this, worldwide efforts towards IoT device and software certification have accelerated as a potential solution, including UK’s IoT assurance program, EU Cybersecurity Act and the US executive order 14028. In EU, the Cybersecurity Act was launched in 2019 which initiated the European cybersecurity certification framework for Internet and Communications Technology (ICT). The heterogeneity of the IoT landscape with devices ranging from industrial to consumer, makes it challenging to incorporate IoT devices in the certification framework or introduce a European cybersecurity certification scheme solely for IoT. This paper analyses the cybersecurity certification prospects for IoT devices and also places article 54 of the EU Cybersecurity Act in an international perspective. We conducted a comparative study of existing IoT certification schemes to identify potential gaps and extract requirements of a candidate IoT device security certification scheme. We also propose an approach that can be used as a template to instantiate an EU cybersecurity certification scheme for IoT devices. In the proposed template, we identify IoT-critical elements from the article 54 of the Cybersecurity Act. We also evaluate the proposed template using the ENISA qualification system for cybersecurity certification schemes and show its qualification on all criteria.


  • Attestation Mechanisms for Trusted Execution Environments Demystified

    by Jämes Ménétrey, Christian Göttel, Anum Khurshid, Marcelo Pasin, Pascal Felber, Valerio Schiavoni, Shahid Raza


  • Open Access

    TEE-Watchdog: Mitigating Unauthorized Activities within Trusted Execution Environments in ARM-Based Low-Power IoT Devices

    by Anum Khurshid, Sileshi Demesie Yalew, Mudassar Aslam, Shahid Raza

    Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are on the rise in devices all around us ranging from large-scale cloud-based solutions to resource-constrained embedded devices. With the introduction of ARM TrustZone-M, hardware-assisted trusted execution is now supported in IoT nodes. TrustZone-M provides isolated execution of security-critical operations and sensitive data-generating peripherals. However, TrustZone-M, like all other TEEs, does not provide a mechanism to monitor operations in the trusted areas of the device and software in the secure areas of an IoT device has access to the entire secure and nonsecure software stack. This is crucial due to the diversity of device manufacturers and component suppliers in the market, which manifests trust issues, especially when third-party peripherals are incorporated into a TEE. Compromised TEEs can be misused for industrial espionage, data exfiltration through system backdoors, and illegal data sharing. It is of utmost importance here that system peripheral behaviour in terms of resource access is in accordance with their intended usage that is specified during integration. We propose TEE-Watchdog, a lightweight framework that establishes MPU protections for secure system peripherals in TrustZone-enabled low-end IoT devices. TEE-Watchdog ensures blocking unauthorized peripheral accesses and logging of application misbehaviour running in the TEE based on a manifest file. We define lightweight specifications and structure for the application manifest file enlisting permissions for critical system peripherals using concise binary object representation (CBOR). We implement and evaluate TEE-Watchdog using a Musca-A2 test chipboard. Our microbenchmark evaluations on CPU time and RAM usage demonstrated the practicality of TEE-Watchdog. Securing the system peripherals using TEE-Watchdog protections induced a 1.4% overhead on the latency of peripheral accesses, which was 61 microseconds on our test board. Our optimized CBOR-encoded manifest file template also showed a decrease in manifest file size by 40% as compared to the standard file formats, e.g., JSON.


  • Open Access

    ShieLD: Shielding Cross-Zone Communication Within Limited-Resourced IoT Devices Running Vulnerable Software Stack

    by Anum Khurshid, Sileshi Demesie Yalew, Mudassar Aslam, Shahid Raza

    Securing IoT devices is gaining attention as the security risks associated with these devices increase rapidly. TrustZone-M, a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for Cortex-M processors, ensures stronger security within an IoT device by allowing isolated execution of security-critical operations, without trusting the entire software stack. However, TrustZone-M does not guarantee secure cross-world communication between applications in the Normal and Secure worlds. The cryptographic protection of the communication channel is an obvious solution; however, within a low-power IoT device, it incurs high overhead if applied to each cross-world message exchange. We present ShieLD, a framework that enables a secure communication channel between the two TrustZone-M worlds by leveraging the Memory Protection Unit (MPU). ShieLD guarantees confidentiality, integrity and authentication services without requiring any cryptographic operations. We implement and evaluate ShieLD using a Musca-A test chip board with Cortex-M33 that supports TrustZone-M. Our empirical evaluation shows, among other gains, the cross-zone communication protected with ShieLD is 5 times faster than the conventional crypto-based communication.